affections; though springing from the same general power and susceptibility of mind, they assume to us different aspects, chiefly from the fact that they are awakened by different objects.

Allow me here to remark, that while President Edwards takes the terms willing and choosing in so comprehensive a sense as to include all the desires and inclinations of the mind, he makes no attempt to show the correctness of this doctrine, except what appears in his brief answer to Mr. Locke. Perhaps he thought it enough to rest in the popular and long-received opinion on the subject, until some one was able to set it aside, or at least should make a more promising effort for this purpose than Mr. Locke had apparently done. It has also been noticed as rather a singular fact, that while Edwards takes this broad ground with respect to the nature and operation of the will, he seldom alludes to it in the first three parts of his great work on the subject of the will. His illustrations are almost uniformly taken from what are, by way of distinction, called deliberate acts of the will, that is to say, those acts which contemplate something to be done or not done. This might be the best ground on which to meet his opponents, and perhaps, from the tenor of their sentiments and the nature of their warfare, it was absolutely necessary that this course should be taken. Yet one can hardly help wishing that he had paid more attention to those primary states of mind, from which the deliberate and imperate acts of the will proceed; enough, at least, to inform us how far he supposed his doctrine concerning one class of volitions would hold true with respect to the other.

There is no room to doubt, however, that he considered willing and desiring the same thing, and not different things the mere development of the same faculty. Of course, that no man wills what he does not desire, nor desires what he does not will, when the same and not

different objects are regarded. Hence, all our inclinations and affections are considered by him as exercises of the will. This appears from many parts of the work to which we have already alluded, but is distinctly discussed in his Treatise on the Affections. Thus on page 124: "The affections," he says, "are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the will: that God has endowed the soul with two faculties-one, that by which it is capable of perception or speculation; or by which it discerns, views and judges of things: this is called the understanding. The other is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is in some way inclined, with respect to the things it views and considers; either is inclined to them, or is disinclined, or averse from them: or it is the faculty by which the soul does not behold things as an indifferent and unaffected spectator; but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting." "This fac

ulty," he adds, "is called by various names. It is sometimes called the inclination, and as it has respect to the actions which are governed by it, it is called the will; and the mind, with regard to the exercise of this faculty, is called the heart. The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of the exercise." He confesses "that language on this subject is somewhat imperfect, and the meaning of words, in a considerable measure, loose and unfixed, and not precisely limited by custom, which governs the use of language. In some sense the affection of the soul differs nothing at all from the will and inclination; for the will is never, in any exercise, any farther than it is affected.* It is not moved

⚫ Nor the understanding either.

out of a state of perfect indifference any otherwise than as it is affected one way or other, and acts nothing any farther. But yet, there are many actings of the will and inclination that are not so commonly called affections. In everything we do, wherein we act voluntarily, there is an exercise of the will and inclination that governs us in our actions;* but all the actings of the inclination and will, all our common actions in life, are not ordinarily called affections. Yet what are called affections are not essentially different from them, but only in the degree and manner of exercise. In every act of the will whatsoever, the soul either likes or dislikes, is either inclined or disinclined to what is in view; and these are not essentially different from the affections of love and hatred. That liking or inclination of the soul to a thing, if it be in a high degree, or vigorous, is the same thing as the affection of love; and that disliking or disinclining, if (it be) in a great degree, is the same with hatred."

All this is exceedingly explicit, so far as the opinions of this great man are concerned. He undoubtedly believed that all the inclinations and desires of the soul, towards the various objects in view, are properly acts or exercises of the will-though not all denominated volitions in the common acceptation of the word. "There are many actings of the will, which are not commonly called affections." What actings are these? and what are they usually called? They are such actings as are concerned in the common actions of life-actions brought about by a direct act of the will, or purpose; and these actings, every one knows, are usually called volitions. Yet such volitions are not ordinarily called affections; nor are the affections ordinarily called volitions-but in Edwards' view, they are all alike acts or exercises of will. He could see no difference in that power or principle of the

* Mr. Locke would say that the will is exercised in nothing else.

mind, which directs and governs our mental and bodily actions, and that power or principle which is pleased or displeased, with any object presented to the mind's view. In the one case the soul is pleased or displeased with a proposed action, as the next and immediate object of choice in the other, with an object which is not an action at least not an action of our own, proposed to be done or forborne. In both cases there is liking or disliking, embracing or rejecting, choosing or refusing, and to what power or principle of the mind, he would ask, can any of these things be referred, but to the will? The objects which occasion them may be different, and the circumstances and results different; but in themselves what are they? but the various developments of one and the same faculty, the will?

At the same time it has been common, and we intend to show that it is important, to distinguish one class of volitions from another. Those which terminate on some action of our own, have been called deliberate acts-and imperate acts of the will, and not unfrequently determinate acts--because they are more the result of deliberation, and determine and govern the action on which they fix; while those which contemplate no action as their immediate result, are called immanent acts of the will. They remain in the mind, and do not flow out into action.

It is of little importance by what names these two classes of volitions are distinguished, provided the terms agreed on be well understood and carefully remembered; but in our apprehension it is immensely important to the cause of truth, that the volitions themselves be distinguished. Though admitted to be exercises of the same faculty, and to be phenomena of the same generic character, yet they are clothed with very different circumstances; and we shall find, upon examination, that what is true of the one

is not always true of the other, and that in several important particulars.

First. As we have seen already, it is true of the deliberate or imperate acts of the will, that they always stand connected with our operative faculties, and terminate on some action of our own which we take to be in our power; whereas, immanent acts of the will never thus terminate. They never fix on something to be done, or not done, and consequently never flow out in action of any kind-except so far as they may become incentives to action, and thus influence the will in its deliberative and determinate acts.

Second. Virtue and vice are primarily and properly predicable only of immanent volitions, or acts of will. They are the seat of all culpability and praiseworthiness; while the deliberate acts of the will do not constitute, but merely indicate, the moral character of the agent.

We take it, there is no one common sense notion better established than this. If the moral affections are right, the actions will be right, and the deliberate acts of the will, from which these actions immediately proceed. If the moral affections be wrong, they will give birth to purposes and acts which are wrong. This is so obvious as a general statement, that there seems no room for doubt or disputation. For it is neither more nor less than saying that when the heart is right all will be right, and vice versa. Yet, when we come to inquire into the matter, we find no person attributing moral qualities to the external action, disconnected with the volition which produced it, nor to the volition, apart from the motive or feeling which excited it. We ask, indeed, if the action was voluntary? because, if it were merely accidental, or not intended, it could not indicate a state of moral feeling of any kind, nor be the legitimate expression of any. But when we have ascertained that the action was voluntary,