Though the war in the Far East has now been in progress for the best part of a year, there has as yet been no attempt, so far as the writer is aware, in any English work accessible to the general public to sum up its naval lessons and to apply their teaching to the peculiar conditions of the British Empire. The British Admiralty has been in the closest touch with all that has happened, but the results which it has ascertained have naturally not been communicated to the world, though the influence of the war is plainly to be seen in various new departures of British naval policy. Yet the naval operations have been of unusual importance and interest even to the unprofessional reader, as they may be said to have thoroughly tested the implements and strategy of modern naval war, upon success in which the very existence of England depends. The test has been on a considerable scale, whence the difference between this war and the conflicts between

Japan and China in 1894-5 and between the United States and Spain in 1898, where one side was far inferior to the other in material strength as well as in skill, and where actions between hostile fleets of battleships did not occur, because in either case one navy was without battleships. In this war the material employed has been of the very newest and best; the Japanese fleet was ahead of most of its European competitors in obtaining the most perfect appliances, while the Russian ships, notwithstanding unfavorable reports which have been circulated in England, were excellent. The force of the two combatants at the opening of the struggle was as follows:

render its position hopeless, while Japan was hampered by the fact that Russia had a considerable fleet in Europe, which sooner or later was certain to attempt to intervene in the war. Hence Japan had to nurse her strength to the utmost, and her admirals were ordered in the most imperative terms to refrain from risking their heavy ships. To these orders the inconclusive issue of several of the actions must be ascribed.

On the eve of war the general impression on the Continent was that the Russian fleet in the Far East would easily be able to hold its own. Le Yacht published an interesting article in which the Japanese personnel was declared to want just the very qualities it has displayed-vigorous initiative, technical skill in gunnery and the handling of fleets, unity of purpose, and, in a word, all that States endeavor to obtain by maintaining organized navies. Though the English public had formed a juster estimate of the Japanese navy, competent writers in the British press thought that the struggle for the command of the sea would be a desperate one, and that in obtaining so great a prize the Japanese must lose heavily in ships and men. The Russian navy was known to have paid great attention to gunnery, and there was good German authority for the high quality of its shooting. It had not, like the Spanish and Chinese navies, neglected target practice; indeed, on the eve of war the continual firing carried out by the fleet at Port Arthur was one of the reasons which led intelligent neutrals to forebode war.

The first lesson of this war, in which it confirms previous experience, is the advantage of a prompt offensive. The Russian fleet at Port Arthur had been warned of the imminence of hostilities, but does not appear to have taken the warning seriously. There were some precautions on the eve of the Japanese

attacks of February 8 and 9, but the ships did not protect themselves by getting out nets, constructing booms and keeping their crews at quarters. The Japanese torpedo boats appeared about midnight, and fired twenty-three torpedoes, of which a very small number took effect. But though the damage done was far less than we should have expected, on that fatal night Russia lost her chance of commanding the sea with her fleet in the Far East. Two battleships and one cruiser were badly injured, and probably it was only the skill and presence of mind of the junior officers on board them that saved them from total destruction. The blow struck was stunning, and had it been instantly followed up by the Japanese, Port Arthur would have fallen within the first three weeks of war.

The unreadiness of the Russians does not appear to have been altogether understood at Tokio, or else there were conditions, of which we know nothing, that intervened to prevent the seizure of Dalny-an event expected after the first blow at Port Arthur-since the opportunity was allowed to pass. On the morning after the torpedo attack, Admiral Togo appeared off Port Arthur and shelled the Russian fleet, but only inflicted upon it slight additional damage. His attack was not pressed, clearly because he was not allowed to risk his ships, though many of his junior officers would have preferred more resolute tactics. From this point on for several weeks there was no serious fighting between the fleets. The Russians made no more grave mistakes, though they displayed a great want of initiative, and failed to use their torpedo craft with energy. The Japanese maintained a mild blockade of Port Arthur, and the two fleets virtually neutralized each other. But the Russians had abandoned all claim to the command of the sea.

The value of a perfect co-ordination of political and naval action is a second lesson of this war. When matters were growing serious, in the winter of 1903-4, the Japanese navy underwent a special battle-training-constant firing at long range with heavy guns, under war conditions, torpedo work at night, in bad weather, using live torpedoes, manoeuvring at night without lights, night-firing, and the rehearsal of operations that were actually to form part of the war when it began. Hence the immense self-confidence which the Japanese displayed, and the complete preparedness of their fleet when the hour for action came. Plans were practically worked out immediately before war, and not pigeonholed at the Japanese admiralty. In fact, the Japanese navy took a “flying

start."

This power of intelligent preparation, so that the maximum of force may be exerted in the minimum of time, is what we mean by the word organization, and the study of all modern wars shows it to be the chief factor in giving success. Here, happily, there are signs that the British Admiralty is taking action, and that in the future useless exercises, of no military value, will be eliminated from the training of our fleet, so that its whole energy will be concentrated upon readiness for war. Yet the danger always remains that the military section of the Admiralty may be obstructed in its efforts by the civil section or by the Cabinet, which may refuse to vote the funds required, not understanding the vital importance of the measures proposed.

