Now, what is necessary to be done under the Act in case of the death of a party entitled to notice? Section 49 (i): Where the drawer or indorser is dead, and the party giving notice is aware of it, the notice must be given to his personal representative, if such there is and with reasonable diligence he can be found.

As a fact, there could be no better way of a notice reaching a deceased party than to simply address the same to him in the mail, for his personal representative would be entitled to receive his letters.

Under the aforegoing sections the notice should be addressed as under s. 4 to the party, and if the holder giving such notice knows he is dead, the notice may be addressed to his personal representative, if with the exercise of reasonable diligence he can be found, if not, then to deceased, and, if no address is designated on the bill or note, at the place where the note is dated.

When is it to be given? By s. 49 (k), as soon as the bill is dishonoured, and not later than the next following juridical or business day. Therefore, if the day following the dishonour is a holiday, the holder has the next day after the holiday to give the notice.

It would seem that the old rule of being bound to catch the first mail leaving on the day following the day of dishonour does not now apply, and that the notice may be given or mailed at any time on the following day.

In Nova Scotia, a County Court Judge held that where the parties reside in the same place, the plaintiff must shew that there was a delivery after the notice was mailed. I cannot see where the Act makes any such requirement.

Again, suppose the bill or note is dated at "London," "Liverpool," or other place where there is another place of the same name in America. I would think that, if the bill or note bears any indication of what place is intended, such as the bill stamp or bank stamp, etc., the party sending the notice would be justified in adding "England," etc., or as the case might be. This would only be common sense. It is true that it was decided in New Brunswick that the bank stamp on the note was not an indication that the bill or note was in

that bank when it fell due, so as to do away with the necessity of proving presentment, the note being payable at that bank: Cole v. McDonald, 34 C. L. J. 174.

The provisions of s. 49, s.-s. 4 (not in the English Act), do away with a large amount of the particularity required by the old law as to personal service of the notice; still in some cases it may be required to be resorted to; in such case s.-s. (h) of s. 49 has to be referred to. It may be served personally or left with an agent, or at the party's place of business. If no place of business, then at dwelling house with the party or some adult person in charge. If no place of business or dwelling house, then at last known place of abode.

It has been held that a notice delivered to a man cutting wood in the yard: Commercial Bank v. Weller, 5 U. C. R. 543: oral notice to solicitor of indorser: Crosse v. Smith, I M. & S. 554: are both insufficient. Notice to clerk in merchant indorser's office: Allen v. Edmundson, 2 Ex. 724: fellow boarder in boarding house of indorser during his absence: Bank of U. S. v. Hatch, 6 Pet. U. S. 250: are both good.

to

Where a party to a bill receives due notice, he has the whole of the following day after receipt of same to send notice any party to the bill he wishes to hold: see s. 49, s.-s. 3. The different branches of a bank have the privileges of this sub-section. The miscarriage of the post will not affect the validity of a notice if it is right in other respects: s.-s. 5.

Delay in giving notice is excused when it is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the party giving the same, and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence: s. 50. When the cause of delay ceases to operate, the notice must be sent with reasonable diligence. The giving of notice. may be prevented by state of war: Patience v. Townley, 2 Sm. 223; Bond v. Moor, 93 U. S. 593; Rouquette v. Overmann, L. R. 10 Q. B. 523. Epidemic: Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213; Tunno v. Lague, 2 Johns. N. Y. 1. Death or sudden illness of the holder or his agent: Rothschild v. Currie, 1 Q. B. 17; White v. Stoddard, 11 Gray (Mass.) 258.

Where an indorser could not be found when the bill was dishonoured, and some time afterwards a writ was issued and served on him without any previous notice, it was held that

he was released on account of not being notified when his address became known: Studdy v. Beesty, 60 L T. N. S. 647, W. N. (1889), 14. This case could hardly arise in Canada, for the holder could simply act under s.-s. 4 of s. 49, and that would fix the liability: see Cosgrave v. Boyle, supra.

Notice may be expressly or impliedly waived either before the time for giving has arrived, as by writing on the bill or note, or expressing it in a separate document, for instance, "presentment and notice of dishonour waived," or after the omission to give, as by taking a new note or promising to pay with a knowledge of the omission. A waiver enures for the benefit of all parties to the bill: Raby v. Gilbert, 30 L. J. Ex. 170.

