how far the general conduct of men will be influenced by the belief of that doctrine. To thefe confiderations we fhall fubjoin the fubftance of Dr. Prieftley's reply. We choofe this fubject, both because we particularly attended to it, when we gave an account of Dr. Prieftley's original work;[See M. REV. vel. lviii. May 1778, page 361.] and likewife because, if Dr. P. has fucceeded in his new illuftration of it, he has cleared up what has always appeared to us one of the most difficult parts of his doctrine, as applied to the conduct of men believing

in it.

Mr. Palmer afks, what can poffibly have a ftronger tendency. towards the rendering men indifferent with refpect to their conduct, and preventing all human endeavours, than for a man to believe that he has no power over his actions; fo that' (to use Dr. Priestley's own words) no action or event could possibly be ether wife than it has been, is, or is to be?" This would be the cafe, Dr. Priestley has before owned, if their own actions and determinations were not neceffary links in this chain of caufes and events, and if their good or bad fuccefs did not, in the ftricteft fenfe of the word, depend upon themselves.'

According to Mr. Palmer, the confideration of the actions and determinations of men being neceffary links in this chain of caufes and events,' is the very thing that conftitutes the difficulty, instead of removing it. If all human actions and determinations are neceffary, what is there,' he afks, that, in any proper fenfe, can be faid to depend upon a man's felf? What, on this plan of human nature, are all endeavours or efforts which a man can exert, but impreffions, or the confequences of impreffions, made upon him, in which he has not the leaft concern as an efficient or agent?-To look upon every action and event as necessary, and that nothing could be otherwife than it is, is a much better falvo for all the follies and errors of men, than any other which they have been able to find out. If any, therefore, are to fucceed better, or be happier, in any part of their existence, than others, their fuperior profperity and happinefs will be infallibly fecured to them: and though there is a certain difpofition of mind and courfe of action, which are infeparably connected with their fuccefs and happinefs, as means to bring about thefe events; yet the means, as well as the end, are alike neceffary; and having no power to make either the one or the other at all different from what they are, or are to be; their lot, through the whole of their being, is by them abfolutely unalterable.'

Mr. Palmer then alludes to the cafe of the farmer, adduced by Dr. Priestley, as a popular illuftration of his doctrine; and which, on that account, we tranfcribed into the page of our Review above referred to. In this cafe, Mr. Palmer fays, that

the

yet/

the Doctor feems to take the principle of neceffity for ganted, and then reasons upon it, as if it were really true. To make it a cafe in point, it must be fuppofed, not only that "vegetation is fubject to the established laws of nature;" but likewife, that the farmer believes, that he himself is, in the whole of his conduct, fubject to the like phyfical neceffity; and that, if he is to reap, he thall alfo find himself under a neceffary, compulsive, inAuence to fow. Whether this is a common opinion among that plain fort of men,' fays Mr. Palmer, let the Doctor himfelf, on impartial reflection, determine. But, till that is first proved, no inference, favourable to the doctrine of neceffity, can be drawn from the pains they take, in making ufe of the means appointed for rendering the earth fruitful.'-The fact, he doubts not, is, that they do confider themselves as having it in their power to neglect or use the means: and, did they believe the contrary, he apprehends, that their belief would be attended with want of exertion, and neglect of their concerns.

In his answer to these objections and obfervations of Mr. Palmer, Dr. Prieftley does not defend himself against the whole of the doctrine here imputed to him. I am confident,' says he (treating only of what makes a man's actions his own, and depending on himself), that, in what you fay on this fubject, you deceive yourself by the use of words, or you could not draw the confequences that you do, from what you fuppofe to be my doctrine on this fubject.' He then proceeds:

Strictly and philofophically speaking, my fuccefs in any thing I wish to accomplish, depends upon myself, if my own exertions and actions are neceffary links in that chain of events, by which alone it can be brought about. And, certainly, if I do know this, and the object or end be defirable to me, this defire (if it be of fufficient ftrength) cannot but produce the exertion that is necessary to gain my end. This reafoning appears to me extremely easy, and perfectly conclufive; and yet, though I have repeated it several times, and have placed it in a variety of lights, you do not feem to have confidered it. I fhall, therefore, give another inftance, and add fome farther illuftrations.'

