fional, but fixed: to rule and govern the question as it shall arife; not to ftart up on a fudden, and fhift from fide to fide, as the caprice of the day or the fluctuation of party fhall direct. Our conftitution does not know any court fo fupreme as to be above reason, nor fo abfolute as to be able to make a cuftom under pretence of declaring it.

The doctrine here afferted is fuch as would maintain the refolution of the houfe to be the law of the land by virtue of its own authority only, notwithstanding it may have ufage, reason, and juftice to contend againft.

Inftances were given of former refolutions, repeatedly taken upon much deliberation, in oppofition to good fenfe and reafon, common ufage, and the rights of the electors. It was faid that a most falutary doctrine was to be drawn from the glaring inconfiftency of thefe refolutions; that where power goes beyond right, it finds no refting place; it never knows where to ftop; but that every part of its career fhews the danger of paffing the bounds prescribed by law.

Befides the original difqualifications, founded on reafon and the common law, and which are as ancient as the conftitution, and from their natnre must be as permanent, reftraints have at different times been laid on by the ftatute law, and founded therefore in the confent of the whole community. These are arbitrary, take their rife from expediency, and are liable to be changed from time to time, by that authority which gave them being. If thefe reftraints could have been established by any authority lefs than that of an act of parliament, it is not to

be imagined that the house of commons would have applied to the other branches of the legiflature, in a matter which entirely concerned itself and its conftituents in their elections; though every application rifqued at least the mortification of a refufal; and that in our own times place-bills, and penfion bills, have been tendered at the bar of the house of lords from year to year, though their only object was the independency of the house of commons. That the great patriots who tendered thofe bills never dreamed of the doctrine now fet up, which tells us, that any reftraint declared by the house, derives fufficient authority from that declaration, and is good in law.

That inftances may be brought of experiments made, how far a vote of the houfe might be effectual where the vote has been afterwards dropped, and the effect obtained by an act of parliament. That in particular, April 2, 1677, the house came to a refolution to prevent expences in elections after the tefte of the writ, much in the fame words as in the act afterwards paffed, 7 Will. III. This was made the ftanding order of the houfe at that time. It was renewed and confirmed as fuch, May 23, and October 21, 1678. But to give it effect, it became neceffary to pafs an act of parliament for that purpofe fix years after the revolution.

That the houfe of commons has the right incidental to its judicature, of declaring what incapacities are legal. But it behoves the houfe to take care, that, inftead of exercising the powers which it has, it affumes not thofe

which it has not; that from the temperate and judicious ufe of a legal power, vefted in it for the benefit of the people, it fwell not to the utmoft pitch of extravagance and defpotifm, and make the law, under pretence of declaring it.

It was fhewn that Mr. Wilkes was not, by any conftruction what ever, under any legal difability, That there are an infinite number of cafes, in which the expediency of new powers in magiftrates, courts of juice, and either houfe of parliament are apparent. But thefe powers cannot be affumed. They must be derived from a fuperior authority to an inferior; from the legifla ure to either houfe of parliament. That there is a manifeft difference between expulfion and difability; and that we must totally forget the common fenfe and meaning of words if we can perfuade ourselves that expulfion, which is the lefs degree of punishment, involves difability, which is the greater; and that the fame difference between the fenfe of thefe words in common language, has in a parliamentary fenfe been conftantly obferved by the houfe of commons.

The causes of expulfion were examined; it was faid, that the charge against Mr. Wilkes was fa accumulated, that it was difficult to fay precifely for what he was expelled; and that it was probable if the queftion had been put feparately for each offence contained in that charge, judgment of expulfion might not have paffed for either. That the first offence contained in the general charge, was the publication of the North Briton; which had been taken up by a former parliament, and for which he had been then punished

I

by expulfion. That being punished by a former parliament, he could not be brought a fecond time to punishment in this parliament for the fame offence, and that it would be an imputation on the juftice of the houfe to fuppofe it. The second offence was the publication of an impious and obfcene libel, which had been taken up by the house of lords in a former parliament, and for which he had been convicted and punished; but which was no offence against the house of commons, nor in any respec within its criminal jurisdiction, The third and laft offence, was the libel contained in the introductory preface to lord Weymouth's letter: however this may be understood as a libel, it was faid not to be one of thofe offences which are within the criminal jurifdiction of the house of commons.

