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about the highly welcome improvement in Anglo-Afghan relations.

Up to almost the close of last year there was nothing in Habibullah's policy on which to found a hope that he would modify the stern and exclusive policy of his father. He was the fanatical "King of Islam," the upholder of monopolies and prohibitive duties, and the patron of border chiefs and clans who had rightly incurred our displeasure. Like his father, he was never actively hostile, and he kept to the strict letter of his obligations, but his friendship was of the stand-off category, and closed the door to intimacy. The first indication of a coming change was given last December. The Ameer, without preliminary warning, announced in durbar his intention of founding a Chiefs' College, in which the basis of instruction should be the English language, taught by native graduates of India brought from that country. The proposal naturally aroused the greatest opposition on the part of the mollahs, or priests, who so far as they dared upbraided Hubibullah for being false to his religion. The Ameer declared himself unshaken in his plan, but his attention soon after this public statement was called away from reform matters by the perilous personal dispute between himself and his half-brother, Omar Jan, supported by that youth's mother, the Bibi Halima-a title meaning "Queen of the Harem," given to Abdurrahman's principal wife during his lifetime. dispute, which at one moment threatened to have a tragic ending, went on throughout the winter, but it conIcluded with the Ameer's complete triumph, and the humiliation of Omar Jan and the Bibi Halima. Omar Jan, the favorite youngest son of the late Ameer, is said to have made himself contemptible in the eyes of the Afghan people, and is openly spoken of as "a delicate and conceited fool," while

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the Bibi Halima herself is a State prisoner in her own palace.

While this family controversy was in progress, and just as events were shaping themselves for the consolidation of the Ameer's position, news came of the outbreak of the war between Japan and Russia. Is there any reason for surprise in this event arousing as much interest in Cabul as in London? The Afghans have a lengthy frontier against Russian territory. There have been many collisions along that frontier which have been ignored by the discriminating directors of our newspapers. There was last winter a large immigration of Russian Turcoman subjects into Afghan territory. The Ameer suddenly found the population of his State thus increased by at least 4,000 persons, and he and his advisers did not know for a time whether they' would be allowed to keep them, or if they did, what troubles might not ensue. Then the boundary pillars along the north-west frontier had by natural decay or malice practically all disappeared. These and other circumstances furnished legitimate ground for anxiety at Cabul as to Russia's intentions. For the Afghans Russia's policy was, and must long remain, a dread and menacing reality.

At that moment of apprehension the war broke out in the Far East, and the Government of India is to be congratulated on having done a wise and a bold thing, which has been allowed to pass unnoticed. By agreement with the Ameer it deputed two of its officers, Mr. Dobbs and Major Wanliss, last March to superintend the repairing and replacing of the boundary pillars along the north-west frontier of Afghanistan. This work was successfully accomplished last July, and on their way back to India the two officers named enjoyed a week's hospitality in the palace at Cabul, and received from his own lips the Ameer's repeated thanks

for the good work that they had done. Once more the north-west frontier of Afghanistan is marked out in an unmistakable manner, and no one can violate it without leaving clear evidence of the fact.

The work referred to had barely commenced when news came that the Ameer had met with an accident whilst out shooting. Rumor magnified the occurrence, and in Russia it was generally reported that the Ameer was dead. As a matter of fact, the injury was not very great. His gun had burst, and torn the fingers of the left hand; with proper treatment the wound would have healed in a week or so. The native doctors, however, treated it improperly, and seriously aggravated the injury. The wound did not heal, and the Ameer became alarmingly ill. He was like to lose not merely his hand, but his life. At that critical moment information as to the state of the case reached India, and Lord Curzon at once offered the services of the surgeon on his own staff, Major Bird. The Ameer accepted them. Major Bird proceeded as fast as he could to Cabul, and arrived in time to save Habibullah's life. This signal service sank deep into the Ameer's heart. Major Bird was not the first English surgeon to give proof of his skill in the Afghan capital. Dr. Gray and Miss Hamilton had resided there during the reign of Abdurrahman, but no opportunity of rendering such timely aid to the ruler had presented itself to them. Major Bird's success where the native practitioners had grossly failed confirmed Habibullah's belief in the efficacy of modern science, and he at once decided to establish a hospital on the European model at Cabul. With the assistance of the Indian Government he has engaged an English doctor, a lady doctor, and three trained hospital assistants. They have reached Cabul by this time, and begun there their beneficent work.

As a conclusive proof of his gratitude, the Ameer ordered, last June, the abolition of the cruel penalty of hand-cutting for theft, which has prevailed in Afghanistan for ages, just as it has done among the barbarous chiefs of Central Asia.

