is the attitude of the European Powers during a war at the present day. And there is no secret made of it, and no shame expressed. That assistance by individuals of other countries should be given to the belligerents is perhaps inevitable, but just as many things in private life, which are not expressly forbidden by law, can only be practised sub rosa, and against the trend of public opinion, so we might expect that in national affairs any assistance should be given clandestinely. But this is far from being the case, as may be judged from the recent statements of Monsieur Bompard, French Ambassador to Russia, given to a reporter. This eminent French diplomat had no hesitation in discussing openly and rejoicing over the fact that Russia was preparing to spend a certain proportion of her money in the purchase of war material in France. The most dreadful part of the matter is, that nobody seemed to be astonished that he should do so. And yet, what would one say of a spectator who handed one of two fighting men a knife? Reluctantly we are forced to the conclusion that the European nations do not really know what international morality is, their vision is obscured by their desire to profit by every opportunity. The remarkable letter of Professor Holland to The Times, in which he stated in effect that contraband selling was legitimate so long as the vessel was not captured, threw an unpleasant light upon the condition of affairs in the international field. What would be said of any one who advanced the theory that we could commit murders and not be doing wrong unless we were found out? And yet that is the argument solemnly advanced by one whose name, as an international law expert, is world-wide. The question of contraband becomes exceptionally acute in a case where the ships are running the

blockade to provision a besieged fortress. Here they are undoubtedly and directly assisting one belligerent, and equally certainly being the cause of the loss of many more lives to the attacking force. As the law now stands, those who run the blockade do so without any personal risk. If caught, their cargo and their ships are confiscated, but they themselves go scot free. And since few blockade-runners start without sufficient money down to cover this risk, this punishment is not such as to deter the contrabandiers from running the blockade. And neutral territory is openly used to prepare these blockade-running expeditions. In

Shanghai so little secrecy was there about the matter, that a case was tried in the public court in which the sailors of a British steamer had refused to sail because she was going to run the blockade to Vladivostok. Here we have a British vessel, in a harbor where British influence is paramount, calmly preparing to convey goods to Russia to enable her to fight longer against the British ally-Japan. Nothing is done to prevent the ship sailing, and the only feeling, should she arrive safely, would be one of satisfaction at the cleverness of the British sailingmaster, and the profits of the owners. In the future the laws must place the blockade-runners on the same footing as belligerents, and make them liable to being shot if captured. If a soldier is found passing through the line in civilian clothes he is shot as a spy. What are the blockade-runners but belligerents in civilian clothes? All these proofs of the lack of an international morality are very saddening, evidences as they are of national decadence and a lack of progress.

The international morals of Japan are much higher than those of Europe, and this has often resulted in her being deceived and taken in by overmuch confidence in her neighbors. But

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it is a quality which makes nations truly great, and an immoral nation can never be for long a great nation. though there are no moral companions for Japan in Europe, there is one in the United States of America. The United States feels intense sympathy with Japan, and does so because she can understand the motives which actuate Japanese policy. These motives are too high to be comprehensible to us. In the past, the United States have shown outward and visible signs of international morality. After the bombardment of the Straits of Shimonoseki by the allied fleets to force the Japanese hand, the Americans turned the indemnity to Japan. But this was the only nation to do so. Great Britain, whose Fleet acted without orders from London, accepted the fait accompli, and kept the indemnity. It was the case of a parent who, having told his little boy not to steal his neighbor's apples, on finding that he has gone and stolen a basketful, forgives him and says, "Give me the apples." The United States also acted very rightly in regard to the Boxer outbreak. The message of President Roosevelt, after his re-election this year, is one of the finest expositions of the American idea of international morality that can be found anywhere.

The steady aim of this nation (wrote President Roosevelt), as of all enlightened nations, should be to strive to bring ever nearer the day when there shall prevail throughout the world the peace of justice. There are kinds of peace which are highly undesirable, which are in the long run as destructive as any war. . . . The peace of tyrannous terror, the peace of craven weakness, the peace of unrighteousness, these should be shunned as we shun unrighteous war. The goal set before us as a nation, the goal which should be set before all mankind, is the attainment of the peace of justice, of the peace which comes when each nation is not merely safe-guarded in its