The precedents of difability founded upon former refolutions were fricly examined; it was fhewn that some of them overthrow themselves; that nobody can rely on the authority of proceedings in which there appears a manifeft abuse, a daring illegality, and a flavish fubmiffion to power: fuch proceedings are vicious in the whole as well as in part; and ought never to be quoted in order to be followed. That others were established in the moft violent times, when every day produced new invafions of the conftitution. That in the year 1642, the precedents grow upon us fa abundantly as to lofe all pretence to authority. That forty-nine members were expelled in two months only of that year, and most or all of them rendered incapable of fitting that the majority then

were

were clearing the house of their obnoxious brethren; and that to render their policy compleat, and better fecure to their order of incapacity the effect intended, new writs were feldom iffued at the time of the expulfion; and frequently were not iffued at all.

That order arofe out of this confufion: and that from the reftoration to the present time, the fentence or punishment has never gone beyond expullion, except in a few inftances of members difabled from being elected at particular boroughs, on proof of a corrupt influence obtained in them.

That the power of expulfion is fufficiently great: it may be ufed to difgrace, to harafs, to ruin an individual; but it carries with it no public danger. If the houfe abuse its power in the execution of it, the electors have their remedy, by re-electing the expelled member. But when incapacity of being re-elected is fuper-added to the expulfion, it is no longer the cafe of an individual; the rights of the electors are moft materially affected. A ftop is put to the freedom of their election. The number of perfons open to their choice is diminished: and though that diminution is in one only, that fingle perfon may be their first favourite, and perhaps on that account rendered incapable. Nor does the evil ftop here. The elected learn to taste the fweets of culling their company, not only by removing troublefome opponents, but barring their re-entry; and by putting a negative on the first intereft in any place, make room for the fecond. That reafon cries aloud against fuch a power in any fet of men whatever. Happily fhe is oppofed by

no confiderbale lift of precedents, except in eighteen years of confusion, from 1642 to 1660. That when we fee this power fo feldom exercifed in old times, fo grofsly abused when it was, and fo entire y abandoned fince, we cannot but conclude that ufage difclaims the power as much as reafor protefts against it, and that it does not exift in our conftitution.

Such were a few of the many arguments urged with great force and energy on this fide of the queftion. On the other fide it was faid, that the houfe of commons had long been allowed a power of expelling their own members, and that unless the perfon expelled was to be excluded, the power of expulfion was wholly ufelefs, and tended rather to expofe the houfe of commons to contempt, than to increase its dignity or importance. That the right claimed by the freeholders of Middlefex, was no other than the right of doing wrong, of fending a member to parliament, who was certainly ineligible in the eye of reafon, however he might be deemed returnable in the judgment of the law. That if the houfe was obliged by the conftitution to receive all perfons who were returned by a majority of freeholders, and who were qualified according to law, the fr eholders were equally bound not to return improper perfons. That the law could not forefee all poffible cafes; but that if it could have been thought, that the free older would, have made an injudicious, improper, or dangerous ufe, of his great privilege of election, the condi tution would not have entrad them with it. That our wife ceftors by no means intended, tat

infidels fhould be the guardians of our religion, beggars the protectors of our property, or convicts the framers of our laws.

That the house of commons is the fole court of judicature in all cafes of election. That this authority is derived from the firft principles of our government; viz. the neceffary independence of the three branches of the legislature. Did any other body of men poffefs this power, members might be obtruded upon the house, and their refolutions might be influenced under colour of determin ing elections. They have therefore an exclufive jurifdiction, and must be in all thefe cafes the dernier refort of juftice. That the houfe in the prefent cafe is the competent judge of disability, and that their decifion on it is final; that if in this, or any other inftance, its decifions were found to be attended with prejudice, the united branches of the legislature, in their fupreme and collective capacity, might interpofe, and by paffing a law regulate fuch decifions for the future; but that nothing lefs could restrict their authority.