There is no waiver if the party promising has no knowledge of the omission: Dana v. Bradley, 5 Allen N. B. 292. It would seem that if a new note is given without knowledge of the laches of the holder it is a waiver of want of presentment of the old note, and the objection of want of consideration could not be set up against the new note afterwards: ib.

Excuses as regards the drawer.-Where the drawer and drawee are the same person, or a fictitious person, or a person not having capacity to contract. Where the drawer is the person to whom the bill is presented for payment. Where the drawee or acceptor is as between himself and the drawer under no obligation to pay the bill. Where the drawer has countermanded payment. In these cases no notice is necessary. But there is no excuse in the fact that the acceptor or maker has said, before the bill or note is due, that he will not pay it.

Excuses as regards the indorser.-Where the drawee is a fictitious person, or one not having capacity to contract and the indorser is aware of it when he indorses the bill. Where the indorser is the person to whom the bill is presented for payment and where the bill was accepted or made for his accommodation: s. 50 (d).

The acceptor of a bill and maker of a note are liable without notice. A guarantor not on the bill is likewise not entitled to notice.

Secondary evidence of a notice of dishonour is admissible without a notice to produce: Roscoe N. P., p. 375.

In the case of a foreign bill, a notarial copy of the protest and of the notice of dishonour and a notarial certificate of the service of such notice, shall be received as prima facie evidence of such protest, notice, and service: s. 71 (f). In the case of an inland bill or note, a protest of any bill or note, and any copy thereof as copied by the notary or justice of the peace, shall in any action be prima facie evidence of presentation and dishonour, and also of service of notice of such presentation and dishonour as stated in such protest: s. 93,

S.-S. 5.

It will be noticed that the terms of the two sub-sections are different. Section 71, s.-s. (f), in the case of a foreign bill, seems to contemplate a copy of the notice of dishonour being attached; and s. 93, s.-s. 5, in the case of an inland bill or note, simply says that copy of protest shall be prima facie evidence of service of notice as stated in the protest, and nothing about a copy of the notice of dishonour.

It has been decided in the United States that notice, after the dissolution of a firm, may be made to one partner for all provided the holder has no notice of the dissolution: Bliss v. Nichols, 12 Allen (Mass.) 443: and that the notice is good in any case in Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43, and other cases. This latter rule has been adopted in the United States. Negotiable Instruments Law as follows:-" Where the parties to be notified are partners, notice to any one partner is notice to the firm, even though there has been a dissolution." See American Negotiable Instruments Law, s. 170.

EDMUND G. KAYE.

St. John, N.B., 12th May, 1902.

COPYRIGHT.

The author of an admirable work just published on the law of British Copyright declares in his preface that his book had its origin in his "endeavours to understand what is perhaps the most complicated and obscure series of statutes in the statute book.”*

"It is now," he adds, "28 years since the Royal Commission on Copyright was appointed, and still nothing has been done to ameliorate the lamentable condition in which the commissioners then found the law. Dissensions among those interested in copyright, failure to come to a satisfactory arrangement with the colonies, and want of time at the disposal of the Legislature, are mainly responsible for this delay."

If the law of copyright in Great Britain is "complicated and obscure," it is doubly so in Canada, where, in addition to the "lamentable" British law, we have in full force an independent system of our own, and where in addition to the law of copyright proper, we have a constitutional difficulty which has remained unsolved for more than half a century, and which for its understanding requires an intimate knowledge of a heterogeneous mass of treaties, conventions, statutes, orders in council, proclamations, official correspondence, and parliamentary discussions, besides the doings of select commissions, copyright associations, societies of authors, boards of trade, and what not.

But if the constitutional struggle between the Canadian and the British Government has been a lengthy and intricate one, the question at issue is simple enough. It is, in a word, the British book trade against Canadian self-government. The influence of the British publishers in Imperial councils has in the past been potent and persistent enough to prevent the Imperial Government for a period of more than 60 years from conceding to Canada that self-government in copyright that has been freely admitted to be our constitutional right in every other subject enumerated in the 91st section of the

*The Law of Copyright: Macgillivray.