highway departments, the departments of community development, health departments, economic affairs departments-a whole range of agencies and departments that have parts to play in recovery efforts. What we hope to do is be able to get all the authorities and plans and procedures and programs in those various agencies to come together. To the degree that these include warning, public safety activities, et cetera, we are very happy. We hope, and we have gone out of our way to make sure, there's a limited amount of duplication of efforts being funded by other Federal agencies that also grant funds for preparedness planning.

[Additional information submitted by Mr. Dunne follows:]

There is a serious question whether every city and county in the country should prepare to meet a disaster like Hurricane Agnes. It is probably unwise for every city and county to base its civil defense plan on the assumption that they will receive a direct hit. These possibilities can't be ruled out, of course, but the probabilities may be so remote that spending money to prepare for them would not be very prudent. There is a difference, of course. If the nation has suffered an enemy attack, every city and county will be a contributor to national survival, even if they have not suffered damages from direct weapons effects. And so every city and county does have some civil defense preparedness responsibilities. But spending money to prepare for a natural disaster that is unlikely to happen is certainly questionable, especially if the preparations would have no application to the probable civil defense role of the community.

It would be better for the city or county to spend that money to improve their general management capability. It is our experience that otherwise well managed cities respond effectively and expeditiously to the unusual demands of disaster.

Mr. KINCADE. I just have two more quick questions and then I'll turn it over to the minority counsel. The response you give raises an issue which I think is very central to the committee's inquiry, that is, how you see the relationship between natural disaster readiness and recovery capability. I think this is implicit in the idea of providing a grant for-I don't want to use the term "dual use"-but for multiple purposes. Do areas with better preparedness programs have smaller recovery requirements? Are there any studies on this or do you see any relationship between the pre-disaster preparedness posture in a given region or county and the kinds of requirements for supplemental aid that you get from them after a natural disaster?

Mr. DUNNE. I don't think I could say that we have evaluated this to a degree that would allow us to give you an honest answer at this point. We do intend to evaluate this, but most of the preparedness grants are still in the process of being carried out. In other words, the award plans are going on now and the majority of the States will not finish until next fiscal year or going into the fiscal year after. I would say that the effectiveness of State and local government operating in disasters where the Federal Government is involved-and I can't speak to when we are not involved-depends upon the level of the official who is designated by the Governor or the mayor to work with us. If this official is down in the bowels of the bureaucracy, even though he may be officially designated, and the Governor doesn't know who he is, for instance, he isn't going to be terribly effective, nor is the State government's response going to be terribly effective. If he is only a part-time official in a local government, he's not going to be terribly effective.

Mr. KINCADE. I wasn't thinking so much of the institutional arrangements as the basic posture, although I know that's affected by

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the institutional arrangements in a given locale. As an example of what I'm driving at, I understand that the tornado which devastated Lima, Ohio, 2 years ago did very little damage in a neighboring jurisdiction which had a good preparedness program and good warning system. Doesn't that imply that the requirements levied on you perhaps would be reduced by having more adequate preparedness posture? Mr. DUNNE. I'm not familiar with Lima, Ohio. Are you talking about Xenia?

Mr. KINCADE. Perhaps it was Xenia.

Mr. DUNNE. Half the town was gone.

Mr. KINCADE. That's right and I understand another jurisdiction very nearby that was subject to the same tornado suffered relatively less damage because it had a better warning system.

Mr. DUNNE. Well, maybe. I can't answer that. If the tornado hit the ground in one town and maybe it didn't touch down in the other. I'm not sure you can make those analogies without knowing the full history. I don't know. I would say that we're certainly hopeful that when States explore their authorities, for instance, and explore their capabilities, that they wouldn't run to the Federal Government unless there was a real need that it was beyond their effective capabilities to meet as the law states. I don't like turning down 33 percent of the requests. We have seen States that have, in their preliminary work, discovered that they do have more authority or the authorities have been changed, that they do have more of a capability than they previously required and they have undertaken more to help local governments themselves instead of running to the Federal Government. We've heard of one or two cases, but I can't honestly say.

