the blame of all that has happened, and of all that may still happen, will be the Czar's, and the Czar's only. It will be so all the more because it rested with him to make last Sunday pretty much what he chose. There were three things that he might have done any one of which would have given the incidents of the day a different direction from that which they actually took. His best course would have been to allow the workmen to present their petition, and to tell them that he would give their requests his full and careful consideration. There is no reason to believe that if he had done this there would have been any hostile action on the part of the crowd. What they asked was a hearing, an opportunity of making their Sovereign— the only authority to which, under an absolute autocracy, it is possible for them to turn-acquainted with the nature of their grievances, and with the means by which, in their opinion, those grievances can be removed. Their complaints could not have been put right in a moment, but the assurance that the Czar was willing to learn what they were, and anxious to do all in his power to meet them, would have been enough to send away the crowd with a new sense of hope and gratitude. This, however, may have been too great a demand on the Czar's courage. Το stand before a vast throng of people, with every eye fixed on him and every ear strained to catch his lightest word, may have been more than he could endure. In that case there was another possibility open to him. He might have announced that he was prepared to receive a small deputation of workmen, and to discuss with them the measures described in their petition. This would have been an inferior, because a far less imposing, expedient than confronting the crowd in person. It would have appealed less to the imagination, and have made less im

pression upon an excitable and, in its way, romantic people. On the other hand, it would have had some advantages over the bolder course. It would have enabled the Czar to get at the real meaning of the workmen's demands, and to have pointed out why some of them could not be granted. Indeed, even if the crowd had been confronted in the first instance, such an interview as this must in the end have taken place; and if it had been substituted for the bolder and more imposing act, it would possibly have been almost as successful. Even now the list of possible courses is not exhausted. The Czar might have put forth a reasoned statement of his rea. sons for refusing to see the petitioners or their representatives. He might have dwelt on the length and difficulty of the statement submitted to him, and have asked for time in which to consider it himself, and to take counsel with his advisers as to the answer to be returned to it. This would have been the least effective course of the three, because it would have been the least definite, and the least calculated to inspire confidence in the petitioners. But even this, if it had been done in good faith, would probably have averted the disasters of Sunday. As we know, the Czar, either of his own will or yielding to the stronger will of his uncles, rejected them all, and preferred to leave the people of his capital in ignorance where he was or in what light he regarded their action. The only information he vouchsafed to them on this last point was such as could be conveyed by the bullets of his soldiers.

What is there now left for the Czar to do? He has made up his mind, seemingly, or allowed other people to make it up for him, that things must go on as they have begun. The end in view is the restraint of any expression of opinion or desire on the part of

his people. The means by which this end is to be reached is wholesale slaughter, as often as a crowd large enough to be slaughtered can be found gathered together. How far this discipline will be effective it is too soon to say. Probably so long as the necessary orders are given, and the troops obey them, it will succeed in St. Petersburg. No revolutionary movement can hope to stand against cavalry and artillery, if they are used with sufficient decision. But St. Petersburg is not Russia, and it is possible that the spectacle of what the Czar's autocracy has come to in the capital may seriously weaken its hold on the rest of the Empire. The Grand Dukes may for the moment be delighting them

The Economist.

selves in the success of their policy, but what is possible in a single city may not be possible in many cities at once; and, after all, the real population of Russia does not live in cities. The grievances of the peasants may not indeed be identical with those of the workmen, but they have points of resemblance, and the rumors of what happened last Sunday growing, as they are likely to do, in the process of transmission, may suggest the need of making common efforts for a common end. The present policy is not fitted to deal with discontents that are spread over the whole country, and the incapacity of the Czar may yet lead to consequences that even the Grand Dukes cannot control.

There is once more grave reason to follow the course of events in Macedonia with anxious attention, and to inquire rather searchingly what steps our own Government is taking to forestall the dangers which seem imminent and to fulfil its pledges. The Times has written well upon this subject during the past week, and if public opinion in France were as alert and as wellinformed as in England one might perhaps hope for some further diplomatic move. The Austro-Russian reforms have failed, as all good judges predicted they must, and their failure has been almost surprisingly complete. The two Assessors have merely travelled about, written reports, and given good advice to Hilmi Pasha, as the humblest consuls might have done. The Turks have permitted an experiment in a few selected villages to see whether it is possible to collect the taxes directly without the intervention of the corrupt and violent publicani,

who buy the tithes of a village at auction and collect as much more as seems good to them. But that this experiment will be generally adopted we do not for a moment believe. The whole Turkish system of ascendency, by which the ruling class of Mohamedan landlords share in the profits of conquest, rests upon these methods of spoliation, and if the "garrison" (to use an Irish parallel) were deprived of its perquisites its loyalty would hardly stand the strain. Lastly, the gendarmerie scheme has broken down because the European officers possess no executive authority. If they see an abuse they must report to headquarters. With the maintenance of order they have nothing to do. In fact, it is clear that the reforms have failed to do any good.

