money is intended to go, but we haven't verified it. We can introduce that for the record if you wish or I can go over it now.

Senator PROXIMIRE. With the limited amount spent overall, I take it the shelter programs are, in the first place, rudimentary. Where they are not-and I take it in some cases they are not-you indicated that the emergency centers in the regions-six of the eight regions have stocked shelters and so forth-would be for a relatively limited group of people who would be the critical people in providing command and

so on.

Mr. SHAFER. Some DCPA funds are now directed to development of prototype evacuation plans, in addition to fallout plans. When the evacuation studies are completed and standards developed, these standards will be fanned out to the State and local organizations for development of their individual plans. But I don't believe the prototyping is quite finished yet, and the prototype plan has not been disseminated to all the State and local civil defense organizations. A substantial amount of the current funds is directed to fallout shelter planning. Of course, looking at it another way, a substantial amount of funds also goes to salaries for the people who are maintaining the State and local organizations.

Senator PROXMIRE. Well, give us as much as you can of what I have mentioned for the record.

Now, can you tell the committee how Federal preparedness moneys are distributed geographically, by State or region, for the record. You have indicated that in California, I guess, there's just nothing going on in terms of evacuation planning. They have rejected the program and feel it's a program that isn't going to provide any real protection, so they have done nothing. Is that about right?

Mr. SHAFER. We'd have to furnish it for the record. I do not have it readily available by geographic areas.

[The information submitted for the record follows:]

DCPA'S MAJOR PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS

2 Includes $6,800,000 for systems previously funded by the U.S. Army Communications Command.

1 Funds for supporting systems equipment are used primarily for purchase and installation of warning and communications systems and also are used for purchase of rescue equipment and other emergency supplies.

Senator PROXMIRE. Is there any other part of the country, besides California, any large area, that's taken a negative view?

Mr. SHAFER. One that comes to mind is that New Hampshire has a very low-key program, and the balance of the States have different

levels of activity. California has not participated in evacuation planning or fallout shelter planning.

Senator PROXMIRE. Recently we have heard civil defense described as a kind of civil weapon; a way of saving human and material resources to continue prosecuting a nuclear war after an initial exchange. This makes it like an antiballistic missile since it is damage-limiting. Yet you quoted this 1969 Pentagon statement to the effect that military technology is incapable of achieving this goal. Can you account for this revolutionary change in thinking? Is it a change in perspective or a change in technology or a reaction to Soviet civil defense plans?

Mr. SHAFER. I believe the 1969 statement was probably directed in a narrower channel in that, given the state of nuclear weapons, they felt in 1969 that there could be no comprehensive shelters provided against the blast and heat effects of a nuclear attack. Nevertheless, the concept of doing nothing more than providing for postattack cohesion of the surviving populace and industries, I think, is basically the posture of civil defense today. There is an organizational structure in place around which, if it survives, the Nation can marshal its remaining resources. But I think the 1969 statement was directed only to the possibility of protecting against the thermal and blast effects of a nuclear weapon.

Senator PROXMIRE. Congressman Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shafer, I'm a little disturbed because I have long been worried about what we have been doing in the area of offensive weapons. Since I have been in the Congress, I have been concerned about pumping money into airplanes that don't fly and submarines that don't sub. I had hoped that when we got into this area we would find a much better record of performance, but apparently, based on your testimony this morning, what we've got is a mess, spelled with a capital "M".

As I understand it, the Federal Government is out looking for shelter sites where people are not. State and local governments are not marking the present sites that they have, so those sites are just about useless in terms of protection of our personnel and civilians. It seems to me we have a grand mess and I, for one, would like to know whether you have any specific recommendations you want to make in terms of trying to clean up a situation that is clearly a threat to American citizens.

Mr. SHAFER. Let me try, Mr. Mitchell, to put your comments in perspective. The present shelter program has, for a number of years, abandoned any attempts at protection from blast and thermal effects. Since the target areas are usually large cities or military facilities within reasonable proximity to large cities, it's true that, in terms of blast and thermal effects, the large cities-in fact all areas are not very well protected. Exceptions are the several centers designed for the survivability of Government and military command and control. The present program has been designed to identify those buildings that would protect against fallout. Since most of the structures in the United States are built in the urban and the immediately surrounding suburban areas, most of the fallout shelters have been identified in those areas. So if those areas are not struck directly by a nuclear bomb and thereby do not receive the blast and thermal effects, they would indeed be protected from the subsequent radiological fallout.

So it's not quite as chaotic as perhaps my statement would seem to indicate.

Mr. MITCHELL. I hope not.