A third lesson of the war in the Far East has been the importance of the Napoleonic principle of concentration of force. The Russian Admiralty did not place in the Far East a fleet equal to the Japanese, though without any great difficulty it could have done so, since there were a number of older

battleships and cruisers in the Baltic that might have been very serviceable had they been stationed at Port Arthur or Vladivostock. Possibly the want of docking and repairing facilities was the explanation of this mistake. But even accepting this explanation, it does not account for the fact that when war was imminent isolated ships were not recalled and placed in safety. Thus three vessels, the Variag, Ķorietz, and Mandjur, were lost to the Russian flag with their crews for the whole of the war, and the Japanese were given an easy victory at Chemulpo. The present British Admiralty is taking steps to do what the Russians left undone, and to withdraw weak and old ships from exposed positions. Yet not till the advent of Sir J. Fisher to Whitehall was this policy of concentration adopted, so easy is it for the obvious to escape the attention of those whose main energy is absorbed in routine work.

In the first twenty-four hours the Japanese navy had asserted its temporary command of the sea (temporary because the arrival of the Baltic fleet was always to be feared, and might transform the conditions), yet it is instructive to note that the greatest difficulty has been experienced in blockading the Russian ports. Up to May, indeed, Port Arthur was only watched while Vladivostock was practically left unmolested to the date of writing. The peculiar geographical conditions of the Far East enable the Japanese to adopt this policy, since the Vladivostock ships could not well escape from the Japan Sea without being sighted from the Japanese coast, and thus could not suddenly fall upon the communications of the Japanese fleet at the Elliot Islands or the Japanese army in Korea. The Straits of Korea were held by Kamimura with four armored cruisers, a force slightly superior to the Vladivostock ships, but this disposition left the Russians free to cruise

At

within the Japan Sea, or even, as they actually did in July, to pass out through the Tsugaru Straits and blockade Yokohama. It was dangerous for the Japanese squadron to leave its post and go in pursuit, as the Japan Sea is famous for its fogs, and under cover of fog the Russian ships might easily have slipped southward past Kamimura, and caused great damage to the Japanese transports and colliers. the same time, with the Japanese force available it was impossible to blockade Vladivostock, because the port has two entrances, a considerable distance apart, because of the frequency of fogs there, and because of the want of a good naval base near at hand. At the very outset the Japanese naval force proved to weak for the work which was demanded of it, and notwithstanding its high efficiency was unable to perform that work with perfect success. Yet it had a greater margin of superiority as against the Russian fleet than the British navy possesses against one existing and possible naval combination.

At Port Arthur a strict blockade was attempted towards the close of May, but the Japanese have never been able to prevent isolated ships from running in and out. The long range guns mounted in the Russian works keep the powerful Japanese ships at a distance and do not allow them to close in as Admiral Sampson did at Santiago. Thus the Lieutenant Burakoff ran in and out; the Reshitelny and Raztoropny escaped; and numerous merchantmen and junks laden with supplies and ammunition have made their way through the blockading line. This is in entire accordance with British manoeuvre experience and it shows the practical impossibility of sealing a hostile port by any blockade, however close. We must be prepared in war to see hostile

1 Since this was written, after six attacks, the "Sevastopol" has been seriously injured out

ships escape singly, if not in squadrons, should we attempt a blockade, though whether we can blockade is more than doubtful, as there are no good bases near the ports which we should have to watch, whereas the Japanese were able to seize and use first the Elliot Islands, only seventy miles from Port Arthur and well placed from the strategic point of view, and then Dalny as their flying bases. Their battleships could remain at these points in perfect security, and receive from their cruisers off Port Arthur information of the enemy's movements. Hence the conditions must be pronounced far more favorable to them than they would be to ourselves in any probable conflict.

Turning now from the strategical lessons of the war to the tactical lessons, the first and most striking is the comparative inefficiency of the torpedo. From this weapon much had been expected, and it was employed upon a large scale. But except in the initial attack at Port Arthur it has gained no successes, and even at Port Arthur it did not sink a single ship. It failed to put any Russian ship permanently out of action. That the Retrisan, Tzarevitch, and Pallada would have sunk if they had been torpedoed far from shore is probable, but not certain. As it was, contrary to all anticipations, they were again at sea in five months, and very little the worse for their experience. The torpedoes used upon them were the large and powerful 18-in. of latest pattern, which, after the British experiments upon the Belleisle, might have been expected to shatter completely the part of the ship struck and to cause a terrible shock to the boilers and machinery. The actual damage was as follows: a large hole was blown in the Retvisan's side. her engines were thrown slightly out side Port Arthur by the Japanese torpedo

flotilla.