This other instance, in which the Author fubftitutes himself in the room of the farmer, feems to us calculated to obviate the objection above made by Mr. Palmer to the former illuftration; and in which he urges, that farmers do not, in general, know, or believe in, the doctrine of neceffity: whereas no one can doubt of Dr. Priestley's believing in his own doctrine.

Can I, fays he, have a fufficiently ftrong wifh to answer your book, and not of course read it, mark proper extracts from it, arrange them, write my remarks upon them, then transcribe them for the prefs, and put them into the hands of a bookfeller or printer, &c. when I know, that if all this be not

done,

done, the book will never be answered? Surely, my firm belief that all these things are neceffarily connected, must convince me of the neceffity of fetting about the work, if I wish to do it at all; and my wish to have it done, is here to be supposed, as having arifen from a variety of previous circumftances.

If, therefore, I fhall certainly find myself difposed to act juft as I now do, believing my actions to be neceffary, your objection to my doctrine, on this account, cannot have a fufficient foundation. You fay, that if the thing must be, it must be; if your book is to be answered by me, it will be answered by me; and that I may, therefore, make myself eafy about it, and do nothing. I anfwer, that fo I fhould, either if I had no defire to have it done, which happens not to be the cafe, or if I thought that no exertions of mine were neceffary to gain my end, which is not the cafe neither. On this confideration depends the capital distinction that I make between the doctrines of philofophical neceffity, and Calvinistic predeftination.

Dr. Prieftley then proceeds to fhew, that the doctrine of philofophical neceffity fuppofes a neceffary connection between our endeavours and our fuccefs; fo that if only the defire of fuccefs, the first link in this chain, be fufficiently ftrong, all the reft will follow of course; and the end will be certainly accomplished.'-Whereas, according to the Calvinifts, the defire and the end, have no neceflary connection. In the work of converfion or regeneration, for inftance, they fay, that God is the fole agent, and men altogether paffive ;'-that, without his immediate agency, to which nothing on the part of man can contribute, let a man exert himfelf ever fo much, in the ufe of all poffible means; yet all his volitions, and all his actions, would be only finful, and deferving of the wrath and curfe of God to all eternity.'

Notwithstanding these explanations, and allowing the justice and propriety of thefe diftinctions, between the doctrine of philofophical neceffity and that of Calviniftic predeftination; ftill, we apprehend, the capital difficulty will appear to many not to be removed by them. We mean that contained in the paffage which we have marked with Italics, in the paragraph preceding the laft. Notwithstanding all that is here faid, this ftumblingblock ftill feems to rear its head, and this question ftill recurs; -If the thing MUST be, it must be; and therefore, how can I prevent it, or why should I exert myself?-Or, in other words,does it depend on me to prevent or produce an event, which "cannot poffibly be otherwife than it is to be? If, in the plan of providence (may an indolent man fay), I am the deftined agent, whofe exertions are neceffary to a certain end; the defire of fuccefs, and other links in the chain of caufes, will neceffarily impel me to thofe exertions; and I will patiently await their REV. Jan. 1780.

Ꭰ

impulfe;

impulfe; which as yet I do not feel -We own, however, that, in the Author's cafe of the farmer- who knows, certainly, that if he does not fow, it is decreed that he shall not reap-as well as in his own cafe, above given, the difficulty has appeared to us to be leffened; on our particularly attending to a circumftance or two, on which Dr Priestley has not perhaps fufficiently amplified, to render his doctrine generally intelligible to his readers. Mr. Palmer, at least, feems not to have comprehended his former illuftration; by his dwelling fo much on the obfervation, that farmers, in general, do not believe in the doctrine of neceffity:-a remark, which appears to us to be of no confequence in the prefent argument. Dr. Priestley's principal intention, we apprehend, was to fhew, that a belief in the doctrine of neceffity is not incompatible with, or even unfavourable to, the most spirited exertions; and that a farmer, believing in that doctrine ever fo firmly, will nevertheless, without any dereliction of his principles, exert the fame endeavours as another farmer who is an anti-neceffarian. Thofe who have not perfectly understood Dr. Priestley's illuftration, may possibly perceive its drift, by feeing it reprefented in a fomewhat new light, or the light in which it ftrikes us.

