I. Feerst, P.E. to Monopoly and Anticompetitive Activities Subcommittee malefactors. But with a decreasing number of college age young people, is it not time to reducing the funding for university research (with its spiralling costs) and return some to the more efficient industrial sector? Reduced funding for university research has several advantages: 1) It would force the universities to curtail their non-traditional activities, which have been the cause of so much trouble. 2) It would cause the universities to shrink to a point where we funds into the private sector and lessen the pressures to fire I thank you for your attention and for making possible these proud moments in my life. The primary objectives for maintaining constant surveillance and control over fire the old, live the ! 1. To assure accurate financial forecasting. To aid in keeping salaries in a proper relationship to the compet- To control the aging rate of the Company's population, particularly To increase incentives to hire qualified personnel at the lowest Techniques for Controlling Average Rates Annual increases in a Company's average salary are dependent upon a. Salary increase expenditures. b. Personnel turnover - the average salaries of new hires and The effects of salary increases are obvious, but the effects of personnel Annual personnel turnover can have either a reducing effect or an Population at start of year 2,000 300 300 2,000 Average Salary $360 330 300 355.50 $360 355.50 1.25% turnover recovery With annual salary increase expenditures of 6.0 percent minus the 1.25 How 2. гдо go! High voluntary turnover is also beneficial because it is usually possible Average Rate Control Reports Each year the Management Salary Committee decides upon the target These percentages are based upon projections of merit budget expend- Cognizant managers receive a monthly report for each pay plan which It cannot be expected that average rate control performance will always ( GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICIES: INSTITUTIONAL PATENT AGREEMENTS TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1978 U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:30 a.m., in room 424, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Gaylord Nelson, chairman, presiding. Present: Chairman Nelson. Also present: Gerald D. Sturges, professional staff member; and Karen Young, research assistant. Chairman NELSON. The subcommittee will please come to order. Our first witness this morning is Mr. Howard W. Bremer, patent counsel, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, of Madison, Wis. We are pleased to have you take the time to come here this morning. Your statement will be printed in full in the record, and you may present it in whatever way you wish. STATEMENT OF HOWARD W. BREMER, PATENT COUNSEL, WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, MADISON, WIS. Mr. BREMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Howard W. Bremer, patent counsel at the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation at Madison, Wis. INTRODUCTION I appreciate the invitation and opportunity to participate in the hearings being conducted by this subcommittee relating to the history, legal basis and implications of Institutional Patent Agreements as an implement of Government Patent Policy. In an earlier session of these hearings, on May 23, 1978, Dr. Thomas Jones, vice president for research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presented a case for the desirability of Institutional Patent Agreements for universities on behalf of the Association of American Universities and sister organizations. On behalf of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation and the University of Wisconsin as well as the Society of University Patent Administrators, of which I am president, I fully and heartily endorse the views and comments expressed by Dr. Jones in the written statement which he submitted to this subcommittee. In fact, Dr. Jones' statement was so complete and so effectively presented the case for the universities that it has made my task more difficult and I can give you my views today only at the risk of repeating some of Dr. Jones' testimony. HISTORICAL In considering Institutional Patent Agreements as an implement of Government Patent Policy we must first concern ourselves with inventions and patents since their ownership is fundamental to the concept of such agreements. This compels us to look at the special treatment given intellectual property by the framers of our Constitution in an effort to stimulate the talent of invention, which is an expression of intellectual originality. James Madison, chief architect of the Constitution, wrote in the Federalist: The utility of this power (the power in Congress to promote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries) will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. . . Then later, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson recognizing the value of permitting artificial monopolies to be granted as encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries: Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to the few. Where the power is in the few, it is natural for them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions. Where the power, as with us is in the many, not in the few, the danger cannot be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many. The key words in these quotations are "The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals," and "It is much more to be feared that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many." Thus, in recognition that there should be no indefinite monopolization of valuable intellectual property, where the public good would not fully coincide with the claims of individuals, and that the rights of the creative few would be in danger of being sacrificed to the many without clarification, a compromise was struck under which intellectual property was to be owned for only a limited term during which the creator had the right to exclude others. There it is, the recognition of the necessity for stimuli to inventive activity and innovation-the incentive-the basis for the patent system and the key to the conversion of scientific knowledge into production benefiting human welfare. We can certainly all agree that we can rely upon man's self interest to motivate his actions. Therefore, if society wishes to benefit from its research dollars, regardless of the source of those dollars, it must supply the necessary incentives to translate research results into consumer goods and services. It is on and about that all important word and concept, incentive, that my further remarks will be addressed to today. |