case on Japan's part for claiming British assistance under the treaty of alliance, while, as has already been said, the new precedents on the subject of neutrality which have been or are being established are of great dan ger to the future of this country and to the cause of peace. Even if the Baltic Fleet is destroyed before it can do any damage, Japan is left with a whole crop of complaints against the various Powers concerned, and with the certain right to demand of them exemplary damages for the mischief they have caused her interests.

In the second place, the Baltic Fleet has behaved with extraordinary severity to neutrals, violating all the laws and customs of naval warfare. In the Great Belt on October 18 it fired on a Danish torpedo-boat and skiff, and also upon a merchantman, though seemingly without doing any harm. On the 21st, in broad daylight, it fired at the German trawler Sonntag, at the Swedish steamer Aldebarân, at the schooner Guyane, which could by no possibility be mistaken for a warship, being a sailing vessel of small size, and at a steamer, which is said to have sunk with all hands after flying signals of distress. A few hours later the outrage in the North Sea was committed; on October 23 the Norwegian steamer Skaatoe was fired upon; and a day or two later an unknown British collier was shelled on the Atlantic.

The attack on the British trawlers in the North Sea was remarkable in many ways. The Russian fleet, to begin with, steamed far out of its course, else it would not have encountered these harmless fishing-vessels. In the second place, Russian officers must have known perfectly well of the presence on the Dogger Bank of the trawling fleet, since Russian vessels are constantly being navigated down the North Sea. In the third place, the trawlers display special lights, and in appear

ance differ entirely from any known warship. They are short squat vessels with one funnel, whereas destroyers or torpedo-boats are long slender craft with several funnels. The Russian ships came within a few hundred yards of the fishing fleet before they opened fire, and the firing, according to some witnesses, was preceded by the sound of the bugle, which indicates that a deliberate order was given, The bugle-note was also heard just before the shelling of the trawlers stopped. When the damage was done, the Russian fleet quietly steamed away, without making the faintest attempt to assist the trawler Crane, though the Russian officers could scarcely have failed to observe that she was sinking, and though, whatever view we take of their attack, it must have been clear after the firing that a grave mistake had been made. The conduct of the Russians was thus of a peculiarly discreditable nature, but it is not altogether surprising in view of certain of their proceedings in the Far East.

each

When the news of this affair reached England, Ministers vied with other in denouncing the conduct of the Russian fleet, and there was an outburst of perfectly natural and justifiable indignation in the press. A British note was despatched to St. Petersburg, and a definite period was appointed within which the Russian Government was to accede to these conditions: (1) An apology for the outrage. (2) The payment of full compensation to the sufferers.

(3) The punishment of the Russian officers implicated.

(4) A guarantee against future outrages on British shipping.

It was the very minimum that a great Power could demand, for it must not be forgotten that this attack had followed the five affairs of the Allanton, Malacca, Calchas, Haipsang,

3

As trouble was anticipated by the well-informed when the Baltic Fleet sailed, and as the various newspaper correspondents in St. Petersburg had for weeks been warning England of the attitude of the Russian Admiralty, some precautions on the part of the British Admiralty might have been anticipated. In actual fact there were no precautions at all. The Mediterranean fleet, the pick of our battle fleets, was in a remote corner of the Adriatic, engaged in festivities at Venice. It did not move until the 27-28th. The Channel Fleet alone was concentrated at Gibraltar. The Home Fleet, minus one of its best units, was far away in the north of Scotland, exposed to attack by a superior German force, and was short of coal at the particular moment of the North Sea affair. A fourth very important fleet, the Cruiser squadron, had been carefully sent into port for a refit about the time the Baltic Fleet started, and its units were quite unready for sea, with machinery opened up and guns in some cases removed. Not a single British warship was patrolling the North Sea. There was a certain want of foresight in these dispositions, for which a heavy responsibility must attach to the Admiralty. Nor was this all. The news of the outrage reached London on the night of Sunday, October 23, and was in certain newspaper offices at 7 o'clock. Two hours later it was still unknown at the Admiralty, and in the Admiralty buildings there was not a single clerk, not a single official! No doubt this is

ly remedied by the new First Sea Lord, Sir J. Fisher, who, owing to illness, had not been able to take over the management of affairs at the Admiralty on October 21, as had been intended, but that it existed at a very critical moment is a disquieting sign of the past imperfection of British naval organization. A question which arises in my own mind is whether the movement of the Russian fleet down Channel was timed to coincide with our "week-end," when, as is well known to every foreign Admiralty, the whole machinery of British administration is at a standstill.