It may be questioned whether these occurrences would have produced so deep, and, as there is every reason to believe, so abiding an impression on the Ameer's mind, but for the incidents of the war in the Far East. As soon as that contest became threatening, he ordered the establishment of daily postal runners from the Khyber to Cabul, so that he might receive regular intelligence without delay, and this practice is still in force. It is with no idle inquisitiveness that Habibullah pays thus heavily for the early receipt of news. He reads out the intelligence to his officials and subjects in open durbar, and then he delivers a kind of lecture on the events, and their bearing on the position and security of Afghanistan. The lesson is not the less impressive or attentively listened to because, in reality, it has been inculcated by one Asiatic race upon another, and against a common enemy. defeats of Russia are encouraging in one sense, because they show that she is not invincible; but from another point of view they do not allay the apprehension of the Ameer, for there is a widely prevalent belief in Central Asia that Russia will seek to recover the laurels she has lost in Manchuria by a move in the direction of India, and Afghanistan lies directly in her path.

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The drift of the Ameer's lectures is, according to the reports received of them, full of just appreciation and good sense. The Japanese are winning, he sets forth, because they were well prepared and ready at all points. Their careful prior organization explains their victory. It is not that Russian

soldiers are not brave, or that Russia has ceased to be a formidable military Power. She has just the same chances of success against a State that possesses only an inferior organization as she had before the struggle commenced on the shores of the Yellow Sea; and the Ameer has not concealed his belief that Afghanistan at present possesses only an inferior organization. His apprehension as to the consequences to his own country is the more lively because he seems to believe in the imminence of trouble in Central Asia, which all our authorities, it may be mentioned, agree in discrediting. But if we do not share the fears of Habibullah there will still be general agreement with his main conclusion, that Afghanistan has only a very inferior organization with which to defend her territory and independence.

He has already taken some small steps to improve it. He has opened arsenals at both Herat and Mazar-iSharif, whereas Cabul possessed, until quite recently, the only factory of arms in his kingdom. The arrangements for the defence of Herat have been improved, the fortification of the undoubtedly strong and extensive position at Mazar-i-Sharif has been brought to completion. But these measures, however necessary and advantageous, leave the question of organization untouched. No one knows the precise value, or rather, want of value, of the existing Afghan organization, but it would be an absurdity to think that it approaches, in even a remote degree, to Japanese efficiency. The most hopeful thing that can be said about it is that the Ameer, its responsible head, the son and successor of the man who created the existing Afghan army, appears to be aware of the defects in his own system. Where the responsible ruler possesses this knowledge there is good reason to look for improvement and reform. Some facts have been

mentioned that reveal the desire for progress in Habibullah's mind. Others might be found in his promotion of horse-breeding and agriculture, in the promptitude with which he prevented the increase of the price of grain by the merchants during a period of scarcity last year, and in his adoption of electricity as the system for lighting his capital and palace. If a comprehensive view is taken of all these facts, it will be admitted that the young Afghan ruler has displayed a progressive tendency that, if wisely encouraged, may, before he is an old man, contribute to the prosperity of his people, and bring about a real and lasting awakening of Afghanistan.

The question that now has to be carefully considered is in what way can the Government of India, which, in this quarter, directs and acts for British policy, assist this movement, at the same time that it does not lose sight of its own special and personal concerns. The Ameer tells his officials and his people, so far as they may be said to frequent his durbars, that the Japanese owe their success to organization, and that the Afghan State does not possess this essential element of strength and security. This may be news to the Afghans, but it is none to the British authorities, who were aware of the fact. The Ameer sees in it an element of weakness and of peril to his country; the Indian Government has long known that it made Afghanistan a feeble barrier against the advance of a well-organized Russian army of adequate numerical strength. The late Ameer used to brag of his line of forts along the Oxus, the present ruler seems to be taking a more just view of the position. By his own line of reasoning, and for his own needs, Habibullah is now inclined to express the very same opinions as the Indian Intelligence Department. Yet it would be going very much too fast

and too far to say that he is in the least degree inclined to accept the organization with which Lord Kitchener would, no doubt, he happy to equip him. He must be left to work out his salvation in his own way, and slower and less direct means will have to be discovered if we are to render him useful co-operation.