own rights, but scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty towards others. Generally peace tells for righteousness; but if there is conflict between the two, then our fealty is due first to the cause of righteousness. Unrighteous wars are common and unrighteous peace is rare; but both should be shunned. ... It is our duty to remember that a nation has no more right to do injustice to another nation, strong or weak, than an individual has to do injustice to another individual; that the same moral law applies in one case as in the other. . . . Within the nation the individual has now delegated this right to the State-that is, to the representative of all the individuals-and it is a maxim of the law that for every wrong there is a remedy. But in international law we have not advanced by any means as far as we have advanced in municipal law. There is as yet no judicial way of enforcing a right in international law. When one nation wrongs another or wrongs many others, there is no tribunal before which the wrongdoer can be brought. Either it is necessary supinely to acquiesce in the wrong, and thus put a premium upon brutality and aggression, or else it is necessary for the ag grieved nation valiantly to stand up for its rights. Until some method is devised by which there shall be a degree of international control over offending nations, it would be a wicked thing for the most civilized Powers, for those with most sense of international obligations and with keenest and most generous appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, to disarm. If the great civilized nations of the present day should completely disarm, the result would mean an immediate recrudescence of barbarism in one form or another. Under any circumstances a sufficient armament would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of international police; and until international cohesion and the sense of international duties and rights are far more advanced than at present, a nation desirous both of securing respect for itself and of doing good to others must have a force adequate for the work which it feels is allotted to it as its

part of the general world duty. Therefore it follows that a self-respecting, just, and farseeing nation should on the one hand endeavor by every means to aid in the development of the various movements which tend to provide substitutes for war, which tend to render nations in their actions towards one another, and indeed towards their own peoples, more responsive to the general sentiment of humane and civilized mankind; and on the other hand that it should keep prepared, while scrupulously avoiding wrongdoing itself, to repel any wrong, and in exceptional cases to take action which in a more advanced stage of international relations would come under the head of the exercise of the international police. A great free people owes it to itself and to all mankind not to sink into helplessness before the powers of evil.

In addition to these words expressing the American policy, they also voice accurately the Japanese policy. That the people of the United States recognize that this is so, is shown by the very remarkable cablegram sent to the Emperor of Japan at a banquet to Prince Fushimi in America, at which the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, assisted. This message ran :

The health of the Emperor has just been drunk amid great enthusiasm. The sentiment was warmly applauded that the character and ability of the Emperor would prove as potent in the regeneration of Asia as it had been in the regeneration of his own country.

Which is a very decided answer to the hysterical Yellow Peril moans of the German Emperor, as well as a vote of confidence in Japanese morality. There would seem to be hope for the world if these two moral nations have come together to work for peace and progress along moral lines. The words penned by Mr. Loomis may help Great Britain to realize her duty and cause all true patriots to rally to the full support of that alliance which is so valua

ble an asset in our national strength. It must be remembered that the carrying out in full good faith of the treaty of alliance is all that even the most exigent Japanese would expect, and this we ought to do, without being forced to do so by national expediency. And yet this question of an alliance with Japan is distinctly one of national expediency. It will pay us better to be allied to Japan than to return to our former "splendid" isolation. There are not wanting those in England who, had they the reins of power in their hands, would abrogate the treaty. This they would do for party reasons, being largely color-blind as to foreign policy. To tell any politician on the Continent that there is a party in England opposed to the Japanese alliance is to lay one's self open to ridicule and derision. To the foreign nations such a course is unthinkable. And Japan is no uncertain quantity. She has proved her reliability in the fire of as fierce a temptation as ever be placed before a nation. Fighting for her national existence, Japan has made no movement to drag Great Britain into the war, although the bringing of her into it would have been all advantage and no disadvantage to Japan. Neither has Japan done anything save restrain China from mixing herself in the war, and so bringing in other Powers. Japan, having emerged triumphantly from this ordeal, we cast mud at her, and disparage the value of the alliance. It needs no great discernment to discover that at the present time a faithful ally is a very rare possession. We have only to look at the alliances existing in Europe to-day to see how much worse we might have fared. As has been shown above, on the Continent and in the Far East, the Japanese alliance means great things to Great Britain. All the gain has been on our side, since there can be very few thinking people who can argue that,