Mr. SHAFER. The problem is that, if a city is hit directly by a nuclear bomb, the fallout shelters provide very little protection against the blast and thermal effects.

The second part of the program which now is getting underway assumes there may be, under certain scenarios of nuclear war, sufficient time in advance to evacuate populations to areas outside the areas of immediate blast and thermal effects, and this would be the inner city, the urban and suburban people, moving out to the outlying areas. Once they get out there, there has to be some provision for medical care, fallout protection, and sanitary facilities to enable them to survive in those evacuation areas for a period of time.

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank you. I missed part of your testimony. Perhaps you addressed this subject. I understand clearly what you're saying. We've got to get folks out of the area where the blast occurs. How do you get them out? Did you address that in your testimony? Mr. SHAFER. No: I did not.

Mr. MITCHELL. As I recall it, in past history, that's been one of the major difficulties. When cities are hit, the roads get clogged. There's no effective means of getting people out of the cities and that's when the enemy comes in with his highest capability for doing damage. What's the system for getting folks out?

Mr. SHAFER. You're absolutely right. One of the major problems is how to evacuate the cities, and I wish I could answer your question, but just recently the United States has become conscious of the possibility and potential for saving lives through the evacuation method. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is only now completing its initial study designed to determine how that would be accomplished and what would happen to the populace once they get to the outlying areas. So I really can't give you a comprehensive answer to that question. It's one of the problems that has to be solved, and it is being worked on right now. It's one of the priority areas that I think should be addressed under whatever level of funding is authorized.

Mr. MITCHELL. I'm certain the chairman and members of the committee will pursue this with a great deal of vigor. It doesn't do a bit of good to put shelters out there and not have any effective means of getting people to them.

Mr. SHAFER. You're absolutely right.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do I have time for another question?

Senator PROXMIRE. Certainly.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Shafer, as I understand it, there are three Federal preparedness agencies involved in this whole problem area. I have been in Congress just long enough to become kind of cynical and jaded about coordination between Federal agencies. In your opinion, has there been any duplication or overlap or conflicting guidelines issued by the three agencies involved?

Mr. SHAFER. We looked at this very closely. I get concerned, for instance, when I see the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, which gets the big bucks for civil preparedness, located in the Department of Defense where the primary concern is the development of more

offensive and defensive weapons. So one has the tendency to feel that civil defense might be subordinated to what the military consider to be more pressing military needs.

I get somewhat concerned when I see the policymaking organization in the civil structure, the Federal Preparedness Agency, located somewhere down in the bowels of the General Services Administration, an agency as you know designed to assist the Government in carrying out its support function.

Then we have the third agency over in Housing and Urban Development. Now we tried to find, given the state of the programs as we examined them, that there was some lack of effectiveness here and I can't point to any. I feel that perhaps this fragmentation, if the program grows to something more meaningful than it is now, will have an adverse effect on the administration of the Federal civil defense program. But given its present level of activity, we really haven't been able to find any serious problems that have arisen from the top level down in terms of fragmentation of this program.

On the other hand, from the standpoint of the States and local communities looking up, we have received comments that to them it looks rather fragmented, that they have to look to one organization for this, and another organization for that, and to the third organization for something else. But even there, given the dual-use concept that has arisen, that is using the Federal matching funds and the State funds for both nuclear crisis and natural disasters, the thing seems to have jelled better in terms of the funds' use at the local level. Our concern expressed in the statement is that, if the Federal funds are restricted only to nuclear disaster use, this effectiveness at the local level is going to be dissipated.

We have found some weaknesses in administration of the program and some overlapping and duplication, and I'd like to ask my colleagues if they want to comment on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just before he responds, could I pursue this just a bit further with you? To the best of your knowledge, do we have a situation in which the three agencies come together on a regular basis during which time the policy decisions are hammered out?

Mr. SHAFER. They do have committee conferences periodically and, as I say, given the present level of effort in the program, we haven't seen where this has been ineffective. I do have concerns about this three-pronged organization if we decide to go into a comprehensive civil defense program. The basic problems that I cited in my testimony are not so much problems of how the structure is organized; they are problems of policy.

I think that the head of the DCPA and the head of the FPA have really not been given, at the national level, significant priority designations against which to apply their limited funds. Nor have they been given the authority to direct their funds to the assessment of national problems in order of priority because they must depend on State and local cooperation. In detail, however, we have found some areas of duplication and overlap that you might be interested in. Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, just a point of inquiry. I see my time is up. Can he respond to that last question?

Senator PROXMIRE. Certainly.