Downtown Connecticut Avenue has achieved a distinguished and distinctive international reputation as an outstanding shopping area comparable to the Rue de La Paix, in Paris, and Fifth Avenue, in New York City. Many visitors in the Nation's Capital include the avenue in their itineraries when they are here. In addition, thousands of shoppers from all parts of the Metropolitan Washington area come regularly to the avenue to do business. Mr. Chairman, in my own case, 40 percent of my customers reside in the suburbs. Some of the establishments on and in the vicinity of downtown Connecticut Avenue have been continuously in business for the past 25 years and longer.

During the past few years traffic congestion along downtown Connecticut Avenue has developed into an extremely serious problem even during nonrush hours. We of the Connecticut Avenue Association are apprehensive that traffic and parking problems in our area will substantially worsen. As more new high-rise buildings are constructed in this section of the city, and in other sections to which Connecticut Avenue and adjacent streets provide through access, the problems are bound to become more acute. As these changes continue there will be relatively fewer parking facilities per number of people who work in the area. Traffic congestion is sure to increase as more people drive into the area and compete for what parking facilities are available each day.

In 1955, the Connecticut Avenue Association, in order to cope with an everworsening traffic situation resulting from the business boom in the area, inaugurated a shoppers' courtesy parking plan. This plan provided fairly adequate parking to our customers for a time. Now, however, these facilities fail to provide adequate parking in the downtown Connecticut Avenue area.

In fact, within the last 3 months, two major parking facilities which had accepted Connecticut Avenue Association shopper courtesy parking tickets have abandoned this plan because their facilities are crowded to capacity by all-day parkers. There is prospect that the the months ahead other facilities will be closed to shoppers' use for the same reason, as additional office buildings are completed and opened in the vicinity.

During the last 5 years, parking rates in our area have doubled. Motorists do not desire to pay these high parking costs. Yet they are essentially a captive audience for we have not given them an attractive public transportation system as an alternative. I don't mean to imply that these parking rates are unreasonable. When the land costs run to $6,000 per parking space competitive private enterprise has no choice but to charge accordingly.

We who operate retail and service establishments along Connecticut Avenue have reasons to be convinced that our very business life in this area depends upon a solution to our traffic problems. Enlargement and expansion of highways from suburban into downtown sections of a metropolitan city such as Washington is not the solution to traffic and parking problems. If anything, freeways bringing more cars into a section only increase the difficulties. In addition to the costs of highway construction and mounting yearly maintenance, there is the withdrawal of huge taxable land areas as pavement devours private property. This assertion is attested by the experiences of such great communities as Los Angeles and Chicago where expansion of the highway system has not solved problems of traffic congestion and has resulted in a sharp decline in land values in the downtown areas over the years.

Retail and service establishments such as do business and are members of the Connecticut Avenue Association are a vital necessity in an area dominated by large office buildings, hotels, and apartments. Yet such businesses can survive only if there is access to them from all parts of the city as well as from the immediate vicinity. This access will be enhanced, and the chance of business survival bettered, we believe, if there is provided a vastly improved mass transportation system to help solve present problems of traffic congestion and parking. We believe that the rapid rail system proposed by the President is a direct solution to the traffic problem of the District of Columbia. We who are in business in the vicinity of downtown Connecticut Avenue are especially interested in this proposal because it touches us intimately. An initial part of the project would be the construction of a subway under or near Connecticut Avenue, with access thereto at various points along this thoroughfare.

Such a subway would provide ready access to our shops for many customers, including old friends who now shop elsewhere because of the traffic problem. Indeed, a 5-minute ride on the subway would permit you people on Capitol Hill to take advantage of the wide variety of services provided by our members. Mr. Chairman, I cannot urge too strongly that your committee approve the bills before you, which embody the rail transit system proposed by NCTA and the President. The lifeblood of commerce of this city depends upon it.

