COMMENTS AND VIEWS OF THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION ON H.R. 8929

(NCTA transit development program, bobtailed version)

This Commission has previously expressed its views on the original proposed transportation plan of the National Capital Transportation Agency (NCTA), in both a formal report and in testimony before the Congress. The Commission, by majority vote, voices the same objections to the bobtailed version of the original plan because the new version is a forerunner of, and apparently was submitted in anticipation of the eventual expansion to, the originally planned full system. However, if the assumption is made that the bobtailed version will constitute the ultimate rail system for the region, the major objection to the original plan has been aggravated even more by the new proposal. The transfer requirement has been multiplied manifold under the modified plan. From a patronage standpoint, it would not be used; from an investment point of view, it would be disastrous.

Chairman Whitener of Subcommittee No. 6 of the Committee on the District of Columbia is to be commended for having suggested that the NCTA present a new and more practical transportation plan for the region. However, as noted above, the desired result has not been achieved.

Indeed, if the bobtailed version is approved and constructed, it will be so unattractive from a passenger-convenience standpoint and consequently, so economically unsound, that the resulting exigencies will demand almost immediate completion of the original proposed system in order to salvage something from the tremendous investment. Because of the major fallacies of the original proposed rail system a smaller part of that same system should not be allowed to be constructed, even at a proportionately lower cost, for the purpose of establishing a lever to bring into existence the original plan. The only attractive feature of the new proposal may be compared to installment buying the downpayment (one-half of the cost) is made attractively low in order to sell an otherwise unsalable commodity. Once the downpayment is made the "point of no return" will have passed and no other result can be reached.

In addition to the above observations, the Commission submits for consideration the following views and comments in regard to the bobtailed version:

(1) The bobtailed version does not represent a practical and generally recognized approach to rail transit development. Based on experience gained from rail operations in other large metropolitan areas, minimum criteria have been established as guidelines for the introduction of rail transit as a means of mass transit. Generally, before rail transit can be justified it must be determined that a given number of people will patronize a single line during the maximum peak period. The patronage should approximate 20,000 to 30,000 passengers per hour during the peak period over an individual line. In order to meet the criterion with regard to passenger volume, a rail line must extend out a minimum number of miles from the business district and tap the origins and destinations of the great majority of people for whom the service is provided. Without exception, none of the rail lines proposed under the bobtailed version come close to meeting the minimum criteria.

Rail transit development in other cities, with few exceptions, has proceeded in stages. Generally, one line is constructed to provide a complete service for the people living within a given area or corridor. When rail transit is being introduced for the first time, the most densely populated area or corridor should be chosen and the line extended out far enough to attract sufficient passenger volume. By developing rail transit in stages, one is able to gain experience in connection with construction costs, operating costs, transit usage, and other facets of the operations, and this valuable experience can be used in constructing the second and subsequent stages. This experience is particularly important in an area where rail transit is being introduced for the first time. If the most favorable and densely populated area cannot support rail transit, then areas less densely populated obviously could not be expected to support such a line.

For instance, the Toronto Transit Commission is presently in the third stage of rail transit development. In 1954 the Yonge Street subway line, approximately 5 miles in length, was completed. After gaining valuable experience the University Avenue subway line, approximately 2 miles in length, was added, forming a loop with the Yonge Street line. This line was completed in early 1963. The third stage, now underway and scheduled for completion in 1967, is the Bloor-Danforth subway line, which when tied in with the University line, will consist of approximately 10 miles additional subway extending east and west across town. In Washington where there exists so much uncertainty as to whether the public will patronize rail transit, it would be unwise to attempt an areawide approach to rail transit development from the outset. The proposal to commence the construction of several short lines radiating out from the central core as opposed to the development of individual lines, one at a time in stages, would appear to be contrary to normal rail transit develop

ment.

(2) In using the bobtailed version many more people would be required to transfer than called for under the original proposed system.

One of the major objections to the original system as proposed by NCTA was the requirement, inherent in the system, that a great majority of passengers would have to transfer in traveling from origin to destination; at least one-half of the passengers would have to transfer at least twice. Under the bobtailed version, this deficiency is magnified tremendously as only a handful of people would be offered through service from origin to destination. No rail system can be reasonably expected to meet the minimum criterion with respect to passenger volume if the great majority of passengers are required to transfer at both ends of the line. The need for through service, with minimum transfer requirements, is one of the very bases for individual line construction thereby providing a complete service within itself to the greatest extent possible. From both a practical and economical standpoint, and assuming that a rail subway system will be constructed in any event to solve the downtown circulation problem, it would be much wiser to construct a much larger downtown subway system circling the central business district than to construct a small subway system through town to be joined by several short rail lines radiating out from the subway. Such a circular subway system could be tied in with the existing bus service thereby making it necessary

to transfer only once for the great majority of people. The larger subway system would provide rail transportation to within short walking distances of the various places of business and employment, eliminating the need for transfer after departing the subway. The buslines could pick up the passengers as they are doing now at the doorsteps and deliver them directly to the larger subway system. This is not a recommendation, but is merely pointed out to show the lack of proper planning in devising a rail system to be confined primarily to the District of Columbia.

