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It is gaining some momentum but in the meantime you will have to deal with energy problem, superport development, oil dumping, oil rigs and other things. We enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act to get the States moving. The President is on TV or radio every weekend saying, Let's get the government back to the people at home. The Coastal Zone Act is the way to do it, but its been stopped entirely and OMB has said, No, we are just not going to fund it at all.

Mr. TRAIN. I believe that some of the States are actually moving ahead with implementation under the coastal zone management legislation irrespective of the funding. I believe there are substantial benefits in the legislation for qualified States in such matters as insuring Federal program compatibility with State programs under the Coastal Zone Act. There are very real advantages in the legislation for going ahead.

Senator HOLLINGS. The Act provides for seed money of $9 million for 33 States, a very nominal amount. It is certainly not a budget concern. I see no fiscal dangers. This is no danger for States following a coastal zone road and then following land use if it is later dovetailed with it. We took this eventuality into consideration, in both the House and Senate, so that if and when a land use act is enacted by the Congress, it would dovetail with coastal zone. I cannot see the danger. Do you find some danger in proceeding with the coastal zone?

Mr. TRAIN. I do not think it is a matter of danger, Senator. I think it is a matter of simply trying to fund an overall program in a coherent fashion which takes into account the full program rather than what at the present time the Administration conceives as only a part of the program.

As I say, I am sure it is a matter that is continuing to be under review and

Senator HOLLINGS. How about reviewing it favorably first, will you. You could help us a lot over there since I am not sure I get through to the President. I have been trying to. I did get to Mr. Ehrlichman the other day. But that is the way the oceans program started we finally had to get to the President individually and it is tough.

I think this is one of his programs. This is a Nixon initiative, the oceans program which was part and parcel of the Stratton Commission, including coastal zone and ocean dumping. We had good momentum going and now we have ground to a halt just on account of the Interior boys. They say, No, we want it and we want funding, and yet they come up at environmentalists with glowing statements about how they are going to move forward in this area and protect the environment. But the very instrumentality the people through the Congress and the President have provided for is being negated. It does not make sense. You know what I mean.

Mr. TRAIN. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, we appreciate your appearance very much. I would like to see those studies of the sea grant college groups when they are completed. They will not be ready for a month, you do not think?

Before & aniter salty was ensiderat in his mal ss je inlowing crite

The ranges were wiented by picting the number of incidents within a velemtorí tange terms the naisetur eoniew magnitude of the age. The ranges vare ad uret mall their pict fielded a stright the in a being graph. (The reight line or hypericite fimetien world care a fir distribution of the fara and a wisely at wisetion of ranges). For presentation purposes the anges vere unded if to the nearest 50 long tons. The data are presented in Tanie 1

Anayeta of Off Oncfows Due to Tanker Accidents- Note by the U.S.A. to he facerzavernmental Maritime Consultative Organization." November 1972. U.S. Coast Gazt and, anker and the Bealogy." Porricali, et £. Transactions, Vol. 79, 1971, The Soetery 9o Ñarai Ateniteers and Marine Engineers.

The data illustrate that the majority of the incidents (188 or 85.84%) are less than 500 long tons and contribute only 17.04 of the total pollution; whereas in a higher range (3001-14000 tons) the 8 incidents constitute 3.65 of the total incidents but 37.74 of the total pollution.

The frequency of occurrence for a spill within one of the ranges is a direct function of the number of such incidents which occurred during the 1969-1970 sampling period. The detailed two-year spill data base was further compared to data compiled by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the Secretariat General a la Marine Marchande of the Ministere des Transports, France, for the period 1960-1970. While these data were not detailed enough to incorporate in the data base, they clearly reaffirmed the 1969-1970 data; and it therefore can be said that the two-year period is representative of a ten-year period. By extrapolating these figures by statistical inference to a 20year period, all data are presented as spills of a given range occurring within a number of ship years.

The midpoint of the 1969-1970 sampling period represented 12,206 ship years of tanker traffic.2 Thus, the expected time for an incident within a given magnitude range to occur can be computed directly from the data.

Ship years can be converted to calendar years for any given entry location by knowing: (1) the number of tankers transiting its coastal, entrance way, and harbor (CEH) zones and (2) the average number of days that tankers require to make any CEH zone transit. This also requires the knowledge of the average number of days per year that all tankers spend in CEH zone transits. This number is relatively simple to compute once one knows:

The average number of round trips that tankers make each year; and

The average number of days that a tanker spends in transit upon arrival or exit from a port.

In the 1969-1970 period there were 6,103 tankers, according to Lloyd's Register of Shipping, with 497 of these tankers greater than 80,000 deadweight tons. Assuming that each vessel on the average spends 2 days on each end of a round trip in CEH zone transit, one can equate the following:

A tanker is in the CEH transit mode 39 days per year; or,
39 days per year equals one ship year of tanker transits.

The projected spill estimations in terms of magnitude and frequency are plotted for each port facility alternative on a log-log scale as the number of incidents within one of the given outflow ranges versus ship years of operations.

An analysis was conducted comparing polluting incident frequency and attendant oil outflow magnitudes. In conducting this analysis tankers were broken into two general deadweight categories, namely:

Those less than 80,000 deadweight tons; and

Those 80,000 deadweight tons and greater.

The intent here was to show whether a relationship does in fact exist between tanker polluting incidents and tanker size. Table 2 depicts the results of this analysis.

These data say that in consideration of the frequency of all types of casulaties, as a function of number of tankers, the larger vessels, as presently operating, have a higher probability of being involved. They also say that oil outflow magnitudes are independent of tanker size. One must point out that the data does not contain a single catastrophic accident with a loaded tanker greater than 80,000 deadweight tons. One such incident would seriously alter that result.