Having made its demands, the British Government appears to have been seized with disquietude when it found that no prompt acceptance of them and repudiation of the officers concerned came from Russia. On Friday, October 28, a Cabinet meeting was held, and at the very last minute, after the period of grace granted to Russia had expired, the Russian Ambassador produced a proposal the gist of which was that the first two British demands were conceded and the third and fourth refused. In their stead the Russian Government was ready to submit the affair to an International Court which was to institute an inquiry "into the facts," and was prepared to direct "the detention at Vigo of that part of the fleet which was concerned in the incident-in order that the naval authorities may ascertain what officers were responsible for it. Those officers. and any material witnesses were not to proceed with the fleet on its voyage to the Far East." Further "precautions were to be taken to guard against the recurrence of such incidents." This vague proposal was accepted by the Cabinet.

This announcement was made by Mr. Balfour in his speech at Southampton, though it is quite clear that the

Premier himself did not clearly understand its meaning, whence the doubts as to the detention at Vigo of the guilty Russian ships. As the Russian authorities accused the British Government and British subjects of covertly assisting Japanese torpedo-boats to attack the Baltic Fleet, it meant that Russia had succeeded in escaping from the position of a criminal in the dock to that of a defendant in a civil action, who counter-claims damages from the plaintiff. Not only this, but the Baltic Fleet was given time to proceed out of the reach of the British squadrons, since it was certain that the pourparlers over the International Court would occupy weeks. Nothing but a vague verbal assurance, if so much as that, was given by the Russian Ambassador, though this was not clearly stated by Mr. Balfour, as to the punishment of the guilty officers; and punishment was only to follow if the inquiry should show "that very heavy blame rests with those responsible for what has occurred," to quote Mr. Balfour's own words. The promise to punish the guilty has since been repudiated by Russia. Mr. Balfour in his speech seems to have forgotten the great maxim of Napoleon: "Je laisse la plainte aux femmes; moi, j'agis." He bitterly attacked the Russian admiral and pointed to the danger of allowing him to proceed on his way, with the telling reminder that the Baltic Fleet might meet far away in the East "some coming transport or liner. approaches within the magic distance. The fleet opens fire, the ship is sunk like a torpedo-boat in the North Sea. There is an entry at Lloyd's that such and such a ship has not returned and has left no record. The waves close over the tragedy." That these possibilities were overstated is clear from the telegraus of the able correspondent of the Daily Telegraph at St. Petersburg:

It

not

"I am

So far as is known, these mischievous instructions have not been cancelled, and the danger still remains. If so, it is clear that not Admiral Rojdestvensky, but the Russian Government was really responsible for the outrage. That belief is strengthened by the following facts:

(1) That, though the Russian Government was in daily communication with the Admiral by means of wireless telegraphy (according to the statements of the Russian officers left behind, who assert that they were kept informed of all the events of the war by this agency), the Admiral was not called upon at once to report.

(2) That the Admiral was thanked by the Czar, immediately after the outrage, in a special telegram, and is said to have been promoted to Vice-Admiral.

(3) That the detention of the Baltic Fleet at Vigo, which, according to the Daily Telegraph, before the miserable conclusion of the affair was known,

was to occupy "about three weeks," and which is believed to have been vaguely promised to Mr. Balfour, lasted only for so long a time as was required to coal the Russian battleships, after which the Baltic Fleet calmly put to sea, leaving behind it as the persons "really responsible" one captain and three lieutenants.

(4) That the three lieutenants, after reaching St. Petersburg, declared emphatically that they were not to be punished, and in their declarations were supported by the whole Russian press and by the statements of officials at the Russian Admiralty, as evinced in the telegrams of the Daily Telegraph's St. Petersburg correspondent.