If such requirements are sought to be imposed on an operating association composed of motorbus companies, it may well become the hard core of their opposition to joint operation of the rapid transit system. But with the rapid transit system fully complete, with rails, signaling equipment, power transmission facilities, and other capital requirements in place and ready for operation, being offered for lease with no requirement for amortizing any capital costs other than those of the rolling stock, with provision for its housing and unkeep and replacement, this opposition should quickly vanish.

Under this proposed setup each member company of the association would share the costs and profits of the rapid transit operation in proportion to its participation in the rail service. They would not lose but gain patronage. Their bus operations would benefit in proportion to their feed-ins to the rapid transit, with the best service producing the most revenue.

The rapid transit rolling stock alloted each transit company might carry the individual company's insignia and colors and be operated by the company's own employees. This would be a private enterprise operation on a competitive basis but with overtones of cooperation. The association would not be a consolidation or merger, but an operator of jointly leased rail facilities through the pooled resources of its member companies.

Each member company would be represented on the board of directors of the association. The public interest, too, because of the public's investments, would be safeguarded by representation on the board by the local and Federal Governments. The representative of the Federal interest should be, ex officio, chairman of the board.

A chief benefit that would accrue from the public investments would be through reduced fares to riders so that more riders would lessen need for added highway construction. The saving from this source alone would largely offset the original public investment. The intangible benefits would be beyond calculation. The association would come under the regulatory powers of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission which is composed of able men with a capable staff. The Commission would see that the earnings of the association and of its member companies would be adequate but not excessive. No regulatory difficulty would arise that could not be fairly adjudicated by the Commission. A serious study of this proposal and equally serious conferences and consultations looking to its adoption, by those who would be chiefly concerned, might well be a proper course to pursue.

Respectfully submitted as one man's opinion.

BAILEYS CROSSROADS, VA., July 19, 1963.

E. V. HAILMAN.

POTOMAC RIVER CROSSINGS FOR RAPID TRANSIT LINES FROM VIRGINIA Rail rapid transit lines from Virginia to connect with the Washington subway system must approach the Potomac River from either the north or south side of Arlington National Cemetery. This fact establishes two separate approaches to the river.

The plan of the National Capital Transportation Agency (NCTA) proposes two rail rapid transit lines from Virginia; (1) the Route 66-Rosslyn line and (2) the Springfield-Alexandria line. The Springfield-Alexandria line approaches the Potomac through Alexandria (south of the cemetery) and the Route 66-Rosslyn line approaches it through Rosslyn (north of the cemetery). However, it is proposed that they unite and use a single river crossing.

The line through Alexandria is to come to the Pentagon and swing around it toward the north onto the right-of-way of the abandoned Pennsylvania Railroad Rosslyn branch freight line and go into a tunnel that will curve eastward under the river just to the north of Memorial Bridge. It will then turn north under 21st Street to a station at State.

The line hrough Rosslyn is to curve south into the same disused freight line right-of-way and then curve eastward into the same tunnel under the river. United, the both reach the State station.

This subway line continues under 21st Street to swing eastward under Pennsylvania Avenue to 15th Street and thence under G Street.

This setup leaves the Federal Triangle and the entire southwest section of the city, including the whole complex of Federal offices along Independence Avenue, marooned from direct rapid transit access by all who use the SpringfieldAlexandria line. These riders, in order to reach this area, must go round Robin

cent of its funds by this time, and has only been able to obligate approximately 25 percent.

Has all this been necessary? Sadly enough, no. While appearing before this committee on July 18, 1963, C. Darwin Stolzenbach, Administrator of the National Capital Transportation Agency, was asked, "If each of the three projects (mentioned above) were built in the near future, what difference would it make in the program of the National Capital Transportation Agency?"

His answer was, "Practically none.

Then why did the NCTA refute the programs of the regional highway departments and the Bureau of Public Roads, programs that were based on years of experience, sound practice, and nationally accepted criteria?