But apart from the failure of the reforms, matters seem to be actually rather worse than they were before the late insurrection. The Turkish admin

istration is more hopelessly centralized than ever, and Hilmi Pasha, a clever but somewhat sinister figure, is a mere shadow of the Palace. He appears to be doing his best, as he did in the spring of 1903, to drive the Bulgarians once more into revolt. Troops are being quartered once more upon the villages-which means a daily round of robbery and oppression. A curfew ordinance has been re-enacted. The whole public life of the Bulgarian communities stands suspended and suppressed. Their teachers are nearly all in exile, and practically all their schools are closed in consequence. A large number of their churches have been handed over to the Greek faction by the Turkish authorities-and that even in villages where the peasants of the Greek party are in a very small minority. Economically, save for the help that was rendered once this autumn in certain districts by the British Relief Fund, their case is still exceedingly miserable. The Turks, needless to say, have not made good their promise to rebuild the villages (12,000 houses in all) which were burned in 1903. In the Adrianople region the refugees have not yet been suffered to return, and their lands are still occupied by Turks. Finally, the Greek and Albanian bands which are making war upon the Bulgarians are tolerated, if not encouraged, by the Government, which is only too pleased to foster any feud among its Christian subjects. The general insecurity defies description, and the outlook for the immediate future is still blacker. With the coming of spring all the lawless bands are preparing to extend their activities, while the rigor of the authorities, not against the agitators but against the villagers, grows ever more stringent. It is an unbearable position, and if there comes no sign of a fresh European intervention before next spring an insurrection seems inevitable-and

insurrection spells massacre, outrage,

and devastation.

It is quite futile to look for help to either of the interested Powers upon whom Europe in a moment of apathy conferred a mandate to pacify Macedonia. Russia is entirely preoccupied both at home and abroad. Austria has no policy except procrastination. Her Emperor is an intensely conservative force. Both the Germans and the Magyars are disposed to be Turcophil and to dread any movement of sympathy which might make them responsible for a large Slav population. And both Austria and Hungary are in the throes of Parliamentary crises. Of the other Powers, Germany stands aloof, and doubtless supports the Sultan behind the scenes. France is tied by the Russian Alliance. Italy is eager, but interested. There remains only England, at once free, disinterested, and sympathetic. We are pledged to action. In the past stands our overwhelming responsibility for the Treaty of Berlin, which flung Macedonia, rescued by Russian intervention, once more beneath the heel of the Turk. But we have also obligations of recent date. Lord Lansdowne has explicitly promised that if the Austro-Russian reforms should fail he will propose more drastic measures of amelioration. He is much too well informed, thanks to our excellent consular staff in Macedonia, to retain any illusions about the success of these reforms. That he has not forgotten his pledges is an assumption which his keen and altogether humane interest in this question warrants. The problem is how best to awaken the interest of the French Government and to bring it into line with Italy. In the autumn of 1903 Sir Edward Grey expressed the opinion that if even one other Power would support us, it was clearly our duty to intervene. There is no doubt that we could secure the co-operation of the Italian fleet if a

naval demonstration became necessary.

Lord Lansdowne has himself indicated the programme which any serious Power must follow if it means to intervene with effect. It would no doubt be worth while merely to confer executive authority upon the European gendarmerie officers. But this would lead to endless conflicts with the Turkish Prefects and Governors. It would be useless to arrest criminals unless the courts were reformed. And to compel the Turks to pay the gendarmerie without reforming their whole financial system would simply mean that the The Speaker.

officials and the soldiers would receive less pay than ever, and there would be no money to repair the roads. Moreover, nothing short of a final solution will ever induce the Bulgarian or Greek bands to disarm or persuade the Turks to reduce the colossal army which lives upon the country. The Sultan would oppose serious reforms of detail as stoutly as he would fight any general and immediate remedy. The only satisfactory course is to nominate a European Governor independent of the Porte, endowed with full powers and responsible only to Europe.

The four hundredth anniversary of the birth of John Knox will occur in May. The Putnams will publish at that time the Knox volume in their Heroes of the Reformation series. The author is Professor Henry Cowan, D.D., of Aberdeen University.

G. P. Putnam's Sons are about publishing an English sociological work by L. T. Hobhouse, which should interest American students of social questions. The titles of such chapters as "The School of Cobden," "The Imperial Idea," "The Useful and the Right" pique curiosity.

Lovers and critics of art will welcome Sir Walter Armstrong's monograph upon "The Peel Collection and the Dutch School of Painting" of which E. P. Dutton & Co. are the American publishers. Taking as his theme the splendid collection brought together by the second Sir Robert Peel, in which were included fifty-five examples of the Dutch school and twelve of the Flemish, the author passes under review and treats with appreciation and sym

pathy the essential qualities of the Dutch artists. He especially combats the idea that Dutch painting is mere technique, taking as his text the somewhat dogmatic pronouncement to that effect in the first chapter of Ruskin's Modern Painters. The conclusion which he reaches is that the Dutch painters were as elemental artists as those of any other century, and that, although the nature which they chose to illustrate was inferior in beauty to that on which Titian and Giorgione embroidered their gorgeous decorations, no art may justly be condemned for the humbleness of its materials. The one weak point of the Dutch artists, in his view, is their incapacity to improve on the realities of external nature. The form chosen for the volume is a large, slender octavo, which admits not only of an ample and legible page for the letter-press but of the reproduction upon an adequate scale of some of the most striking examples of the Dutch school of art. Of these there are four photogravures, and twenty-four other full-page illustrations.