country going as freely to school as do those of the United States or Japan, then may he take heart and know that Russia can for the first time rightfully take her place among the foremost nations of the world. And so it is that, after less than nine months of war, the question of the day has become, not "Will Japan win?" but "How and why?" If it be permitted to speak paradoxically, the answer is simply that Japan will win because she has already achieved victory! This seemingly bold statement becomes more capable of comprehension when we remember what are the reasons and objects of the war. It is useless to hold any idea that Japan seeks to annihilate her enemy, or to crush Russia at home; to occupy Moscow or even Irkutsk. There has never been any ground for such supposition, and yet in this case alone would Russia's greatest acquisite, territorial vastness, be of value to her. There is ground for the belief that an invasion of Russia by any Power would be, must be, doomed to failure, except under the most exceptional conditions. An insane Government or a nation led by madmen might attempt or dream of such a war, but Japan is not governed by madmen. Far from it! There has never been the slightest uncertainty in the minds of the Japanese statesmen and people as to what the war was about, and what results had to be attained thereby. Russian generals may have talked glibly about signing treaties of peace in Tokio, but there is no instance recorded of a Japanese vaunt of negotiations in the Russian capital. Japan went to war with Russia for certain definite reasons, and the accomplishing of these she considers should be taken to constitute success. Japan stands in this war as the advoIcate of the high principles of justice, freedom, and Christian civilization. She stands for education against ignorance, for freedom of religion against

religious intolerance. Truly she is fighting the battle of all that is highest in our Western civilization, even against our wishes it would seem, so difficult do the Western nations find it to keep up to those principles, which they profess their missionaries teach, and leave to an Asiatic country to defend. It was of vital interest for Japan to secure Korea from the Russian domination which was threatening it, and also to take such steps in Manchuria and in Korea as should prevent Russia from being able to menace Japan permanently. Secondly, there was the question of influence over China, which depended on the comparative prestige of the two nations, the possession of Manchuria largely deciding this. Russia had taken Manchuria, temporarily or permanently, from China. If Japan could give back to China the ancient tombs of the Manchu dynasty and at least part of Manchuria, there could be no doubt as to which nation would have the dominating influence in China. This is clearly shown by a letter of Li-HungChang published in the Times. LiHung-Chang was as thoroughly Russian a Chinaman as any member of that nation can ever become foreign, and yet the following quotation shows that he regarded the matter with an undecided mind. "Wait until you can be sure, and then back the winner," was his sage advice.

"In the event of war," he wrote, "should things take an unfavorable turn for the Japanese, it will be our business to join the Russians and help them to crush the Japanese, thus establishing a claim upon the gratitude of Russia, who, retaining Korea for herself, will give back Manchuria to China. If, on the other hand, the Russians are unable to withstand the Japanese, we can join with the latter and help them to drive the Russians out of Manchuria. Thus we shall get back Manchuria without running any grave

risks, whilst in present circumstances it might be difficult for us to recover possession of it."

The Chinese people as a whole, it is worth observing, agree with Li-HungChang.

It is not difficult, when once it is understood what the war was and is about, and what results were expected by the Japanese, to see that Japan has already practically obtained all that she is fighting for. Korea is under her protection; Manchuria proper has been cleared of Russians to Mukden; battle after battle has demonstrated to the Chinese the superiority of Japan, and at the present moment the immediate peril to Japan of Russia as an armed neighbor has been rendered very slight. And, strive how she will, it is very difficult to imagine that Russia can undo any of these things. In the field nothing more can be done by Russia except under very different conditions. Oyama and Kuropatkin south of Mukden have settled finally the question of the possibility of a Russian advance south. Such an advance would only have a chance of success were Kuropatkin able to dispose of such an overwhelming preponderance of numbers as is quite out of the question for Russia to send and to maintain in Manchuria. The effect upon the Chinese of the Japanese successes may be judged by the nonchalant way in which the Chinese Government dealt with M. Lessar's protest against the seizure of the Russian destroyer at Chifu. Especially efficacious has been the slow but sure reduction of Port Arthur, because here a question of principle is involved. The Peking correspondent of the Times also bears testimony to the commercial part of Japan's victory:

The Japanese have certainly obtained a position in the empire superior to that secured by any other nation. Japanese agents are active in all the

provinces, and Japanese travellers are to be met with even in such remote provinces as Yunnan and Sze-chuan, and right away in Kashgaria. Chinese are also proceeding in large numbers to Japan, and nearly every week we hear of the departure of fresh batches of students, many of them of a superior class, well born and well connected. There is also a continuous immigration of Japanese into China. The Chinese at present are more closely in contact with the Japanese than with any other foreigners.

As far as the military part of the war is concerned, Japan can more than hold her own with Russia. There may be talk of second and third Russian armies, but Japan can raise man for man with her adversary, and can place the men in the field in a fourth of the time. She need thus never despatch her extra troops until the Russians have been some time on the way

-a

considerable saving. Above all, she can feed all her troops, even should she place a million men in the field. It is doubtful whether Russia can feed and maintain 500,000 men.