The field of financing is one in which the Agency has been notoriously less than forthright. In print we have seen constant references to a $793 million rapid rail transit system which will be paid for out of the transit fare box. Yet not once did the NCTA candidly admit, until pinned down by this committee, that interest costs alone over the life of the bonds would add $800 million to the system's capital costs for a total of $1.6 billion.

The NCTA study seems to fly into the face of all practical experience, particularly that of the Toronto transit system, a combination bus feeder-downtown rail subway. Installed in 1954, it has declined in revenue passengers ever since-from 320 million in 1954 to 268 million in 1961.

Even more distressing is the Agency's use of 30,000 as the number of people who would be displaced in the District of Columbia highway plan. It conjures up a picture of 30,000 helpless people thrown out of their homes immediately by a heartless, faceless Government

agency.

Actually, the total displacement if the NCTA plan and the District of Columbia highway plan are both constructed, would be only 9,060 over a period of 10 years. Using the standard factor of 2.9 persons per dwelling unit, it would mean that each year there would be 312 homes displaced.

We do not intend to minimize what this means to the individual family but it should be borne in mind that the most recent District government forecast, covering fiscal years 1963-67, estimates an overall displacement of approximately 8,200 families for all governmental programs except highways, or approximately 1,600 families per

year.

We believe that the people have been deliberately misled into believing that the rail rapid transit system would do away with the need for any further highway building in the District. Gentlemen, this is totally inaccurate.

In conclusion, we urge this committee to use its influence to see that there is no further delay in the development of a good balanced transportation program which should include the Three Sisters Bridge, the Potomac River Freeway, and the completion of the inner loop.

Mr. DOWDY. Thank you.

(The complete statement of Mr. Miller follows:)

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR E. MILLER, CHAIRMAN, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ADVISORY BOARD, AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Arthur E. Miller. I am chairman of the District of Columbia Advisory Board, American Automobile Association. I am authorized by the District of Columbia Advisory Board, AAA, to present its views with reference to H.R. 6633 and H.R. 7249.

We are deeply concerned by the unjustified sabotaging of the highway program by the National Capital Transportation Agency report on the transportation needs of the National Capital region.

While we have no inherent opposition to a rapid transit rail system, we justifiably resent the attempt to present this one method as the only answer to the Capital's transportation problems.

In using this Madison Avenue advertising approach the proponents of the rapid transit rail system have succeeded in completely disrupting the highway construction program for the District of Columbia and the National Capital region and, in the process, have presented the worst example of urban transportation planning in the country.

It is our charge that the NCTA has played fast and loose with facts and figures relating to comparative costs, anticipated traffic and revenue, and that it has deliberately failed to comply with the specific mandate of Congress that it cooperate with interested Federal and regional agencies.

The NCTA also has injected an emotional factor into the picture by claiming that more than 30,000 persons would be displaced if the District of Columbia Highway Department's freeway-highway program is approved. This highly exaggerated estimate by the NCTA has misled some well-intentioned persons into urging delay in the highway program at this time. It is shameful that such a serious human and economic problem, in which we all are vitally interested, has been turned into a shabby political weapon.

Blithely, the NCTA has suppressed conclusion with which it is not in agreement, "evaluated" reports in fields in which it is not qualified, and ignored the judgment of numerous qualified experts.

Because of the NCTA recommendations, President Kennedy has called for a "reexamination of the highway program of the District of Columbia in the light of the transit development program, and the social, economic, and esthetic impact of highways on the Nation's Capital."

The result is the District of Columbia Highway Department has exhausted its backlog of design plans, except for a couple of contracts pending necessary construction phasing. And since most of the major remaining elements of the freeway system are now in the early study or restudy stage, it is not likely that many new design plans will be completed and ready for advertising within the next 2 years.

Further, the Bureau of Public Roads has recently informed the District of Columbia Highway Department that it cannot enter into a project agreement for the design work on the center leg of the inner loop nor on proposed interchange C until such time as there is agreement in the District as to the status of the Three Sisters Bridge, the north leg of the inner loop, and the Potomac River Freeway.