It is afked, under what head of legal difability, is the prefent expulfion to be found? how are the electors to know it? The answer is eafy the records of parliament will inform them. How have they learnt, that judges of the fuperior courts cannot be chofen reprefentatives of the people? How are aliens? How are clergymen difqualified? The house has adjudged them incapable, as the feveral queftions occurred.

It was faid, that a very extraordinary principle had been adopted in the course of this debate, as

if the commons wanted to infringe upon the liberties of the people, without recollecting that the commons and the people are virtually the fame, and that any endeavour to make them feparate bodies, is no lefs dangerous, than it is prepofterous. If the commons, in their reprefentative capacity, have privileges which render them important, that importance increases the confequence of the people in their capacity of delegation: the people cannot be fecure, unless the commons are fecure; they are infeparably connected, both in interest and in freedom: and though upon fome occafions the privilege of parliament may be a feeming oppreffion to individuals, the lofs of it would be attended with very fatal effects to the whole community. That if the house of commons had not in their collective capacity a title to peculiar privileges, no one member in his individual character could claim them with the fmallest degree of propriety; yet individuals hourly claimed them with confidence, and they were admitted by the law of the land.

That nothing could be more mifreprefented, than by saying that this meafure was an injury to the freeholders of Middlesex. That on the contrary the injury was attempted on their fide, who would obtrude an improper person on the houfe as a member, and obftinately perfevere in this attempt, though all England was open to them for the choice of a proper perfon. That the fuppofed violation of right, in returning a perfon with a manifeft inferiority of votes, will vanifh, if the fubject is properly confidered, and at liberal conftruction put upon the

law.

law. That thofe who obftinately and wilfully perfevere in voting for an unqualified perfon, are to be confidered as not voting at all; their right of fuffrage is acknowledged; but if the elector obftinately refuses to exercise this right according to law, he wantonly fufpends his own right for the time, and his act being illegal is confequently void, and he is only in the fituation of a man who had neglected to attend; he fuffers no injury, he knows the confequence of what he does, and if he chufes to indulge his humour, it cannot even be counted a hardship. That an unqualified candidate can be no candidate; and that it is fo evident that votes given to a perfon incapable by law of receiving them muft in their nature be null and void, that it is furprizing how any body can dispute it.

Thefe arguments were fupported by a long train of precedents, fhewing the ufage of the houfe in a number of cafes, under the two heads of exclufion and expulfion. The former cafes came generally within the line which has before ben animadverted upon; the inferences drawn from the latter were greatly controverted, and in fome inftances, particularly the cafe of Sir Robert Walpole, were fhewn to overthrow the principle which they were brought to eftablish.

The prorogration fucceeded the day after the final deciMay 9. fion on the Middlefex

election. Great approbation was given, by the fpeech from the thione, to the whole conduct of parliament; their attention to the permanent commercial interests of their country, as well as to the immediate benefit in point of revenue, their deliberations on East India affairs, were particularly commended; and it was hoped that the hearty concurrence that appeared in all the branches of the legislature, of maintaining the due execution of the laws in every part of the dominions, would be productive of falutary effects in America. The rupture between Ruffia and the Porte was regretted; a warm intention of endeavouring to restore peace between them expreffed; and a hope that the calamities of war would not extend to any other part of Europe. Particular acknowledgements were paid for the provifion that was made for discharging the debts incurred on account of the civil government; and an affurance given, that the readiness fhewn in relieving the difficulties that were ftill increafing from the continuance of that debt, fhould always be confidered as an additional motive for economy in that refpect. And it was finally and ftrongly recommended, and great concern expreffed for the neceffity of it, that they would exert their utmost efforts in their feveral counties, for the maintenance of public peace and good order.

CHRO