XXXIII.

he resolved the contents of the despatch, they would CHAP have seen him turn crimson in poising the question whether he ought to resist the pressure of the Queen's Government, and to resist because of mere danger. What the Duke of Newcastle meant was to do all he reasonably could to enforce the invasion; and, so intending, he did honestly in making his order as peremptory as possible; but if, in any times to come, it shall be intended that an English general commanding on a foreign service is to exercise his judgment freely and without passion, the Secretary of State must not challenge him as Lord Raglan was challenged by the despatch of the 29th of June.

sion gov

counsels

Allies.

Lord Raglan's decisions governed the counsels of His decithe Allied camp; for although the Staff of the French erned the army* (including, as I believe, M. St Arnaud himself) of the were adverse to the undertaking, the Marshal's instructions were so framed that, if the English should be ready to go forward, he was virtually ordered to concur in the enterprise; ** and we have seen that he had not such a weight in the French camp as would have enabled him to oppose any valid resistance to the wishes of his own Government and the determination of the English General.

In announcing his decision to the Home Govern

This will be shown by the narrative in cap. 37, post.

** Lord Raglan had the advantage of knowing (by means of a communication from Lord Cowley) that the "Emperor quite concurred in "the views of the British Cabinet."

CHAP; ment, Lord Raglan thus wrote to the Duke of Newcastle:

XXXIII.

He announces

it to the

Home Government.

The Duke of Newcastle's reply.

"It becomes my duty to acquaint you that it was "more in deference to the views of the British "Government as conveyed to me in your Grace's "despatch, and to the known acquiescence of the "Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, than to "any information in the possession of the naval and "military authorities, either as to the extent of the "enemy's forces, or their state of preparation, that "the decision to make a descent upon the Crimea was "adopted.

"The fact must not be concealed that neither the "English nor the French Admirals have been able to "obtain any intelligence on which they can rely with "respect to the army which the Russians may destine "for operations in the field, or to the number of men "allotted for the defence of Sebastopol; and Marshal "St Arnaud and myself are equally deficient in in"formation upon these all-important questions, and "there would seem to be no chance of our acquiring

"it.

The Duke of Newcastle's reply to this despatch was in full consistency with that fearless and unshrinking assumption of responsibility which had marked his instructions of the 29th of June.

"I wish," he writes,** "that circumstances which

* 19th July.

** Private letter to Lord Raglan, 3d August 1854.

are engrossing my attention this afternoon per"mitted my expressing to you the feelings of intense แ 'anxiety and interest which your reply of the 19th of July to mine of the 29th of June have created in 'my mind. I cannot help seeing, through the calm "and noble tone of your announcement of the deci"sion to attack Sebastopol, that it has been taken in "order to meet the views and desires of the Govern"ment, and not in entire accordance with your own "opinions. God grant that success may reward you, "and justify us!

CHAP.

XXXIII.

Queen's

"I wrote to the Queen the moment I received your The 'despatch, and in answer she said: "The very impor- expression ""tant news which he conveyed to her in it, of the "'decision of the generals and admirals to attack

666

'Sebastopol, have filled the Queen with mixed ""feelings of satisfaction and anxiety. May the "Almighty protect her army and her fleet, and "bless this great undertaking with success!'

"Let me add my humble aspirations and prayers "to those of our good Queen. The cause is a just "one, if any war is just; and I will not believe that "in any case British arms can fail. May honour, "victory, and the thanks of a grateful world attend "your efforts! God bless you and those who fight "under you!"

of feeling.

Invasion of the Crimea. III.

9

CHAP. XXXIV.

ence at

head

quarters.

CHAPTER. XXXIV.

On the 18th of July a conference took place at Confer- Marshal St Arnaud's headquarters. It was attended the French by the Marshal, by Lord Raglan, and by Admiral Hamelin, by Admiral Bruat (who was the second in command of the French fleet), by Vice-Admiral Dundas, and by Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, who was the second in command of the English fleet. It lasted four hours.

Perhaps most of the members of the conference imagined that they were met for the purpose of determining upon the expediency of undertaking the invasion; but Lord Raglan had already made up his mind, not merely to support the wish of his Government in the Allied camp, but to cause its actual adoption; and he was so constituted that he could bring the resources of his mind to bear upon the object in view with as much abundance and strength as if he had himself approved or even devised it. Clearly a discussion upon the expediency of undertaking the enterprise would have been fatal to it; for no member of the conference, except Lyons and (possibly) Bruat, could have conscientiously argued

XXXIV.

that the scheme was wise or even moderately prudent. CHAP. How was it to be contrived that a council of war, disapproving the enterprise, should be prevented from strangling it?

lan's way

objec

As almost always happened in conferences where Lord RagLord Raglan had the ascendant, the grand question of eluding was quietly passed over, as though it were either tions. decided or conceded for the purpose of the discussion, and it was made to seem that the duty which remained to the council was that of determining the time and the means. The French had studied the means of disembarking in the face of a powerful enemy. Sir Ralph Abercromby's descent upon the coast of Egypt in the face of the French army was an enterprise too brilliant and too daring to allow of its being held a safe example, for he had simply landed his infantry upon the beach in boats, without attempting, in the first instance, to bring artillery into action. It seems that hardly any stress of circumstances will induce a French general to bring his infantry into action upon open ground without providing for it the support of artillery. Naturally, therefore, the French authorities at Varna were impressed with the necessity of being able to land their field-guns in such a way as to admit of their being brought into action simultaneously with the landing of their battalions; and, having anticipated some time before that a disembarkation in the face of an enemy might be one of the operations of the war, they had already begun to make the boats required