ence him, a year or ten years hence, to save one soul yet in the bondage of error and sin, why is not his benevo lence exhibited now in the salvation of this soul from error and sin? God is unchangeable, the same ten years hence that he is now, and his goodness will be no greater then than at this moment. Of course, then, the work of salvation is at an end, if this argument is a logical one. Either this, or the same reasoning which allows the future. conversion or salvation of one soul not saved now, will allow the future conversion and salvation of all not saved now. And the consistency of God's goodness stands alike in both cases.

But believers and disciples, the truly good and righteous-do these suffer nothing in this world? Are they delivered from every form of evil? Certainly not. In common with the rest of mankind they are subjected to griefs and trials, to the sorrows and ills, incident to the lot of man. And we often hear, from the same quarter from which comes the argument in hand, complaints of how many and various are the sufferings of good men, of the multiplied evils falling to their lot. And the Scriptures are appealed to; Moses and David, Jeremiah and the prophets, and the apostolic record of those who "had trial of cruel mockings and scourgings, of bonds and imprisonments, who were stoned, sawn asunder, slain with the sword, wandered about in sheep-skins and goat-skins, being destitute, afflicted and tormented," (Heb. xi.),-all these are summoned as witnesses to prove the afflictions of the righteous. Nay, from this very class of facts the doctrine of future retribution is argued, the necessity of rewards and punishments in the next world, in order to adjust the inequalities of this; giving to the persecuted righteous good for his evil, and to the wicked persecutor evil in his turn.

But if the logic of Orthodox analogy be sound and just, the opposite conclusion would seem to follow, as the only legitimate deduction from the premises. "If God suffers the sinner to ruin himself in this world," says the writer named, "how do we know but he will, for the same reason, suffer him to ruin himself in the next world?" Exactly; and if God permit the righteous to endure such a weight of suffering in this world, how do we know but he

will, for the same reason, permit him to endure an equal weight of suffering in the next world?" The kind of suffering is not in question, but only the fact, the principle, involved in the argument, which is the same in both cases.

Of course, the reasoning against universal restoration being good, it must hold equally in the case of the righteous. "You cannot argue the future salvation of all men from God's goodness, because that would necessitate immediate salvation from present sin and misery, which is not the fact." Very well; then you cannot argue the future deliverance of the righteous from affliction and suffering, because that would necessitate immediate deliverance from present affliction and suffering, which is not the fact. If it is not inconsistent with his benevolence that they should suffer in this world, it will not be inconsistent with his benevolence that they should suffer in the next, and forever-for he is without variableness or turning. So the argument lies as strong, and as weak, on the one side as on the other. The reader can judge whether this sort of analogy does, or does not, prove too much.

But again: Believers, and those elected to salvation, are not perfect, not without sin. "Even the best of men,' says one well known, "have sad remains of the corrupt nature about them." And one of the authorities quoted in Dr. Beecher's "Conflict of Ages," says, that the "frowardness of our nature doth always bring forth some fruits of malice and rebellion, in such sort that even they which are most holy, although they resist it, yet are they defiled with many infirmities and offences, so long as they live in this world." (Harmony, p. 172-3.) And the Scriptures assert that "there is none that doeth good, no not one," and Paul himself confesses to his failures and shortcomings. Let us apply the argument here also.

If the benevolence of God will suffer even the "most holy" to fall into temptation, and "to be defiled with many infirmities and offences so long as they remain in this world;" then his benevolence will suffer the same imperfections and infirmities to beset them so long as they live in the next world. And so heaven is only a dream, and its ineffable purity and bliss but an empty name. You cannot predicate any thing of his goodness or mercy in the future, which may not be affirmed with equal force in reference to the present.

And the difficulty cannot be met at this point by saying, that the Scriptures reveal the deliverance of the righteous in the future life from all the infirmities and sufferings of the present life. The question is not now what we may assert from the Scriptures, but what we may legitimately argue from the goodness of God. If it be affirmed that the Scriptures declare the final holiness and happiness of the righteous, we reply, that they declare the final holiness and happiness of all mankind; but this is an abandonment of the argument in review, and the substitution in its place of a new method of reasoning, and a new class of proofs.

