What shall it profit a nation if it gain the whole world and lose its own integrity? This is a question which is a very pertinent one to all citizens of the British Empire at the present moment. On January 30th, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance was signed in London, and was the result, to quote Lord Lansdowne's words, of the discovery that the Far Eastern policy of the two nations "was identical." The British Foreign Minister also referred to the treaty as "an international contract of binding validity." Since January, 1902, how has this alliance, entered into as "of mutual advantage to the two countries," been observed by the contracting parties? Up to the outbreak of the war with Russia there was little test of the sincerity of the two Powers, and, although Great Britain seemed content to view with comparative indifference Russian aggression in Manchuria and Korea, the alliance may be said to have been

GOOD FAITH AND

EXPEDIENCY.

adequately maintained. To Japan the gain by the alliance was largely a sentimental one, since it demonstrated to all the world the fact that Japan had made so great a progress that an alliance with a great European Power was possible. Beyond this the alliance partook rather of the nature of a shadowy assurance against attack by two Powers. For Great Britain the gains, even before the Russian war, were much more substantial. British diplomacy assumed a new importance at Peking when backed by Japan, and amongst other results, the Tibetan expedition was rendered possible. Since the beginning of the RussoJapanese war and the consequent revelation of Japan's power, the advantages to British diplomacy in Europe have been very considerable. If the advantages accruing to one and the other be compared, there can be no doubt that Great Britain got the best of the bargain. Should any one feel inclined to

dispute this let him travel around Europe, especially in the small Balkan States, and their attitude towards Great Britain alone and Great Britain and Japan allied will speedily afford him sufficient proof. Great Britain is envied her good fortune in having seen clearly enough to ally herself to the coming Power before the world knew Japan's worth. The opinion of the Continent on this subject is very much that of a mining camp towards a miner who has staked out his claim in an immensely rich diamond field before any one else knew diamonds were there. This Continental envy is convincing proof of the alliance with Japan, were such proof needed. But, after all, it is not a question of relative advantage or disadvantage; it is simply a question of fact. The treaty was made and stands; how has it been kept? The record of British policy during the war is such as to cause any thinking Englishman seriously to question the moral adequacy of our foreign policy. Do we make treaties to keep them, or is it permissible to break both the spirit and the letter of a treaty when urged to do so by a senseless fear? And there is reason for such a query, except, alas! that it must be added that business has proved as potent a charm as has fear. Great Britain has not even been neutral-certainly not benevolently neutral-towards her ally. Without going into details, there are several flagrant examples of Great Britain's lack of good faith towards Japan. The trade with the Russian Government and the Russian Baltic Fleet in Welsh coal could probably only have been prevented by an individual sense of rectitude too great to be hoped for in any nation where civilization has been developed along individual rather than along national lines. But the Government might well have assisted the national conscience by making the path of money-earning more difficult. As it

was, the traffic was carried on openly and shamelessly, without any real attempt by the Government or by public opinion to prevent it. The case of the destroyer Caroline, which sailed down the Thames past the Houses of Parliament, en route to Libau, under the charge of British subjects, is more serious from the point of principle than of actual and material damage. But since the builders of the Caroline have publicly stated that they warned the Admiralty that the ship had been sold, it seems difficult to exonerate the Government from at least tacit connivance at this open assistance of the opponent of our ally. British ships have taken coal to the Baltic Fleet, and thus deliberately assisted the pas sage of a hostile fleet towards Japanour ally. A very flagrant case was that of the Roddam, which openly conveyed coal to Suda Bay for the Baltic Fleet. without calling down any of the punishments legally enforceable against her owners or her crew, of whom at least a certain proportion are British. presumably. The enthusiastic welcome of the Baltic Fleet by the authorities in Egypt contrasts very curiously with the reception accorded to the Spanish Fleet under Admiral Cervera in 1898, when it was attempting to pass through the Canal to reach the Philippines. In the words of Cervera's own despatch, "after waiting four days for the decision of the Egyptian Government as to trans-shipping coal to the Pelayo, this trans-shipment has been forbidden, and we have been ordered at once to leave all Egyptian ports." This treatment was at the time ascribed to British benevolent neutrality to the United States during her war with Spain. All the more remarkable appears, then, the permission given to the Baltic Fleet to take in coal at Port Said. Is there one kind of benevolent neutrality when it only calls for action against a smaller

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other high contracting party will maintain a strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