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during this war, we have been profitable allies to Japan. Notwithstanding this, the Japanese are quite ready to keep up the alliance with Great Britain, and even to extend its scope. In China, Great Britain is nothing, and less than nothing, unsupported by Japan. It is interesting to recall the fact that it is to a Japanese envoy that the foreign representatives at Peking owe their first reception by the Chinese Emperor. In a recent number of the Jiji Shimpo, one of the leading Japanese newspapers, a policy of extending the alliance was advocated in all seriousness. Japan expects to obtain the Island of Sakhalin as one of the results of the war, just as Great Britain has obtained a foothold in Tibet as another. The Jiji Shimpo advocates a widening of the alliance to cover the questions of Persia, of Tibet, of India, as well as those of Sakhalin, China, and Korea. "Let each ally have equal rights and benefits. Let the alliance, instead of limiting the extent of the war, serve as a means of preventing all wars. Let each of the allies agree to come to the support of the other if attacked. The danger is equally great for both, because Russia will not more easily forget Tibet than Manchuria." Thus it would seem as if Great Britain might draw still greater advantages from the Japanese alliance should she so wish. On the other hand, if the alliance be ended through British action, then there may well be cause for anxiety. There are already in Australia, and elsewhere, existing questions which, quiescent during the alliance, would naturally The Fortnightly Review.

come up for settlement were there no alliance. Neither could any one blame Japan, if she were cast out as a pariah nation, from seeking Asiatic friends, little as she wishes this. The effect upon the native races subject to Great Britain in Asia might also be worth consideration. The progress of Japan has fired their imagination, but they refrain from seeking her as a leader because of the fact that Japan is the friend of Great Britain. All which goes to prove that on the score of national expediency, if on no other, it is necessary to take every measure, not only to secure the continuance of the alliance, but also to infuse international morality into our dealings with our ally. This fact should make it easier and not more difficult for Great Britain to keep adequately her pledged word to Japan or to any other nation. The case of Japan is a case in point at the moment, but the question is one which extends to all British foreign relations. Besides the immediate benefit to us from the alliance, it may lead us to that most desired goal of a new triple alliance, for Peace, when the United States, Japan, and Great Britain shall stand together as the guardians of international justice and morality. Such a combination would be all-powerful, and might well rejuvenate the world. Let us be wise in time, and not, like the unwise virgins of Scripture, be left to mourn outside the door. Great Britain should reform her international ideas, and thus ensure the possession of at least a sleeping partnership in the coming dominant combination.

Alfred Stead.

Diffidence is not a marked feature in English character, and there are not many subjects which a full-blooded Englishman will not tackle. It is therefore almost pathetic to notice the hopelessness with which a person who has not had the privilege of Scots blood or a training in Scots history approaches ecclesiastical affairs in Scotland. English visitors cannot remain impervious to the prevailing atmosphere, and are obliged, even though they be Gallios at home, who care for none of these things, to give their attention to the question of the Kirk. They find at a glance that there are various Kirks, and that they are all provokingly like one another; they discover, on going a little into the matter, that the distinctions between them are extremely subtle but very pronounced, and that even the humblest people with whom they associate understand them thoroughly and hold them firmly. Very likely those distinctions may not be more important or more unintelligible than those between the different forms of dissent in England, and the average Englishman will tell you any day without a blush that he has never been able to distinguish between a Baptist and a Congregationalist. The Scots Kirk has, however, in all her branches, her divisions, her controversies, her creeds, something of the rugged strength and irresistible fascination of Scots character and scenery. No one, neither king nor statesman in history, has been able to treat the Kirk as a negligible quantity. If he tried to do so, he got into trouble instantly, and very likely had invited a disastrous defeat. From the beginning of her separate history in the sixteenth century to 1843, the year of the last battle with the State, the Church of Scotland has been the

most virile, determined, uncompromis. ing, and unmanageable factor in Scots life. Her attitude expressed in the minds of the people challenges attention, and the English visitor does his honest best to understand the difference between the various parties in what is practically the one Scots Church. It is no reflection upon his intelligence that as a rule he fails, and comes South a chastened man, full of questions to which he has not found an answer, and ideas of his own which are largely wrong. For centuries Scotland has been one large theological debating society, and the national intellect, exercised from school days upon the most profound and speculative themes in Christian thought, has become a perfect instrument for the creation of distinctions and the pursuit of inferences. Has any nation produced a peasantry so learned in theology? to whom, according to David Deans, "Independency is a foul heresy, and Anabaptism a damnable and deceiving error," and to whom an Erastian, a Romanist, an Arminian, and a Cocceian, as well as all sectaries, are equally obnoxious. Perhaps the most wonderful achievement of the Scots intellect has not been Hume's philosophy, or Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, but the distinctions which separate the branches of the Scots Church; and the second most remarkable achievement has been understand

ing them. And my modest but perhaps not unuseful purpose in this article is not to discuss the law of a recent momentous decision of the House of Lords, but to explain the situation, how it came about, what it means, and what is likely to be its issue.

Before one approaches the history of the divisions in the Church of Scotland