Mr. KINCADE. I wasn't thinking of the recovery capability but their preparedness capability. I'm trying to get at the relationship between the preparedness posture and their recovery needs. Does preparedness save us money in terms of what we have to provide in loans or grants after a disaster? Is preparedness cost effective in that you're able to reduce some of the damage, reduce some of the loss to property?

Mr. DUNNE. I would say that if Congress is gutsy enough to keep the Flood Disaster Protection Act on the books for the next 15 or 20 years that we will see a substantial savings of both dollars and lives, particularly dollars. Because what we have been foolish about in the last number of years is we allow people to go back and live in a flood plain which is exactly where they are going to be flooded again. I can point to 20,000 communities which have already been identified as flood hazard areas. That is preparedness. One may not consider it preparedness because it does not carry that preparedness label, but that's preparedness in the best sense of the word-don't allow people to go back into hazardous areas if you know that the hazard exists and is likely to occur in a short period of time again.

Mr. KINCADE. I think there are some limits. By that token, we wouldn't let people live in cities because they make prime nuclear targets too. I'm trying to understand what we are capable of doing in the way of damage prevention through preparedness. Perhaps you could supply something for the record upon further reflection.

Mr. DUNNE. One thing that I'd like to point out, because you used the tornado as one of the cases. If you get an effective warning system you're probably not going to save any property, but you could

save some lives and I think there's a big distinction. There are some things that you couldn't do to protect property that you could do to save lives, and I think we ought to deal with that distinction. We try

to when we evaluate.

Mr. DAWSON. Congressman Brown asked before he left if I could follow up on some of the questions he was asking on the similarities and differences between the nuclear disaster and what you call local disaster or natural disaster. And if I could concentrate primarily on your very commendable statement you quote Congressman Leggett's committee's report beginning with saying that it would be nice if we could find some common denominators. I wonder if we could go on with what Congressman Brown began and find the common denominators and I think he found that there was a substantial commonality in certain areas.

Mr. DUNNE. You mean what I rattled off to him--the warning and prediction?

Mr. DAWSON. You started down a road where you came up with prediction, warning, and emergency communications system and then you mentioned shelter, but with the caveat, of course, that shelter required for a fallout, as opposed to shelter required for a flood, is a different thing.

Wouldn't in the post-disaster area you also include evacuation? Mr. DUNNE. Not post-disaster. Pre-disaster. You don't see much evacuation of an area after a disaster.

Mr. DAWSON. But would there be a difference or would there be a similarity to either type of disaster-natural or nuclear?

Mr. DUNNE. The word is the same. We have looked at evacuation situations, such as the evacuation of Darwin, Australia the day after Christmas 1974 to see if we could draw any analogies. I don't want to say it's a commonality or it's dissimilar in terms of preparedness planning because you would be doing it for different reasons. We evacuate a city such as Washington, D.C., every day when people go home and go out to Virginia and Maryland. That's evacuation.

Mr. DAWSON. And they say the work we do here is often disastrous. Mr. DUNNE. There could be some commonality, but I'm worried about evacuation in natural disasters. We have done a study on this through the National Academy of Sciences and it raises 30 policy issues. One of the big problems it raises is that of legal authority to order evacuation. I assume for natural disasters that legal authority has to be vested in local and State officials. The President has zero authority to do it. In a nuclear attack he may have authorities that I'm not aware of. Consider the policy questions that may arise in prenatural disaster evacuation. Insurance companies may cancel insurance, the mortgage companies and the banks may foreclose on loans. When you start to think about the potential disruptions you'd better be sure that your prediction is going to be 100-percent correct before you order evacuation.

Mr. DAWSON. Isn't the mechanism for getting the people out of the cities hopefully the same? They have either got to travel by foot

or

Mr. DUNNE. No; because I can't think of any situation, even the worst earthquake, where we would have to evacuate a whole city. You sure would have to if there was to be a nuclear attack. I assume you

would want everybody out. In hurricanes, when there's a warning from the National Weather Service, people voluntarily get up and leave. Somebody told me in Louisiana a couple years ago 100,000 people went 50 miles away. But there were also hundreds of thousands that didn't leave the shore. It wasn't a forced evacuation. I think you have to be very careful about suggesting that evacuation could be forced in a natural disaster.