It may not be inopportune to remind the reader that the Afghan race is as brave and high-spirited as any on the earth. With a good rifle in his hand, the Afghan, individually, would be more than a match for any soldier of the Czar. But wars are no longer decided by the individual strength, courage, and activity of the combatants. Those qualities provide the best material of a fighting force, but it is for those in authority to supply the organization and cohesive power without which courage counts for little. How little has been accomplished in this direction in Afghanistan may be judged from the fact that no attempt has been made to create a body of regimental officers. The private soldier possesses a great many good points, but the officer and non-commissioned officer are practically worthless in the military sense. Afghan organization is thus totally lacking in almost its first essential. An army without officers of some slight degree of capacity is foredoomed to defeat, and that appears to be the true state of the Afghan army. This radical defect is put in the foreground of our comments because it appears to be the one that the Government of India could most easily cooperate in removing, without committing itself too far in the direction of interference in Afghanistan, and without compromising the Ameer's own position. There appears to be no objection to a certain number of officers of the Afghan army being trained with Indian regiments. In this way the formation of a nucleus of efficient of

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The questions of greatest interest to the Indian Government, in regard to Afghanistan, are, however, not of the military order. They are divisible under two main heads, trade and communications. But they are matters affecting the prosperity and security of Afghanistan, as closely as any detail of military organization. The late Ameer Abdurrahman imposed import duties on Indian trade that virtually killed it. His policy was rigidly conservative, and may be judged by one of his favorite sayings: "Pack-horses, and not railways, are all that the Afghans require for their commerce." As the necessary consequence, Afghan commerce did not expand, and the State revenue has continued to be of a comparatively low total. In the course of years the demands on the Exchequer have grown heavier, while its own resources have proved cramped and unelastic. The present ruler has displayed a more just view of the situation. He has not gone so far as to reverse the policy he inherited, but he has of late removed some of the more severe and arbitrary restrictions on trade, and he has shown interest in the affairs of the Cabul merchants, and more especially of the Povindahs, who are the great carriers between his country and India. As the consequence of this slight diminution of rigor, the returns of trade across the borders show a considerable increase, so that both

the merchants and the Government of Afghanistan have benefited. The facts thus favor a more enlightened policy, and they may even have made it clear to Habibullah that his father's policy was mistaken.

At any rate, there is enough to justify the belief that whenever the Indian Government takes up the discussion of a tariff with Afghanistan it will find Habibullah far more willing to listen to reasonable suggestions than in the past. It may be well to fix with precision exactly what the Indian Government want him most to do. The principal Indian produce for which we wish to obtain a market in Afghanistan and Central Asia is tea. There was a period when it seemed as if Indian tea might command those markets, but these hopes were killed by the late Ameer's policy. If Habibullah can be induced to place only a light import duty on it they will revive, and very satisfactory results must follow for both parties. It is true that Russia's custom houses come down to the Oxus, and that the Russian import duty is even higher than the Afghan.

But it may be observed that the markets south of the Oxus are extensive and profitable, and also that the Russian customs line may not prove so impenetrable as is assumed. A diminution of the duty on tea can also be bought by some concessions on our side in favor of Afghan produce.

An improvement in the tariff will not suffice by itself to cause any large augmentation in the volume of IndoAfghan trade. It must be accompanied by an improvement in communications. The argument that pack-horses are good enough can no longer be taken seriously. We have reason to believe that the Ameer is disposed to concede a good deal about the tariff, but we are absolutely in the dark as to his views about railways, and yet without railways there can never be any true

awakening of Afghanistan. For nearly twenty years we have had a line of railway to Chaman, on the southern side of the great plain of Candahar, but owing to the Afghan prohibition to continue it, this railway has remained for all commercial purposes absolutely useless and unprofitable. To make the absurdity of the situation more glaring, we are now constructing through nonAfghan territory, but along the Afghan border, another railway, in order to reach the Persian province of Seistan. There is nothing to be said against this Nushki route, which was adopted as a pis aller, but it is undeniable that if we and the Ameer could come to terms, it would appear of little importance in comparison with trunk lines through Candahar to Herat in one direction, and Cabul in the other.

There is another matter to which the Ameer is not unlikely to lend a willing ear, and this may pave the way to the introduction of railways into his country later on. He can have no misgivings about facilitating the transmission of news. If he had acquiesced some time ago in the establishment of wireless telegraphy between the Khyber and his capital, he would have got his daily bulletin about the war more rapidly and at less cost. Habibullah has a good deal of mechanical knowledge. He was once a constant visitor to the Cabul workshops, and he is quite convinced of the advantages of electricity for lighting purposes. There is no apparent reason why he should demur to the employment of the same agency for the receipt of intelligence. It is most essential in his own interests that he should be able to know at once what is happening at both Herat and on the Oxus. Some remissness has surely been shown in not impressing on him the prime importance of this question. His suspicions might have been dispelled if he had been exhorted in the first place to lay the wires only

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