(3) The traffic between the District of Columbia and Virginia will not justify rail transit in the foreseeable future.

The unequivocal facts clearly show that the number of person-trips will not justify rail transit between the District of Columbia and Virginia in the foreseeable future. A thorough traffic check, conducted on May 15, 1963, shows that during the peak hour between 7:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., 42,923 persons moved, by all modes of travel, from the Virginia side of the Potomac River across the six bridgesWoodrow Wilson, Key, Memorial, Cabin John, Highway, and Chain. On the assumption that by 1980 the traffic will increase by 50 percent to 60,000, what will the picture be then? The Capital Beltway is scheduled for completion in 1964, and in contemplation that the current highway program, including the inner loop, will be completed long prior to 1980, a conservative estimate is that at least 50 percent of the people crossing the Potomac River from Virginia will not be destined to the downtown central business district. On this assumption we are still estimating that in 1980 approximately 30,000 people will cross the six bridges destined to the central core of the downtown area. Assuming further that 60 percent of all the people destined to the downtown area will use public transportation, we are confronted with a total of only 18,000 people moving from Virginia across the six bridges to the downtown area. Thus, if all 18,000 people could be channeled into a single corridor and accommodated by a single rail line, we could perhaps justify the construction of such a line, but when one considers the extensive area of northern Virginia and the low density of population and with the many access routes across the Potomac, with more to come in the future, it is obvious that such a favorable situation will not develop. But even assuming that the traffic would justify a rail line in 1980, which it will clearly not do, it is much too early to plan for such a line.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Regardless of what the future may hold for rail transit in the Washington area, the Commission recommends that the proposed rail lines to northern Virginia be abandoned at this time.

(2) Earlier, in commenting on the original transportation plan, this Commission recommended, as a first stage rail transit development, that the existing facilities of the B. & O. Railroad between Rockville and the Union Station be reactivated along the most modern lines, supplemented by an excellent feeder bus service. This Commission felt, and continues to feel, that such an operation would provide valuable experience in future rail transit development for the region. In the first place, such an experiment would answer the No. 1 concern as to whether or not the people would make the necessary transfers

in using rail transportation. Second, valuable experience could be gained in regard to construction costs, costs of operations, and transit usage in general. One of the major objections to the Commission's proposal was that in the absence of a tie-in with a downtown subway system, such an operation would not provide a complete service within and of itself. This objection overlooks one of the primary purposes of the Commission's proposal; namely, to test whether or not a large number of people would be willing to make the necessary transfers at both ends of the line in using the proposed system. As the Commission pointed out, under the original NCTA proposal a great many people will have to make transfers at both ends of the line. The Commission continues to be of the opinion that the public will not patronize a transit system wherein multiple transfers are involved. However, as stated earlier, in our views and comments, we feel that because of the strong feeling that a rail system is justified, a reasonable approach should be taken to determine once and for all whether a rail system is the answer.

Under NCTA's bobtailed version, it is still contemplated that the B. & O. Railroad right-of-way be utilized between Union Station and Woodside, Md. We renew our original recommendation that the existing facilities of the B. & O. Railroad between Union Station and Rockville, Md., be activated immediately (with emphasis on mass transit service) and completely modernized with all the features advocated by the NCTA. In order to overcome the one objection to our original proposal, we now recommend that the Rockville-Union Station line be tied in with a subway extending from Union Station to the vicinity of the Capitol and Senate and House Office Buildings, thence across the business district to the vicinity of the White House.

Undoubtedly, some rail advocates, in desperation, will argue that the passenger volume on a single rail line will not adequately support, and will not justify the construction of, an expensive subway across town. This argument loses sight of the very basis for the Commission's proposal. The ultimate result--whether rail transit is practical and feasible-will be measured in terms of passenger volume and not in terms of subway construction costs. If subway construction costs are to be considered a factor in determining whether the proposed "rail experiment" passes the test, then only a portion of such costs should be allocated to the project. The important point is that if a rail line, constructed to serve a corridor with the area's highest population density, does not attract an adequate passenger volume, even though tied in with a very expensive subway system, it would be foolhardy to pursue such an imprudent course. The construction of additional lines in less favorable areas, instead of improving the transit picture, would add to the deficits, create chaotic conditions, and delay by several years the solution to the mass transit problem.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) The NCTA's bobtailed version of its original plan should be rejected.

(2) This Commission's proposal will constitute the first stage of the rail transit development program for the region.