It should also be noted that the case with tanker explosions discounted significantly changes the results. Here, frequency probabilities are also independ ent of tanker size; i.e., the incident rate is the same for both large and small tankers. It is interesting to note the marked drop in oil outflow magnitudes with an increase in size. Again, however, the cautionary remark concerning the effect of one large laden tanker's involvement in a catastrophic incident will apply.

Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Statistical Tables, 1969 and 1970.

1 Tankers 80,000 dwt and greater had 21 poliuting inciments including 5 explosions during the 1965-70 reporting period with an associated oil outtion of 25,465 long tons Tankers less than 8,000 ow: nat 245 polluting incidents, including 10 explosions, during the same reporting period with an associated of outfion of 403 254 long tons

The reason the data have been presented with explosions segregated is to show their effect on the supertanker frequency and magnitude oil spill spectrum and how the case may be made either way for or against supertankers as has been done in the past. It is also noteworthy that primary explosions occur in two modes of tanker operation:

While the tanker is in ballast and probably tank cleaning at sea: and, While transferring cargo and more often during the unloading phase. Another approach compared incident frequency and outflow to the total amount of deadweight tons in the two categories above and below 80,000 tons deadweight. Due to the greater proportion of deadweight (30.7%) in the supertanker category as opposed to the actual number of vessels (6.04%) the results are significantly altered; ie, the supertankers shows smaller oil outflows in proportion to its representative deadweight.

The baseline port facility alternatives can then be modified for:
Improved tanker construction technology, i.e. double bottoms;
Implementation of traffic control; and,

The use of an offshore terminal.

Data showing the effectiveness of any of these three modifications are either sparse or non-existent. However, reasonable estimates can be made for them; the effectiveness of double bottoms in terms of grounding protection was estimated to be 75 percent; the effectiveness of a traffic control system was esti mated to reduce all grounding and collision polluting incidents which could occur in harbors and harbor entranceways by 50%; the effectiveness of an offshore terminal has been qualitatively taken to reduce in two cases, 40 and 90 percent of all casualties which would occur within the harbors and entranceways-40 percent for a deep water terminal but not necessarily far offshore or out of the heavy traffic density, 90 percent for a true deep water offshore terminal without the traffic density and proximity of the shoreline.

Double-bottom construction is just what it sounds like. It uses an outer wall for the hull structure of a vessel and an inner wall for the structure of the oil

storage tanks. The resulting space between the two provides additional insurance against oil spillage because it permits damage to the outer hull without necessarily affecting the oil storage systems. In this analysis, we assume a double bottom height on the order of 0.08 percent of the tanker's molded beam and a segregated ballast capacity sufficient to attain 45 percent of the tanker's full load displacement.

Various sources have placed the effectiveness of double bottoms in terms of grounding protection between 61 and 92 percent. A grounding study conducted by the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Maritime Safety Committee on Ship Design and Equipment stated that effectiveness is on the order of 73 percent.3 In this study, an effectiveness of 75 percent is used.

Traffic controls in this analysis are defined as mandatory, radar-guided, computer assisted systems for positive control and coordination of shipping movements at superport facility locations. The effectiveness of such a traffic control system is estimated to reduce by 50 percent all groundings and collisions which cause oil spills and which could occur in harbors and harbor entranceways. This figure is considered more qualitative than quantitative because no real data exists on a maritime traffic control system. Some data do exist regarding traffic separation routes, which are strictly advisory and not fully comparable to positive traffic control systems. For example, the average accident rate in the Straits of Dover for the 3 years after traffic routing was established improved by 21 percent over the 4 years prior to routing, despite an increase in traffic and despite the fact that only 75 percent of the vessels transiting the Straits of Dover comply with the routes.4 Harbor advisory systems such as the one in Teesport,5 have also shown considerably lower accident rates. In the port of Rotterdam, where more ship tonnage is handled than in any other port in the world, there has not been a single major accident since a harbor control system was instituted several years ago. Thus, the 50 percent effectiveness value used here for traffic control systems, though unquantified, is considered minimal.

The location of a superport can greatly affect the probability of casualties and consequently the magnitude of oil spills. One of the key variables is distance from shore. As distance increases, traffic congestion and therefore casulaties from collisions are reduced. Far offshore facilities are also in deeper water-reducing the probabilities of groundings. The effectiveness in terms of reduced vessel casulaties is not readily quantifiable. However, a detailed casualty analysis by the Coast Guard indicated that approximately 40 of the polluting incidents occur within harbors and entranceways. Of the incidents occurring within harbors and entranceways, approximately 80% are due to collisions and groundings. Two values of effectiveness are used. For offshore locations between 5 and 15 miles from shore, but still exposed to shallow water and to coastal traffic, a 40% reduction of collisions and grounding is assumed. If the site is far offshore, beyond 15 miles, a 90 reduction is estimated.

It is important to realize the limitations of the results; especially when one considers the absence of quantitative data regarding the effectiveness of double bottom, traffic control systems, etc., and perhaps more important the sensitivity of the results to the assigned values of effectiveness. A sensitivity analysis was conducted by varying the value of the effectiveness of the three parameters by 10 percent. The effect of varying this value by 10 percent can change the quantity of oil outflow from 0.1 to a maximum of 10 percent. This same 10 percent variation will alter the frequency of occurrence from 1 to a maximum of 10 percent. These results say that the oil outflow magnitude-frequency spectrum will vary in direct proportion with the effectiveness of the super-imposed parameters.

D. M. Bovet, "Grounding: A Brief Analysis," U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Research and Development, December 1970.

J. M. Beattle, "Safer, Saner Seaways," U.S. Naval Institution proceedings, December 1970.

"Improving Safety of Navigation in the Oil Ports," Europe and Oil, Ferranti Ltd., May 1970.