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of inferring the matter contained in the illegible part CHAP. of his despatch. Apparently it was the desire of both the Home Governments that the Allied commanders should prepare to make a descent upon the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol.

On the 16th of July the despatch of the 29th of June was received at the English headquarters; and a despatch forwarded from Paris at nearly the same time reached the hands of Marshal St Arnaud.

who had

mine upon

to be given

Since the proposed expedition involved the employ- The men ment of both land and sea forces, the duty of deter- to determining upon the effect to be given to the instructions the effect from home devolved upon those who had the com- to the inmand of the Anglo-French armies and fleets. These structions. were three: Marshal St Arnaud (having Admiral Hamelin under his orders), Lord Raglan, and ViceAdmiral Dundas.

St Arnaud.

Marshal St Arnaud had not weight proportioned Marshal to the magnitude of his command. Reputed at first to be daring even to the verge of rashness, we have seen him so cautioned and schooled into strategic prudence as to have determined to place hundreds of miles of territory, and even the great range of the Balkan, between the French and the Russians; and now, within the last week, he had been almost reproved by his Government for want of enterprise. Colonel Trochu, admitted into consultation upon the most momentous affairs, seemed to wield great authority. At Constantinople and at Varna, no less than in Paris, the Marshal had been made the victim of

CHAP. XXXIII.

unsparing tongues. Indeed at this time two of his divisional generals openly indulged in merciless invectives against their chief; and soldiers all know that a general officer thus setting himself against the commander-in-chief is never without a great following. Perhaps, as had been at first supposed, it may have been true that boldness and craving for adventure were the true lines of the Marshal's character; but if that were so, his native ideas had been overlaid by much counsel, and bent into unwonted shapes. After a while, as will be seen, his mind, fatigued by advice, and now and then broken down by bodily illness, began to lapse into a state which rendered. him almost passive in very critical moments. Naturally, he had been cowed by the result of his endeavours to have his own way against Lord Stratford and Lord Raglan. He was without ascendancy in the camp of the Allies.

Colonel Trochu was a student of the principles applicable to formal inland warfare, and it was to be expected that, the more the obstacles to the proposed undertaking were canvassed, the more likely it would be that he would throw the weight of his scientific advice into the negative scale.

Upon the whole, it resulted, from the composition of the various forces acting upon the mind of M. St Arnaud, that, whatever opinion he might lean to, he was not strong enough to be able to act upon events. If the English should decide against the project, he would be well content, and perhaps much relieved.

XXXIII.

If, on the other hand, the English should press for CHAP. its adoption, then the French Marshal would do his best to carry it to a good conclusion.

Hamelin.

The French fleet was commanded by Admiral Admiral Hamelin. It was understood that he disapproved the expedition, but he was under the orders of the chief who commanded the land-forces.

Pasha.

It was not at that time a part of the project to Omar move any very large proportion of the Turkish army to the coast of the Crimea, and therefore the opinion of Omar Pasha would hardly become a governing ingredient in the counsels of the Allies. It was known, however, that he deprecated the proposed invasion.

Dundas.

The English fleet was commanded by Vice-Admiral Admiral Dundas. Most of the Vice-Admiral's latter years had been passed in political and official life, and it was by force of politics that he had now become troubled with the business of war; for his seat at the Admiralty Board, and his subsequent appointment in peace-time to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, were things which stood in the relation of cause and effect. He had not sought to return to scenes of naval strife, but the war overtook him in his marine retirement, converting his expected repose into anxious toil. He was an able, a steadfast, a genial man, and his square Scottish head, and his rough, shrewd, good-humoured eyebrows, had grown grey in the faithful service of a political party. By nature he was so stout-hearted that he could afford to give free,

XXXIII.

CHAP. manly counsel without the least dread lest men should say he was too cautious. His habits as a working subordinate member of Government, and perhaps, also, his natural temperament, inclined him to take a homely view of questions a view recommended by what men term common sense." I am sure, though I never heard him say so, that he believed the war to be extremely foolish, and that the less there was of it the better it would be for the Whigs and for all the rest of mankind. He spoke and went straight forward. He thoroughly disapproved the project of invasion, and he said so in plain words. His opinion sprang, not from dread of peril to the forces which he himself commanded, but from anxiety anxiety in every way honourable to him for the safety of the English army. That that anxiety was altogether vain, or even that it was weakly founded, few men, speaking with the light of the past, will be ready to say. Still less will it be thought that the Vice-Admiral was wrong in giving bold expression to his views.

Admiral Dundas's command was of course independent of the General in command of the English army; but the feasibility of the sea-transit was not at all in question, and it was plain, therefore, that the decision would properly rest with those who were responsible for the direction of the land-forces. So,

* Dundas, I think, said fairly and bluntly that he could undertake to land the army on the coast of the Crimea, but not to supply it, nor to bring it back.

XXXIII.

although he held stoutly to his own opinion, the CHAP. Vice-Admiral did not fail to give assurance that, if the decision of the Generals should be in favour of undertaking the expedition, they might rely upon the aid of the English fleet.

Raglan.

There remained Lord Raglan: and now it is time Lord to give the words of the instructions which had been addressed to him, as we have already seen, by the Secretary of State.

The private letter which was the forerunner of the detailed despatch ran thus:

structions

to him by

Govern

"Since I last wrote to you, events unknown to The in"you at the date of these letters have been brought addressed "to us by the telegraph, and the raising the siege the Home "of Silistria, and the retreat of the Russian army ment. "across the Danube (preparatory, probably, to a "retreat across the Pruth), give an entirely new "aspect to the war, and render it necessary at once "to consider what shall be our next move.

"The Cabinet is unanimously of opinion that, "unless you and Marshal St Arnaud feel that you "are not sufficiently prepared, you should lay siege "to Sebastopol, as we are more than ever convinced "that, without the reduction of this fortress and the "capture of the Russian fleet, it will be impossible "to conclude an honourable and safe peace. The "Emperor of the French has expressed his entire "concurrence in this opinion, and, I believe, has "written privately to the Marshal to that effect. "I shall submit to the Cabinet a despatch to you on