In view of these facts, it is impossible to attach any serious importance to the Russian assurances that the captain and the three lieutenants are the persons really responsible for the outrage; that they will be punished; and that there will be no repetition of the tragic incidents of the night of October 21. They are of no greater value than the assurances given in August by the same Government, which made Mr. Balfour "perfectly certain" that no more neutral ships would be sunk.' England has been tricked, with the connivance of her own Government, and whereas events in the China seas showed in July and August that she could not or would not protect her shipping, so now events in the North Sea have proved that she cannot and will not protect the lives of her subjects. It may have been right not to run the risk of war, though it is always a question whether any nation or individual gains anything by showing the white feather; but, if so, there should have been no brandishing of the navy, no movements of battleshipsquadrons, no such violent talk as Mr. Balfour's speech contained. Το

• Compare the instructions to Rojdestvensky, already noted above.

threaten and then meekly surrender is the most dangerous, because the most provocative of games, and adds to the bitterness and humiliation of the diplomatic retreat. Mr. Balfour should at the outset have informed Hull that a war with a first-class Power was not worth risking for the lives of two mere fishermen; and at Southampton he should have stated that the Russian Admiral's view of his duties was an excusable one, in view of the fact that war with Russia, France, and Germany was possible if England declined to excuse the outrage. This would have been a consistent if inglorious policy, and, provided that the Westminster Gazette and one or two of our Ministers could have been induced to hold their tongues on the subject of the immense dangers, political and financial, of a great war to England, we might even have persuaded ourselves that our surrender was "inspired by the proud consciousness of our strength and preparedness." But unfortunately, indiscrete disclosures gave that position away.

The arrival of the Baltic Fleet in Eastern waters will probably mean the stoppage of all British trade with Japan, perhaps even with the Far East, and thus will affect our shipping and trade. Under the Russian proclamation coal, machinery, iron, cotton, and a host of other articles of regular and lawful commerce are contraband. The seizure of British ships brings immense personal gain to Russian officers, and commends them to the attention of their Admiralty, whence they are likely to make seizures in spite of the "assurances" given. It is true that Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne deny that the above goods are contraband, but as they have failed to give effect to their denial or to back it by any manifestation of force, as they have failed to exact compensation for the seizure of the Allanton and Calchas and

the sinking of the Haipsag and the Knight Commander, as they have further warned shipowners that such goods must be carried at those owners' own risk, and as they affect to think that England must acquiesce in Russia's illegitimate extension of her rights, because one day or other England may be a belligerent-the opposite position, by the way, to that assumed by these Ministers during the Boer War-nothing is left for shipowners but to abandon an important trade to others whose Governments give it better protection, and to ask why Englishmen are taxed to support a navy which cannot perform its first duty. At moments such as these shipowners might lay to heart List's great generalization, that trade supremacy "can only be permanently maintained if it is based upon a great nationality and supported by a great national spirit." National spirit in England has been weakened by years of laisser faire.

A third point of not less importance is that the movement of the Baltic Fleet involves either a dislocation of our naval dispositions and a transfer of force from Europe to distant waters at a critical time, if the Russians are followed and watched, as they should be, or, if they are not "shadowed" by an adequate force, the risk of infringement on their part upon British neutrality, as there is no knowing whether the Baltic Fleet may not attempt to coal in remote British harbors or island possessions, such as, for example, the Maldives and Chagos groups, or the small islet of Minicoy in the Indian Ocean, which has been marked down, I am informed, as a possible rallying-point for the fleet. The weakness of British policy during the war has certainly encouraged such action, and must be taken into account when estimating its probabilities. It is quite possible even now that our Government will be "bluffed" into

ordering any "shadowing" force back, so smoothing Admiral Rojdestvensky's path. If a Power has no will, or cannot and dare not assert its will, then tricks will be played upon it.

The fourth point, and the most important of all, is the effect which the arrival of this fleet in the Far East will have upon our ally, Japan, and her fortunes in the present war. This is closely bound up with the operations at Port Arthur. If Port Arthur falls before January, or if the Russian warships in the harbor are destroyed by the Japanese siege-guns, it will not be beyond Japan's power to meet the fleet. But it is absolutely essential for her success against Admiral Rojdestvensky that she should be able to turn her whole naval force against him. In any case that force is none too large; it has been reduced by the cruel fortune of war to four battleships, of which only three can be described as really first-class. Behind these are eight armored cruisers and a large number of protected cruisers, but at least three of the armored cruisers must be deducted to counterbalance the Vladivostock fleet. Hence she may not be able to put more than nine armored ships in line against the seven Russian battleships with their congeries of cruisers, armed steamers and destroyers. Save for the immense superiority of her personnel, she could not look for victory; but with her wartrained officers and men, aware that the fate of their country depends upon the consequences of the battle, and that Russia has now no further reinforcements to send, victory may be expected, if her fleet can locate the Russians and bring them to battle. that Admiral Togo can do this is by no means certain. There are several routes to Vladivostock by the Tsushima, or Korea Straits, by the Tsugaru Straits, and by the La Pérouse or Soya Straits, and the position which

Yet