of the internal and international situations, but addressed itself also to a number of basic doctrinal propositions. It did not, however, seem to merit the extreme praise bestowed upon it as "a milestone, a new stage in the study of the laws governing Communist construction." 12 Most of the themes developed in the report had already been covered frequently in current Soviet propaganda and in Khrushchev's own utterances. No startling new theoretical ground was broken. With perhaps a few exceptions of some significance, the principal doctrinal novelties associated with Khrushchev's namenotably his revision of the concepts of capitalist encirclement and inevitable war-had already been introduced at the 20th party congress. Nevertheless, the report was a major exercise, knitting together Khrushchev's views on a wide range of issues and exuding the confidence of a man who seemed to feel that he had mastered his vocation of laying down the line for the Communist world to follow. On the question of "capitalist encirclement," Khrushchev spelled out fully his previously asserted conviction that a histrionic reversal had taken place, assuring the "final outcome of the world struggle" in Communist favor. In part, he said:

The situation in the world has fundamentally changed. Capitalist encirclement of our country no longer exists. There are two world social systems: capitalism which is coming to the end of its days, and socialism in the full flood of its growing forces, on whose side are the sympathies of the working people of all countries. Just as any other socialist country, the Soviet power is not guaranteed from possible aggression on the part of the imperialist states. However, the correlation of true forces in the world at present is such that we will be able to rebuff any attack by the enemy.

The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the creation of a world socialist system are incalculably strengthening the forces of the international workers' movement and opening up new prospects for it *** no shadow of doubt can remain as to the final outcome of the world struggle. In this respect the final victory of socialism is fully and unconditionally insured.13

With regard to the prospect of Communist victory without a world war, Khrushchev again offered the formula that war was not inevitable, in view of the growing might and moral influence of the "peace loving" Communist camp. In reaffirming this deterrent thesis, however, Khrushchev seemed to be addressing himself to doubters on the Communist side, and perhaps also to his own second thoughts on whether the capitalist world would remain a passive accomplice to its own demise. He said:

Thus even before the complete victory of socialism on earth, there will be an actual possibility of excluding war from the life of society. Some people may say: "But capitalism will remain, and therefore the adventurers who could start a war will remain also." This is correct, and this ought not to be forgotten.1

Among the doctrinal questions of "great historical significance" upon which Khrushchev trained his sights at the 21st Congress was that of the "transition from socialism to communism." His answer to this hardy perennial, while couched in carefully chosen theoretical language, had some interesting implications. "How will the development of socialist countries proceed toward communism?" Khrushchev asked. (In Soviet terms, the U.S.S.R. is a country which has

completed the building of "socialism," but is now only on the path toward "communism"). He then said:

Can a situation be imagined in which one socialist country attains communism✶✶✶ while other countries still remain somewhere behind in the early stages of building a socialist society? If one takes into account the laws of economic development of socialist systems, such a prospect is scarcely possible. It would be theoretically correct to assume that socialist countries, properly using the possibilities inherent in the socialist system, will reach the highest stage of communist society more or less simultaneously.15

What Khrushchev was saying, in effect, was that Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country" had now been altered, and that one could no longer expect to reapply it as "communism in one country." For alert party congress listeners, this meant that the Soviet bloc as a whole should expect to advance toward communism together, which in turn could be taken as a reminder to the Chinese comrades not to try setting their own accelerated pace. Khrushchev was thus asserting his right to prescribe for the Communist movement as a whole, without directly challenging the "fraternal" Chinese leadership. Elsewhere in his discussion of the transition question, Khrushchev delivered another lecture probably meant for Chinese ears. Speaking of the tempo of advance, he said that the "transition to communism should not be understood as a kind of slow motion," but on the contrary, as "a period of quick development.' However, he went

on to say:

One should not hurry and apply hastily that which has not yet matured. This would lead to distortions and to a compromising of our cause.18

This oblique manner of getting his point across was in plain contrast with Khrushchev's open assurances of "no differences between us and the Communist Party of China." The point of interest is that oblique reference to the authority of doctrine, as Khrushchev here used it, often masks issues which cannot be read in the public. face communism presents to the world.

Among key Marxist tenets of long standing which drew Khrushchev's attention at the 21st congress was that of the withering away of the state. He paid the notion lip service, as a good Marxist should, but then went on, much as Stalin before him had done, to assert that any withering of state power under "present circumstances" would only help the enemies of communism. In words which ardent proponents of unilateral Western disarmament might well ponder, he said.