To grant such valuable assistance to Russia as against Japan by enabling the Russian Fleet to proceed towards that country, is as clear an infraction of the treaty as can be imagined. And what must not be forgotten is that the Continent looks at all these incidents in a way derogatory to British prestige, and as signs of British fear of Russia. Along this line was the announcement of the Russian Admiral that the British Fleet had "protected" the Baltic Fleet during part of its journey, and the presentation of a cup by the Tsar to a British naval officer. The latter is a disgrace to Great Britain, and it must have come as a surprise to many that the traditions of the British Navy could happily submit to such a studied insult. The British action in connection with the North Sea incident is perhaps the worst of all the crimes against our ally. The North Sea Convention, as it finally emerged from the St. Petersburg mould, bears every sign of being a treaty to try Japan-our ally-for an offence with which nobody, not even those Russians who affirm it, believe Japan had anything to do. Apart from

the unnecessary truckling to Russia implied by the change in the wording of the convention, the whole arrangement is a distinct breach of the fourth article of the treaty of alliance with Japan. This states that, "The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests described in the foregoing articles."

How ever British diplomats could have allowed themselves to be enticed into this Russian trap passes comprehension. Quite apart from the breach of good faith with Japan in connection with the North Sea incident, it is interesting to note the effect which was produced by the devious course of British diplomacy on the smaller European States and on the Asiatic peoples. These saw in the incident an opportunity for Great Britain to raise her prestige without running any risk of a war with Russia. Although these countries close their eyes too easily perhaps to moral arguments, it is well for us not to ignore what was the effect of the fatal half-strong, half-weak policy adopted by the British Government. The first few days the prestige of Great Britain went up, but by the time the convention was announced it had fallen so low as to be quite invisible. A case in point is to be found in Persia. The Russian reverses had strengthened the hands of Sir Arthur Hardinge in Teheran, but the British retreat before Russia, as it appeared to the Persians, led the Shah at once to send a special mission of friendship to St. Petersburg. So little trouble does Great Britain take to maintain her prestige, that at the present moment it is not too much to say that British prestige is upheld by Japan. Especially is this the case with Asiatic countries. An Englishman from the Far East recently wrote an excellent

It is Japan alone that has saved us and the British Empire from a reduction to impotence in the China Seas. ... Instead of the Alliance producing a feeling of satisfaction that we possess the friendship and support of a nation which has shown itself superior in organization to all the rest of the world, an utterly illogical apprehension tends to drive them into the opposite extreme. Such people cannot see that our international position minus the Alliance would be hazardous in the extreme, and that if there is one factor which has furthered our European policy more than another, it has been the alliance with Japan. The backing of Japan, especially in Asian political questions, has strengthened our diplomacy immensely, and increasingly so ever since the world was forced to recognize the brilliant efficiency of the Mikado's naval and military power.

Japanese statesmen have not by any means overlooked the British laxity in neutrality, as is evidenced by the following statement made by Baron Suyematsu :

It is strongly felt that the nations of Europe are assisting Russia in a way never contemplated by us. I do not suggest that England is not fulfilling her duty as an ally, but even in this country much indirect assistance is being rendered to Russia by individuals.

But for the assistance of the subjects of neutral States, the Baltic Fleet could never have put to sea, and it could not have gone far without English coal. Probably this sale is not effected directly, but Russia is receiving very material assistance.

When contraband trade is carried on in the present wholesale and open fashion, the Government of the country in question should take steps to prevent the continuance of action prejudicial to another nation, especially when that nation happens to be an ally.

There might easily arise a case in

connection with the Baltic Fleet's journey to the Far East which would force the nations having ports in the south of Asia to come to a definite decision upon the possibility of allowing facilities to one belligerent and not to the other. Suppose, as is quite possi ble, that Admiral Togo decided to go and meet the Baltic Fleet in the Malayan Archipelago, and in the pursuance of this policy were to put into Saigon or Singapore to repair and coal. Would the French and British authorities be prepared to grant to the Japanese ships the same facilities as were granted to the Baltic Fleet in French harbors and in Egypt?

But

The net result of the attitude of the European Powers during this war has been to call up very considerable doubts as to the existence of any international morality amongst them. Of course it is well known that international law is very backward, and consists of a few great conventions, such as the Geneva and Hague conventions, and local treaties affecting only parts of the community. there is, besides these international laws, an international morality, just as in private life there are many things governed by sentiments or public opinion and not by law. Gradually the system of international morality was to develop into a system of international law, binding upon all the world -such was the desire of all progressive people. All nations are unanimous in declaring themselves desirous for peace, and as abhorring war. Therefore they might have been expected, if not actually to work for peace, not to work against it. And yet, what is the case to-day? Instead of working for peace, the European nations are urging on the war. Two men are fighting in the street in a private quarrel, and instead of attempting to dissuade them from their fisticuffs, the spectators are handing now one a