personally known to, and trusted by, both sides,1 the choice can hardly be other than a compromise. Under these circumstances, the best way out of the difficulty may often lie in the selection of some man of outstanding eminence, whose conscious motives, at all events, whatever may be said of his sub-conscious ones, are above suspicion. Such a man, moreover, if, like Lord James or Sir Edward Fry, he serves in the same way without payment frequently, may gradually win for himself a large measure of respect and confidence throughout the industrial community. Another satisfactory solution would become possible if the British Labour Commissioners' suggestion of the governmental manufacture of professional arbitrators were followed.

In the second place, arbitrators must be thought competent. It will often be difficult for persons who have been brought up in a particular trade to realise that any one without "practical knowledge" of it can be capable of forming an intelligent judgment upon a question of wages. The natural inference is that the rule of the Midland Iron and Steel Board, which requires the independent chairman to be personally connected with the industry,2 should be generally followed. Since, however, practical knowledge is scarcely found except among masters or men who have been, or are, actually engaged in the calling, and since the impartiality of such persons is likely to be doubted, this solution is not free from difficulty.

1 Even Sir David Dale, though entirely trusted by the men's representatives, seems to have been on one occasion suspected by some of the rank and file, who knew him less well (cf. Price, Industrial Peace, p. 50).

2 Industrial Commission, xvii. p. 500.

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Rather, we are again driven to invoke outstanding eminence, coupled, if possible, with the lawyer's faculty for grasping some, and pretending to grasp many, things with great rapidity. Such a person, listening patiently to a prolonged argument, can often give the impression of having understood the whole of it, so that, if he has fairly numerous opportunities of arbitrating in the same trade, he will soon be able to establish a considerable reputation for ability.

Thirdly, the tribunal ought to be competent, lest the results of its decision bring arbitration into discredit. In order to this, "practical experience" of the industry is not, in general questions, of any great importance. The decision of such matters calls rather for a general economic knowledge of the industry concerned, and, inasmuch as all industries are connected, an acquaintance with the condition of the whole national trade." This third consideration, therefore, points, like the two preceding, to the selection of some person of acknowledged general ability.

1

§ 9. This conclusion implicitly determines the number of persons by whom the arbitration panel should be constituted. Eminent outsiders are not likely to be obtained in groups. If their services are to be secured at all it is practically necessary that the panel shall consist of a single man. This, however, is not the only argument against a compound tribunal. Reasoning of a general character shows that, even when practicable, such an arrangement is, except in interpretation differences, decidedly to be deprecated. The compound body in its most attractive form comprises one representative of each side, and an umpire, 1 Schultze-Gaevernitz, Social Peace, p. 165.

selected either by them or by the principals, to be referred to in case of disagreement. The argument in favour of it is that the two representatives may possibly agree. On one occasion Messrs. Mundella and Williams succeeded in doing this, and, in a miners' strike on the Loire, Mr. Jaurès and the employers' representative have recently followed their example. A decision reached in this way is likely to command a higher degree of confidence than one imposed upon the parties by an arbitrator. On the other hand, agreement between the representatives is improbable, and the real decision will generally rest with the umpire. When this is the case a compound tribunal resembles an elaborate machine, two-thirds of which is ornament. Nor is this all. So often as a division of opinion emerges in this type of tribunal the authority of its decisions is weakened. It is true that the division can be concealed by devices like that of the Staffordshire potteries' agreement. "The award when given in such general arbitration shall be signed by the umpire and the arbitrators, and shall be issued as their joint award, signified by their individual signatures thereto, and nothing shall be divulged by any of them, or appear on the face of such award, to signify whether the umpire and arbitrators are unanimous in their decision, or whether it is only the award of the majority of them." 1 It may, however, be questioned whether makeshifts of this kind are really of much avail. For is it not highly probable

1 Strikes and Lock-outs, 1892, p. 217. There is the same rule for the National Arbitration Board, agreed upon in 1901 between the American Newspaper Publishers' Association and the International Typographical Union (Industrial Commission, xvii. p. 367).

that, in spite of, or perhaps partly because of, them, the Board will be thought to have disagreed, and is not this the important point? Except, therefore, when the opinion of the parties tends strongly in favour of multiplicity, it seems clear that the panel had best be a single man.

§ 10. Finally, we have to consider the method of an arbitrator's appointment. There are several different ways in which he may be chosen.1 Perhaps the most satisfactory is that of the Durham Wages' Board, where he is elected at the first Board meeting of each year. Annual election of this kind, while not incompatible with prolonged tenure of office, avoids some of the dangers involved in a permanent or very long appointment. For, great friction might arise if one side came to consider the arbitrator at once irremovable and biassed in favour of their opponents. Furthermore, election at fixed periods is superior to election ad hoc, because an arbitrator is most likely to command confidence if he is chosen by agreement of both sides, and he will seldom be so chosen if his election is deferred until after a difference has arisen.

When, in spite of these considerations, an ad hoc appointment is preferred, the most obvious arrangement is that the parties should first try to agree on an arbitrator, and, if unsuccessful, should accept one nominated by an impartial outsider. There is, how

1 The Window Glass Cutters' League of North America has the following interesting method of selection: “If the arbitrators cannot agree on the referee, then each arbitrator shall write two names of disinterested parties, not in any way connected with the glass business, on slips of paper, and all names put into a bag, and the first name drawn out shall be the person selected as the referee" (Rule 18, Ibid. p. 365).

ever, a danger that they may try, and fail, to agree on the very man who is afterwards imposed on them from without, or that they may have urged against some other suggested name reasons which hold equally as against him. It is, therefore, more satisfactory for them to nominate an impartial person, such as the Speaker of the House of Commons, whose duty it shall be to appoint an arbitrator when requested to do so, no name having previously been discussed by the Conciliation Board.2

1 e.g. in the boot and shoe arbitration, 1893, the masters refused to accept Sir Charles Russell as arbitrator on the ground that he was a politician, and the impartial outsider subsequently chose Sir Henry James.

2 It is, of course, possible that, even when a standing arbitrator is appointed annually, the Conciliation Board may sometimes fail to agree on a name. To meet this case it was provided in the constitution of the Federated Coal Board, 1893, that if the two sides could not agree on a chairman at their annual meeting, the Speaker was to nominate him. Under similar circumstances, in Northumberland, the chairman of the County Council nominates after conferring with the parties. The justification for an attempt at agreement previous to outside nomination in these cases is that the probability of success is much greater than it is in the case of ad hoc appointments.