Though the imperialists cannot now destroy us, the revisionists are in fact suggesting that we ourselves should disarm, destroy state organs which insure the defense of the country, and thus put ourselves at the mercy of our enemies. The defense functions of the socialist fatherland carried out at present by the state can wither away only when danger of attack by imperialists upon our country and our allied countries is fully eliminated.

Khrushchev then went on:

Now, as the construction of socialism has proceeded beyond the framework of one country, as a world socialist system has been formed, new theoretical problems have arisen in the struggle for the victory of socialism and communism.1

This last passage could be taken to imply that Khrushchev was thinking merely of the task of holding together the Soviet empire

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Pravda, Jan. 29, 1959. Italic added.

(memories of Hungary still fresh in his mind), or of defending it against outside threats. However, the emphasis on spreading of the Communist system and reference to "new theoretical problems" in connection therewith could also be understood to mean that Khrushchev was announcing, in aeosopian terms, that with opportunities for expansion on a worldwide scale opening before it, the Soviet Union would be doing less than its historic duty if it now dismantled its armed might.

A considerable part of Khrushchev's 21st congress report bore on Soviet achievements under his leadership in various fields of endeavor, with emphasis on industrial and scientific development. To Khrushchev fell the distinction of being the first leader in Soviet history to affix even an approximate terminal date to the traditional slogan "to catch up with and surpass the United States." Reviewing the goals of the 7-year plan (scheduled to end in 1965), he said:

*** after fulfillment of the 7-year plan, we will need probably about 5 more years to catch up with and surpass the United States in industrial output. Thus, by that time, or perhaps even sooner, the Soviet Union will attain first place in the world in both absolute output and per capita production.18

As for the field of science, Khrushchev could assume the air of a man who had already won his race, for did not Soviet satellite and cosmic rocket achievements already demonstrate clear superiority over the best the United States could do? Even more to the point, and Khrushchev did not miss the opportunity to make it later in the Congress, the United States might well reflect that it had lost something besides a scientific race, namely, its military invulnerability. Said Khrushchev, in dwelling on Soviet missile progress:

I think it is high time for American strategists to quit their fool's paradise that in the event of a military conflict U.S. territory would remain invulnerable. For a long time now this has not accorded with reality and has been nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of American generals. As a matter of fact, today the Soviet Union possesses the means to deliver a crushing blow to the aggressor at any point on the globe. It is not a mere figure of speech, after all, when we state that we have organized the series production of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Nor do we say this to threaten anybody, but rather to clarify the exist ing state of affairs.19

The tough tone taken by Khrushchev at the 21st congress on Soviet ability to deal with "aggression" if the United States should be foolish enough to try it was more than matched by the generally conciliatory tenor of most of the things he had to say about Soviet relations with the West. One of the basic objects of Khrushchev's whole performance, in fact, was to put fresh momentum behind the new Soviet peace offensive which took up again after the previous one launched at Geneva in 1955 had bogged down over the events in Hungary and the Suez crisis in 1956.

Toward this end, Khrushchev stressed the need for peaceful coexistence, and dwelt on a number of themes to suggest what he had in mind. Disarmament and an ending of the arms race was one of these. However, he made it plain that Western insistence on inspection was not to his taste:

Now that they have encircled us with their military bases, the Western Powers want to establish bases on our territory for military reconnaissance, to obtain the right to fly over Soviet territory in order * * * to select the moment to put their

18 Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, 10 Pravda, Feb. 6, 1959.

military bases into action against our country. And they want us to help them in the realization of these plans. Is that not a bit too much, gentlemen? 20

Another theme advanced to define the path to peaceful coexistence was the identification of economics as the main sphere to peaceful competition between capitalism and socialism. To further sweeten the attraction of coexisting with communism, Khrushchev sought to reassure the West that revolutions are not exportable, although he made perhaps the unfortunate choice of citing Lenin as the authority for this assertion.