One of the circumstances to which we have alluded above is, the ignorance of men refpecting the decrees of providence. On this ignorance (and the neceflary influence of motives) we apprehend, that our Necefarian Farmer founds his plan of conduct; for we will fuppofe Dr. Prieftley's active farmer to be as determined a neceffarian as himself; and yet he shall till and fow fields with as much spirit [Dr. Priestley would fay more] as any of his more orthodox neighbours, who think they have a will of their own. Suppofing one of thefe laft to ridicule our farmer, on account of a conduct feemingly fo inconfiftent with his principles; we can conceive him thus anfwering his opponent:

Will you, Sir, be fo kind as to inform me which of these two decrees has paffed ;-whether I fhall fow my fields, and live, or neglect them and ftarve? I firmly believe one of these events to be unalterably determined; but I know not which; nor can you inform me. Under this uncertainty (nay, partly because of this uncertainty), but knowing the uniformity of the courfe of nature, and that unless I fow I cannot poffibly reap, and feeling moreover a defire to fow; I fhall fow with as much spirit as yourfelf; and half a year hence, my barns and ftacks will inform us both what was the decree.-Nay, even now, I think I can venture to specify the decree before-hand, and to pronounce, that it is the favourable one; because I find myself determined (by motives that have a certain and neceffary influence) to exert fuch endeavours to fulfil it, as can fcarce fail of producing that effect, according to the ufual course of things.

Thus

Thus likewife, in the other inftance, Dr. Prieftley might fay, I know not, certainly, whether it is decreed, that I fhall, or fhall not write an answer to Mr. Palmer's book: but, ignorant as I am of that decree, I know my own prefent feelings, and am fenfible of a fufficiently frong defire to anfwer it. I know likewife, that unless I take the pen in my hand, I cannot answer it. Nay, further, though the decree is as yet a fecret to me, it fhall not (in confequence of my endeavours) remain a fecret much longer; for I will fit down, and anfwer it immediately. -And fo, in fact, it has turned out.

In thefe amplifications of Dr. Priestley's two illuftrations, we know not whether we have caught the whole of his mean ing, or only a part of it. If we have erred, in our attempt to illuftrate it fill farther, we cannot well incur much difgrace in fuch a dark fubject: and befides, we err in very good company. -As to the main queftion, it is ably difcuffed by both the parties; but the cause of liberty is more pertinaciously defended by Mr. Palmer, than by Dr. Priestley's former amicable antagonift, Dr. Price. For instance, the latter owns, that he cannot fee how a contingent event can be the object of fore-knowledge, even to the Deity himself. "It carries," fays he, in his correfpondence with Dr. Prieftley, p. 175. " the appearance of a contradiction; it is in leed a difficulty, and I do not pretend to be capable of removing it." - Mr. Palmer, however, in his zeal for liberty, more boldly gives up, in fact, the divine prefcience; and endeavours to fhew, that the facrifice is not very great for that, by giving up fuch a notion of prefcience, as is directly inconfiftent with the idea of liberty, or agency in man, we only deny that to belong to the fupreme mind, which is in truth no perfection at all:"

.

Again, Dr. Price acknowledged it to be abfurd to fuppofe, that men ever act either without, or against, motives; but he fuppoled the felf-determining power to exert itself only when the motives were equal and contrary: a very rare cafe indeed! -and which reduces,' as Dr. Prieftley obferves, this boafted liberty of man to a very fmall matter, hardly worth contending for.' Mr. Palmer makes no fuch conceffions; but, in general, fuppofes that the mind may act contrary to any motive whatever.—It is difficult, however, to refift the force of Dr. Priestley's argument, that our volitions, and our actions, depending on them, muft always be the fame, ceteris paribus, i. e. every circumftance being equal; or muft always be definite, in definite circumftances:-for what, we may afk, is there to produce an alteration, when every affignable circumftance is exactly equal? In phyfics, a propofition of this nature paffes with every one as an axiom;-that fimilar caufes, operating on the fame material fubftance, under fimilar circumftances, muft produce effects pre

D 2

cifely