We have seen a hurricane study on Dade County which said that because of the way the roads were structured there was no way to get everybody out within 48 hours. Now you don't have to get everybody out of Miami or Dade County because of a hurricane, but if you thought Dade County or Miami was going to be hit with a nuclear strike, I suspect you would want everybody out and would 48 hours be enough time? I don't see the evacuation question as an area in which there is a great similarity between nuclear and natural disaster situations, but it could be.

Mr. DAWSON. I don't want to take too much time here but I've got two more similarities I want to or possible similarities I want to discuss with you, but I'm doing all of this with the understanding that the Leggett committee found that you have to be very careful about drawing these similarities for the fear that in doing so nuclear disaster preparedness will not maintain itself.

In that regard, before I go to two more similarities or possible similarities, what you're really suggesting, if you're going to try to come up with common denominators, is total Federal funding for nuclear disaster preparedness. What you're basically saying is that if you really think it's so essential, why don't you forget all the matching funds.

Mr. DUNNE. That may be a possibility. You would have to analyze the problem before you say how much Federal funding to apply or whether or not it should be 100 percent. What do you want the local and State governments to do and what is their role vis-a-vis the Federal Government in its posture and its policymaking? That's what seems to be up in the air, not how we should provide the funds; because funding mechanisms can be logically determined once you determine what unit of government has what responsibility and what authorities. That's what seems to me to be the unanswered question. Mr. DAWSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Dunne, we're running somewhat late this morning due to the interruptions. What I would like to do at this point-I still have several questions remaining-but I would like to submit those for the record. Then if you would be so kind as to give us your prompt reply to them, we would appreciate it. I thank you for appearing as one of our witnesses this morning.

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you, Congressman.

[For responses to additional questions for the record, see page 282.] Mr. EVANS. Mr. Rodericks, would you please come forward? Mr. Rodericks, we welcome you to the Joint Committee meeting this morning. In your capacity as Director for the District of Columbia Office of Emergency Preparedness, would you please proceed with your oral statement this morning?

STATEMENT OF GEORGE R. RODERICKS, DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Mr. RODERICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Kincade and other members of the staff, for helping me prepare for today's session.

I shall not even attempt to read my statement. As you indicated that is in the record and I know you will give it consideration, but I would like to ask you to consider the fact that I am here as a witness who has worked in all phases of defense preparedness at the Federal level, the State level, and now in the local level, and for 21 years I have chosen this profession and worked at it very hard and like it and will miss it when I leave. I have worked with all of the leaders of the national program personally since Val Peterson in the early days of the Eisenhower Administration. The only national leader I have not worked with was Governor Coldwell of Florida.

So I would like to offer to you some observations in summarizing my statement to try to synthesize those experiences into two specific areas of concern which I have and have had for a long time and about which I have tried to make some changes as an individual within a bureaucratic structure and as president of the National and State Directors Association and as secretary-treasurer for 12 years.

Those issues are: The coordinated roles of the Federal agencies. Every President since President Truman, upon assumption of office, has looked at the existing authorities granted by Congress and reorganized the Federal apparatus for conducting those programs and carrying out the mission. The one thing which has remained constant with minor amendment has been the Federal statute.

The other activity which has fluctuated beyond all reason in terms of managing and developing a national capability has been the manner by which the Presidents have changed radically the structure at the Federal level. One of the things that did contribute, Mr. Chairman, to continuity of an understanding between the Federal goals and objectives, the will of Congress and efforts of State and local officials, was the fact that until recently the national office for coordinating and establishing policies for national goals was always in the Executive Office. Not only that, the national appointed head of civil defense was, until recently, a member of the National Security Council. When the Nixon Administration came in-and I'm not criticizing the Nixon Administration alone-I have criticized all administrations who made these radical changes-it got so bad that the Nixon Administration eliminated the national director of civil defense from membership on the National Security Council.

Since 1950 we at the State and local levels had a voice that we could communicate with here in the White House to have our concerns brought to the attention of the National Security Council and, as a matter of fact, to the President of the United States himself. We have lost that.

In the years since, we have lost the coordination and the cohesiveness of the Federal agencies themselves because they were fractured