As to the argument of divine goodness, singly and alone, any objection to the future deliverance of all men from imperfection and suffering, because they are not delivered now, lies with equal weight against the future deliverance of "even the most holy' " of men, because they are not delivered now.

One further application of this analogical reasoning. It is contended, with great zeal sometimes, that sinners are happy in this world, and escape the just punishment of their sins; and indeed on the whole, enjoy much more than the righteous. We have glowing descriptions of the good things falling into the lot of wicked men, of their ease, and wealth, and luxuries, though in the daily commission of the greatest wrongs; and of the entire absence of all outward calamities and inward remorse, and even of the common ills of human life, as sickness, loss of property, loss of friends, &c. And from this point too is demonstrated, as supposed, the necessity of future punishment, that they who have received their good things here, may receive their evil things hereafter.

But we reply, in the spirit of our present argument, if it is consistent with the justice of God that sinners should escape the punishment of their sins in this life, it will be consistent with the same justice that they should escape in the life to come. You cannot argue from this quarter for a judgement of retribution hereafter, for that would necessitate a present immediate judgement of all wrong and transgression, which of course the objector in this case does not admit. It is plain that if God permits the wicked to be happy in their wickedness now, and he is the same forever, he will forever permit them to be happy in their

wickedness. The same spiritual laws that regulate the issues of good and evil in this world, will prevail in the next; for the divine government is perfect, and therefore unchangeable.

And now let us put this and that together. God has so ordered his government that the good are miserable, and the wicked happy, in the present life. To his friends he ministers suffering; to his enemies enjoyment. Now, what is consistent with his goodness and justice to-day, will be consistent with them to-morrow, and through all eternity; and therefore this state of things will continue forever. Thus we see the results are reversed; sinners are endlessly happy, and the saints are endlessly miserable! Plainly, no other conclusion is possible, if we admit the soundness of this argument of analogy.

Thus have we followed to its results the objection to the salvation of all men, which reasons from present evil to future endless evil. And manifestly, if the existence of sin and evil is a legitimate and unanswerable argument against their final destruction, all are involved in the same calamity. If the analogy is good in part, it is good throughout, and the same order of things established now, will remain always, and heaven will be no better than earth, and hell no worse.

In conclusion, we remark that the great error of all this kind of reasoning lies in overlooking the fact that the present order of things is only for a time, so intended in the beginning, a means to an end. We cannot, therefore, argue from what is for a day, to what shall be for eternity. What is perfectly consistent with the divine wisdom, or justice, or goodness, as a means, may be directly opposed to these as an end; and though positively required in the one case, may as positively be rejected in the other.

It would be idle to judge of the architecture of a palace by inspecting the scaffolding, or the rubbish gathered about the foundation wall. You must wait until the structure is complete, before you criticise its style, proportions, or beauty, or undertake to pass judgement on the design and aim of the builder.

So we must not decide too hastily that evil will enter into the finished work of God, because we see sin and suffering present in the progress of the work. These are

only the scaffolding of God's great temple, consistent with the process of erection, but wholly inconsistent with the object of the building when finished. The same plan which introduced them as a means, excludes them as an end.

Of course, we cannot determine all the objects which God has it in view to obtain by the present order of things, the mingled good and evil of our earthly life. "No man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end." But this is certain, "the end is not yet." What we see and suffer is not the result, but the means to it; not what God will rest in as final, but what he is using as instruments for the fulfilment of his purposes. And though we are too near-sighted to sweep the whole field of his plans, or penetrate to the last results, we may count it as sure that they are all good, for God is love, and love cannot rest in any thing opposite to its own nature, any thing essentially and fixedly evil.

The present, with its passing sorrows and trials and discipline, is the ladder of many rounds by which we mount up to the future. And when that glorious future is gained, we shall need it no longer-the shadows of evil passed away, we shall rejoice forevermore in the revelations of God's infinite wisdom, and in the blessedness of his infinite love.

T. B. T.

ART. III.

The Conflict of Ages.

The Conflict of Ages; or, the Great Debate on the moral relations between God and Man. By Edward Beecher, D. D. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1853.

THE department of divinity should surely be excepted from the judgement which affirms that the American mind. is sluggish and tardy in its contributions to literature. New England was colonized by a theology; and the in