Dissension in high quarters has had much to do with the absolute failure of the Russian strategy. Mr. Millard, an American correspondent who has been with the Russian Manchurian army since the war began, wrote in July:

The Russian Commander-in-Chief has had more handicaps than numerical weakness, a strategically difficult position, and a lack of support in certain high quarters. It is not to be wondered at that of late his temper has become so irritable that even his chief lieutenants hesitate to approach him. As for General Kuropatkin's relations with the Viceroy, they are no longer even outwardly amiable. All pretence has been thrown aside, and the whole army knows that the Commanding General and the Viceroy hold no communication with each other beyond what is absolutely necessary. As will readily be understood, this knowledge

The

The value of this evidence from within the Russian army, by a man who is in sympathy with the Russian Commander-in-Chief, and who had seen three months of the war when he wrote, is great. If necessary, there is also much evidence from other sources to demonstrate the impossibility of the Russian soldiers succeeding in the future where they have failed in the past. letters of the late General Count Keller contain much information concerning the conduct of the troops and the organization of the army. He wrote that whole regiments were without uniforms or proper clothes, others had no boots, the deficiency of the sanitary arrangements was appalling, and confusion was general. Another officer's letters from the front contained the following pregnant passage:

Given equal numbers on either side, there is on our part-on the staff, at any rate-no hope of absolute and in

disputable victory after the refusal of the Twenty-second Regiment to attack at Tuirencheng, and after the terrible havoc wrought by the Japanese artillery at Wafangkau.

Evidence might be piled upon evidence. As far as stores are concerned, what can be hoped from a country wherein there is always doubt felt as to whether a letter posted will reach its destination or not? How much more uncertain must be the carriage of all kinds of stores over thousands of miles! Even the Red Cross supplies paid for by the Imperial family are reported to have been tampered with. This uncertainty of integrity in the supply of munitions is in itself a serious handicap to the Russian armies. Corruption amongst contractors in Russia seems to be almost as rife as it was in China before the war of 1894. It is, on the other hand, a remarkable refutation of the current stories of Japanese lack of commercial morality that there has not been from first to last even the breath of a suspicion of dishonest dealing amongst the Government contractors. This crowning proof should demolish for good and all what has at best been only an accusation based on past conditions. As to the organization and conduct of the Japanese troops, there is a universal chorus of praise. Everything is of the best, and best of all is the human unit. There has been in the past carping criticism, largely due to the despatches of unhappy war correspondents, of the generalship; but the last battles have effectually removed this unjust reproach. To those who cried out against the apparent slowness of the Japanese movements, the success of the armies under Marquis Oyama is sufficient answer. Beyond the necessary precaution which is the foundation of sure success, the totally different topographical conditions render it quite impossible to judge this war by the standard of others. In Manchuria

there are no roads, there are liter

ally thousands of watercourses to be crossed, the rain transforms the plains into seas of mud, and the hills are so arduous that the Russian artillery found it impossible during times of peace, when brigand-hunting formed the sole diversion, to avoid working their horses to death in a two-days' march.

Although Japan has practically won all that she is fighting for, there is no guarantee that the war will cease in the immediate future. No nation humbled in its military pride likes to make peace; and so there is every possiblity that Russia will continue to make war although she has no chance of success. That the Japanese regard a long war as at least probable may be gathered both from their preparations and from the message of the Japanese Emperor to his people, which runs:

Since the commencement of hostili

nation is unanimous upon this question of the war, and full of determination to carry it to a successful termination. On the other side, even amongst the people of Russian blood, there are many who would rejoice were the war to terminate, even without any Russian victory. Then the conquered races situated within the Empire, the Poles, the Finns, the Georgians, the Armenians, all these look upon Russia's defeat as the forerunner of better things for them. Hopes of freedom are aroused, and these subject races cannot be numbered amongst the resources of Russia. Those resources of Russia!-how much is spoken of them, and how little is seen! They remind us of the Humbert millions in the famous safe. The fable of the mountain in labor producing a mouse has its counterpart in Russia striving with this war. And the unfortunate Russian mouse has to run several thousands of miles before it can get to work. A divided

Nevertheless, our prospects of final success are still distant. I earnestly hope that the sincerity of the national spirit will enable us to realize our final object.

This message is a distinct contrast to the bombastic proclamation with which the Russian Government burdened Kuropatkin on the eve of his attempt to retake Liao-yang. Granted that the war will drag on its course through weary months, until Russia finally comes to see the uselessness of it all, it then becomes of interest to examine how the two nations are fitted financially, nationally, and economically for this test.

First and foremost, the Japanese have the enormous advantage arising from the fact that the whole of the

means everything in favor of the latter, and in this respect Japan holds an advantage which is hard to over-estimate.

Then, again, the relative cost of the war must not be forgotten. Russia's bill is three times as great as that of Japan, and she has not even the satisfaction of being sure that much of the money spent does not go into the hands of fraululent contractors or officials. This freedom from corruption is another strong point in favor of Japan. A well-known authority upon Russia wrote recently:

The war is a terrible drain on the financial resources of the Empire. The savings of a number of years are being lavished in the span of a few months, after the lapse of which a cheque has to be drawn upon future economy. It is roughly calculated that during the first five months the needs of the campaign have swallowed up $431,014,668. In order to realize what this sum means, one would do well to remember