*

So, to
So, to CHAP.
sketch

dealt with in front by the English troops.*
find some occupation for the English, the
represented our army as filing away obliquely, in
order to turn the enemy's right flank. Of course
this plan rested entirely upon the assumption that
the enemy's front would be fully occupied (as repre-
sented in the sketch) by the French attack.

Lord Raglan's experience or instinct told him that no such plan as this could go for much until the assailing forces should come to measure their line with that of the enemy. So, without either combating or accepting the suggestion addressed to him, he simply assured the Marshal that he might rely upon the vigorous co-operation of the British army. The French plan seems to have made little impression on Lord Raglan's mind. He foresaw, perhaps, that the ingenuity of the evening would be brought to nothingness by the teachings of the morrow.

XLIV.

naud's de

meanour.

Whilst the French Marshal was striving, in his st Arvehement way, to convey an idea of the vigour with which he would conduct the attack, his appointed adviser, Colonel Trochu, whose mission it was to moderate the fire of his chief, thought it right to interpose with a question of a practical kind — a question as to the time and place for relieving the French soldiers of their packs. Instantly, if so one may speak, St Arnaud reared, for Trochu had

* See the facsimile of this plan, taken from the "Pièces Officielles," published by the French Government.

XLIV.

CHAP. touched him with the curb, and in the presence, too, of Lord Raglan. He angrily suppressed the question of the packs as one of mere detail. Yet, on the afternoon of the morrow, that question of the packs was destined to recur, and to govern the movements of the whole French army.

Result of

the conference.

Before the Marshal and Lord Raglan parted, it was agreed that Bosquet with his Division should advance at five o'clock in the morning, and that, two hours later, the rest of the Allied forces should begin their march upon the enemy's position.

This determination as to the time for marching was almost the only fruit which St Arnaud drew from the interview. He had thought to engage his colleague in the plan contrived for the guidance of the English at the French headquarters; but when he came to be in the presence of the English General, he unconsciously yielded, as other men commonly did, to the spell of his personal ascendancy; and although he showed the sketch, and may have uttered, perhaps, a few hurried words to explain its meaning, he did not effectually bring himself to proffer advice to Lord Raglan. Either he altogether omitted the intended counsel, or else he so slurred it over as not to win for it any grave notice from even the most careful of listeners.

When the conference ended Lord Raglan came out with his guests to the door of the hut. M. St Arnaud mounted his horse, and was elate; but he was elate, not with the knowledge of having achieved

XLIV.

a purpose, but rather, it would seem, from the CHAP. sense of that singular comfort which anxious men always derived from the mere power of Lord Raglan's presence. Perhaps, when the Marshal reached his quarters, he began to see that, after all, there was a gulf between him and the English General, and that, notwithstanding his energy and boldness, he had been unaccountably hindered from passing it.

IV.

It had been determined that the troops should March of get under arms without bugle or drum.

the Allies.

Silently, therefore, on the morning of the 20th of September 1854, the men of the Allied armies rose from their bivouac, and made ready for the march which was to bring them into the presence of the enemy. It was so early as half-past five that Bosquet, with the 2d French Division and the Turkish Battalions, began his march along the coast; and at seven o'clock the main body of the French army was under arms and ready to march. But the position taken up by the English for the defence of the Allied armies on the Bulganak had imposed Causes deupon Lord Raglan the necessity of showing a front march of towards the east; and for the Divisions so employed lish army. a long and toilsome evolution was needed in order

laying the

the Eng

XLIV.

CHAP. to bring them into the general order of march.* At that time, too, there was a broad interval between our extreme right and Prince Napoleon's Division. Moreover, the line of the coast which the armies were to follow trended away towards the south-west, forming an obtuse angle with the course of the stream (the Bulganak) on which the Allies had bivouacked; and in the movement requisite for adjusting the front of the Allied forces to the direction of the shore, the English, marching upon the exterior arc, had to undergo more labour than those who moved near the pivot on which the variation of front was effected.**

This was not all. The baggage-train accompanying our forces, though small in comparison with the encumbrances usually attending an army in the field, was large as compared with that of the French; and Lord Raglan (whose favourite anxiety was concerning his reserve ammunition) refused to allow the convoy to be stripped of protection. The oblique movement of the troops towards their right was tending to leave the convoy uncovered; and in order that it should be again enfolded, as in the previous day's order of march, it was necessary to move it far

* Those divisions had been posted nearly at right angles to the front line, and the segment in which the troops would have to wheel in order to get into the line of march would be nearly 90 degrees.

**Several military reports and documents explain this, but the plan prepared by the French Government shows with admirable clearness the nature of the evolution which the English army had to perform. See the Plan.

XLIV.

towards our right. Lord Raglan insisted that this CHAP. should be done; so on the morning of the longexpected battle, and with the enemy in front, St Arnaud and the whole French army, and the English army too, chafed bitterly at the delay they had to endure whilst strings of bullock-carts were slowly dragged westward into the true line of march. Besides, the enemy's cavalry gave the English no leave to examine the ground towards which they were marching; and whilst the French, being next to the sea, could make straight for the cliff already reconnoitred from the ships, the English army advanced without knowledge of that part of the position which it was to confront, and was twice compelled to make laborious changes in the direction of its march. Therefore, for much of the delay which occurred there were good reasons; but not for all. Sir George Brown had been directed on the night of the 19th to advance on the morrow at seven o'clock, and he imagined it is strange if he, of all men, with his great knowledge of such things, was wrong upon a point of military usage -he imagined that the order would be repeated in the morning, and he waited accordingly. Also the English troops moved slowly. Time was growing to be of high worth, and from causes which justified a good deal, though not quite all, of their delay, the English at this time were behindhand.

In order that the operations of the day might be adjusted to the time which the English army re