In short, we are approaching a complete breakdown in the area's highway construction program. It is further compounded by the fact that under the new date established by the Bureau of Public Roads for final reimbursement of Federal-aid interstate funds (October 1972) the District should have obligated approximately 50 percent of its funds by this time, and has only been able to obligate approximately 25 percent.

Has all this been necessary? Sadly enough, no. While appearing before this committee on July 18, 1963, C. Darwin Stolzenbach, Administrator of the National Capital Transportation Agency, was asked: "If each of the three projects (mentioned above) were built in the near future, what difference would it make in the program of the National Capital Transportation Agency?" His answer was: "Practically none."

Then why did the NCTA refute the programs of the regional highway departments, and the Bureau of Public Roads. Programs that were based on years of experience, sound practice and nationally accepted criteria?

Actions such as these by the NCTA seriously undermine belief in the reliability of any of its statements. It seems to be its philosophy that any weaknesses in

its own program can be compensated for by attacking other groups, whether the attack is germane to the main issue or not.

The field of financing is one in which the Agency has been notoriously less than forthright. In print we have seen constant references to a $793 million rapid rail transit system which will be paid for out of the transit fare box. Yet not once did the NCTA candidly admit, until pinned down by this committee, that interest costs alone over the life of the bonds would add $800 million to the system's capital costs for a total of $1.6 billion.

Indeed, the implication of the NCTA report seemed to be that it could be financed by doing away with much of the inner loop highway, thereby forcing erstwhile drivers to turn to the rapid transit system. It would "reduce the pressure" for more freeway extensions into downtown areas was the way it was put by Deputy Director Elmer E. Staats of the Budget Bureau in his testimony. Nobody asked how the unseated driver would feel about this.

The field of faulty statistics seems to be the NCTA's strong suit. Its modal split study-which deals with the number of motorists and bus passengers who might be diverted to train travel-has been challenged by numerous authorities and precedents. The NCTA study seems to fly into the face of all practical experience, particularly that of the Toronto transit system, a combination bus feeder-downtown rail subway. Installed in 1954, it has declined in revenue passengers ever since-from 320 million in 1954 to 268 million in 1961.

Even more distressing is the Agency's use of 30,000 as the number of people who would be displaced in the District of Columbia highway plan. It conjures up a picture of 30,000 helpless people thrown out of their homes immediately by a heartless, faceless, Government agency.

Actually, the total displacement if the NCTA plan and the District of Columbia highway plan are both constructed, would be only 9,060 over a period of 10 years. Using the standard factor of 2.9 persons per dwelling unit, it would mean that each year there would be 312 homes displaced.

We do not intend to minimize what this means to the individual family but it should be borne in mind that the most recent District government forecast, covering fiscal years 1963-67 estimates an overall displacement of approximately 8,200 families for all governmental programs except highways, or approximately 1,600 families per year.

We believe that the people have been deliberately misled into believing that the rail rapid transit system would do away with the need for any further highway building in the District. Gentlemen, this is totally inaccurate.

In conclusion, we urge this committee to use its influence to see that there is no further delay in the development of a good balanced transportation program which should include the Three Sisters Bridge, the Potomac River Freeway, and the completion of the inner loop.

Mr. DowDY. The next witness is Mr. John M. Thornton, of the National Capital Voters Association.

I appreciate all of you hurrying, because we do want to hear everybody. We regret that the time is running out.

Your statement will be made a part of the record-if you will summarize it for us, please.

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. THORNTON, NATIONAL CAPITAL VOTERS ASSOCIATION

Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Chairman, my name in John M. Thornton. I am chairman of the National Capital Voters Association.

I won't read my statement. I just want to say a few words extemporaneously.

We have had several meetings with the staff of the National Transportation Agency in an effort to persuade them to put a leg of the line out in the far northeast area so that the more than 100,000 in that area could be served.

According to the figures we have received from the several agencies here in Washington, by 1970 the far northeast area will comprise about 200,000.