In every country the people themselves must determine their fate and choose the path of their development. The Soviet Union does not want to impose upon anyone else the path it has chosen. We are guided wholly by the instructions of Lenin to the effect that revolutions are not exportable. Would it not be better if the leaders of states with different social systems would come as soon as possible to the following conclusion: Since we occupy the same planet, which is not very large by the standards of present-day technology, would it not be better if we lived on it in such a way as not to elbow each other, and not to shake fists constantly at each other in the form of atomic or hydrogen bombs? 21

The reasonable tone of this plea for coexisting peacefully was adopted again later at the Congress when Khrushchev addressed himself to the German question. After restating that "every country must decide for itself which social system suits it," he went on to say that free elections in the two German states were impossible as long as third parties proposed to interfere in such elections. Thus Khrushchev used the device of "no outside interference" to indicate that the West should give up any idea of ousting the East German Communist regime, although he did not commit himself to keep hands off in the other direction. "We can indeed assume," he said, "that the Germans" will at some time want to conduct free elections to abolish the capitalist system in West Germany." 22 Such an "assumption," in view of the Communist notion of what constitutes a free election, could hardly be mistaken for a promise to suspend the export of revolution beyond the Communist realm.

The new leadership style of Khrushchev

As noted earlier, and as the brief glimpse above at some of his party congress formulations suggests, the notion that Khrushchev is somehow an un-Marxist-type leader derives less from the novelty of his ideas than from his public style and personality. His habit of sounding off at the drop of a hat-at diplomatic receptions, at exhibitions, on foreign visits-has enriched the standards of Marxist expression with pithy Khrushchevisms and Russian proverbs, as well as giving his utterances a wider audience than straightforward, political pronouncements usually enjoy. Moreover, his frequent public appearances, where he jostles elbows with crowds and correspondents, mark a sharp departure from the aloof, forbidding style of Stalin, and help to flesh out the image of Khrushchev as a leader "in close contact with life."

Apart from his earthy, grassroots appeal to the masses, other qualities which mark Khrushchev's particular style include great tactical flexibility and a shrewd sense of timing. While the latter are attributes which every model Communist leader is supposed to

20 Ibid.

1 Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959. Pravda, Feb. 6, 1959.

possess, along with stubborn dedication to long-range ends, Khrushchev appears to be unusually well endowed in these respects.

Khrushchev's taste for personal diplomacy is another factor which sets him apart from the stereotype of the orthodox Communist leader. Whereas Stalin, for example, emerged only now and then from the inner precincts of his secret world to treat with other heads of state or an occasional eminent journalist, Khrushchev has taken on virtually all comers, either in their capitals or his own. His numerous meetings and exchanges of open correspondence with statesmen, industrialists and other influential figures of the non-Communist world indicate confidence in his own ability to state a persuasive case. Obversely, as one analyst has pointed out, Khrushchev's penchant for dealing directly with prominent people from the other camp also reflects a belief in their ability to influence events. This suggests a somewhat un-Marxian attitude toward the role of personalities in history. Even though Khrushchev has sometimes gone out of his way to assert the standard Marxian view that individual "great men" are unimportant, as he did to a visiting German delegation in the summer of 1959 23 he acts very much as though he believed otherwise.

The field in which Khrushchev has strayed farthest from the beaten path of Soviet thinking is that of military strategy. Khrushchev emerged as an authoritative voice on military affairs at about the same time he became undisputed dictator, in the latter part of 1957. Prior to that time, Marshal Zhukov had been the top leadership's most frequent and authentic spokesman in the military sphere. Khrushchev himself came to power without having been closely associated with military matters during most of his career, although he did attain the rank of lieutenant general in World War II as a political commissar. Retrospectively, he has been credited with participation in the conduct of battles and important strategic decisions, though he never managed to achieve membership on the State Defense Committee, through which the highest ranking party leaders of the time made their contributions to military victory.

Whether Khrushchev's antecedents in a formal military sense are extensive or not probably makes no great difference with regard to his subsequent assumption of responsibility for laying down Soviet grand strategy. In a broader sense, his whole experience as a member of the Communist leadership caste has helped prepare him for the major strategic tasks he must now perform at a level where military considerations and the pursuit of basic political objectives merge. Communists, bred in an age of violence and revolution, are trained to think and act essentially in terms of the organization and management of power. Hence, Khrushchev's long schooling in the tactics and strategy of Communist leadership is an asset more significant than whatever purely technical military competence he may possess.

Prior to consolidating his grip on power in late 1957, Khrushchev stayed rather quietly in the background so far as expressing himself on basic military questions goes. Through most of 1954, for example, a controversy involving strategic issues was carried on between Malenkov, then Premier, and Premier, and an opposing faction of which Khrushchev was the ringleader. At issue was the question whether a nuclear war would result in the destruction of civilization, as Malenkov

23 Pravda, May 9, 1959.