CHAP.

XLIV.

Disposition of his troops.

On the same hill, but higher up and more to his right, the Prince threw up another slight breastwork, which he armed with a battery of field-guns. This was the Lesser Redoubt.

The vineyards at some points were marked and cleared so as to give full effect to the action of the artillery; but except the two redoubts, no field-works were constructed by the Russian General. Wilful and confident, he was content to rest mainly upon the natural strength of the ground, the valour of his troops, and the faith that he had in his own prowess as a commander. He even omitted, as we have seen, to break up or to guard the waggon-road which led up from Almatamack to the left of his position. The Prince did not attempt to occupy the West Cliff; but some days before the action a battalion* and half a battery had been placed overlooking the sea in the village of Ulukul Akles, in order, as was said, to "catch marauders," or to prevent a descent from the sea in the rear of the Russian army; and the detachment remained in that part of the field until the time when the battle began.

On the ledge which divided the river from the steep broken side of the Telegraph Height Prince Mentschikoff placed four Militia** battalions, and

* The No. 2 battalion of Minsk.

** I adopt this inaccurate term as the best I can find to describe these semi-regular troops, because to call them, as the Russians do, "reserve battalions," would tend to confuse, by suggesting the idea of "reserves" in the ordinary sense. I thought at one time I might have

XLIV.

supported them by three battalions of regular in- CHAP. fantry, placed only a hundred and fifty yards in their rear, and by a fourth battalion ** drawn up in a neighbouring ravine.*** Further still in rear, he held in hand, as a reserve for his left wing, the four battalions of the "Moscow" corps which had joined him that morning. † These, with two batteries of artillery, were all the forces occupying that part originally of the position which was about to be assailed by posted in the French.+++ Including the battalion and the half- of the battery at Ulukul Akles, they consisted of thirteen assailed battalions of infantry with twenty guns, and num- French: bered altogether rather more than 10,000 men. §

Forces

the part

position

by the

called them "depôt battalions," but upon the whole it seemed to me that the term "militia" would be less likely to convey a wrong notion than the term "depôt." They are troops regarded as very inferior in quality to troops of the line. The four battalions which I call "militia" were the "reserve" battalions of the 13th Division. Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.

wicz.

*Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the Taroutine corps.

**The No. 1 battalion of the same corps. *** Chodasiewicz.

Anitchkoff, Chodasie

The battalions of the Moscow corps. Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz. + Viz., the Nos. 3 and 5 batteries of the 17th brigade of artillery. +++ The four batteries of the Minsk corps, with several guns, were afterwards moved into this part of the ground, as will be seen byand-by.

XLIV.

CHAP. They formed the left wing of the Russian army, and were commanded by General Kiriakoff. The battalions were placed at intervals, checkerwise, and each battalion was massed in column of companies. A line of skirmishers was thrown out in front; but for want, as was said, of better ground to act upon, these skirmishers were kept within ten yards of the "Militia" battalions. The two batteries of artillery were not at first so placed as to be of any use. No part of this force on the Telegraph Height was covered by intrenchments, or by any kind of fieldwork.

Forces originally posted in the part of the position assailed by the English.

In the main Pass, facing the bridge, and destined to confront the 2d Division of the English army, Prince Mentschikoff placed four battalions of light infantry,* with one battalion of rifles;** and three out of those five battalions had orders to advance and skirmish in the vineyards. The other two battalions were kept massed in column. Near the bridge was posted a battalion of sappers and miners.*** Astride the great road, and disposed along the chain of hillocks which runs across the Pass looking down on the bridge, the Prince placed two batteries of

differing in many things, are strictly in accord as to the number of battalions posted in this part of the field.

*The four battalions of the Borodino corps. Chodasiewicz.

**The sixth battalion of Riflemen. *** Anitchkoff.

Anilchkoff,

- Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.

XLIV.

field-artillery.* These two batteries, acting together, CHAP. and comprising sixteen guns,** are here termed "the "Causeway batteries." The force in this part of the field formed the centre of the line, and was under the command of Prince Gortschakoff. ***

The right wing of the Russian army was the force destined to confront, first our Light Division, and then the Guards and the Highlanders. It was posted on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Here was the Great Redoubt, armed with its fourteen heavy guns; and Prince Mentschikoff was so keen to defend this part of the ground, that he gathered round the work, on the slopes of the hill, a force of no less than sixteen battalions of regular infantry,††

* Light batteries, Nos. 1 and 2 of the 16th Artillery brigade. Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.

-

** Prince Gortschakoff says that these guns were eighteen in number.

*** The Borodino corps formed part of General Kiriakoff's command; but the nature of the ground and the course which the action took prevented him from having it in his actual control; and Gortschakoff, in the absence of the General commanding in chief, was the General to whom the corps would have to look for guidance.

+ Prince Gortschakoff puts the numbers of these guns at twelve. Chodasiewicz supposed that the redoubt was armed with the guns of the No. 2 battery of the 16th Artillery brigade; but the calibre of the gun and the howitzer now at Woolwich prove that the ordnance which armed the redoubt were not a part of the regular field-artillery, but were brought from Sebastopol.

+ The four battalions of the Kazan, or Prince Michael's corps, the four battalions of the Vladimir corps, the four battalions of the Sousdal corps, and the four battalions of the Uglitz corps. Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.

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CHAP. besides the two battalions of sailors, * and four batteries of field-artillery.** The right of the forces on the Kourganè Hill rested on a slope to the east of the Lesser Redoubt,*** and the left on the great road. Twelve of the battalions of regular infantry were disposed into battalion-columns posted at intervals and checkerwise on the flanks of the Great Redoubt; the other four battalions, drawn up in one massive column, were held as a reserve for the right wing on the higher slope of the hill. Of the four field-batteries, one armed the Lesser Redoubt, another was on the high ground commanding and supporting the Great Redoubt, and the remaining two were held in reserve. † General Kvetzinski

*Chodasiewicz. Anitchkoff calls this force a half battalion only; but Chodasiewicz saw the two battalions in march with their four guns, and I accept his statement. Anitchkoff says that these men were thrown forward as skirmishers in the vineyards.

**The No. 2 heavy battery of the 16th Artillery brigade, the No. 3 battery of position of the 17th brigade of Artillery, and the No. 3 battery of position, half of the No. 3 light battery of the 14th Artillery brigade, and the half battery belonging to the sailors. - Anitchkoff, or Chodasiewicz. The latter supposes that some of these batteries were posted more towards the centre with the reserve battalions.

*** It fired five guns only at the time when the Highlanders advanced; but it is believed that the three additional guns requisite to complete the battery were in the work at the beginning of the action. It was probably the No. 2 battery of the 16th Artillery brigade referred to in the former note.

Although I gather the numbers and descriptions of these forces from Russian authorities, I draw much of my knowledge of the way in which they were disposed from the observation of our officers; and it should be observed that the above statement applies to the state of the field at the time when the battle was going on, and not to the dispositions which Prince Mentschikoff may have made in the earlier part of the day.