The hard line, or what might be called the "face the facts" approach is intended to sell the West the idea that it has no alternative but to reconcile itself to a shift in the world power balance in favor of the Communist bloc. This aspect of Khrushchev's strategy is backed up by occasional H-bomb and missile rattling, dramatic demonstrations of Soviet space prowess, boasts of steep industrial growth rates, blunt reminders that the Soviet Union will tolerate no future Hungarys, and continued assertions that no moratorium in the worldwide class struggle is in prospect. Because Soviet policy toward the West since Khrushchev came to power has been both militant and conciliatory, "insistently aggressive" and "insistently cordial," it is sometimes asked whether one can make rhyme or reason out of the pattern. Perhaps the pattern begins to make sense when, as indicated above, both the hard and the soft aspects of Khrushshev's policy are viewed as mutually supporting parts of the same overall strategic line. The main strategic line For the present phase of struggle between the capitalist and Communist camps, the main strategic line is based on the concept of "peaceful coexistence." Both cajolery and threat are aimed at forcing the West to accept "peaceful coexistence" as the governing concept in relations between the two competing systems. While this concept is not new in Communist doctrine, it generally has been favored for periods of relative Soviet weakness when a "breathing spell" was needed. The fact that the peaceful coexistence concept again underlies Soviet strategy in a period when, according to Khrushchev, the Communist movement is running strong and in the full tide of success, is significant. For it demonstrates that Khrushchev has assessed the period of historical transition to Communist supremacy as one of great criticality, during which the capitalist world must be deflected from effective interference with the process of transition. What peaceful coexistence means in terms of the Communist struggle for world dominance, and how it is expected to serve this ongoing struggle under Khrushchev's leadership, therefore deserves close scrutiny. III. THE MEANING OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE Khrushchev never tires of asserting that "hostile propagandists" and "cold-war mongers" in the West are guilty of distorting the concept of peaceful coexistence, of trying to picture it as "a fraud." * Any suggestion that Soviet "peace policy" represents a form of manuever in the struggle with the non-Communist world, rather than a sincere desire to live peacefully with it, also draws pained denials from Khrushchev. At the 20th party congress, where peaceful coexistence was one of Khrushchev's major themes, he addressed skeptical opinion in the West in these words: It has been alleged that the Soviet Union advances the principle of peaceful coexistence merely out of tactical considerations, considerations of expediency. Yet it is common knowledge that we have always, from the very first years of Cf. Adam Ulam, "Expansion and Coexistence: Counterpoint in Soviet Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, No. 5, vol. VIIII, September-October 1959, p. 2. "See for example Khrushchev's article "On Peaceful Coexistence," in Foreign Affairs, October 1959, as published in the New York Times, Sept. 3, 1959, p. 4. Soviet power, stood with equal firmness for peaceful coexistence. Hence it is not a tactical move, but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.40 This assertion, with its insistence that Communists have never taken an expedient view of the peaceful coexistence principle, stands in interesting comparison with other Communist statements on the subject. At the VI World Congress of the Communist International in 1928, for example, it was stated: This policy (the Soviet peace policy) is the Leninist policy of the proletarian dictatorship. It is merely another and under present conditions-a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism; a form which the U.S.S.R. has employed consistently since the October revolution."1 The curiously lopsided Communist view of what a peaceful policy means is to be seen in the contention that when others talk peace they are hypocrites, but that Communists are consistently for peace even when they are preparing for war or actually waging it. The "Theses of the VI World Congress" put it in these words: There is a glaring contradiction between the imperialists' policy of piling up armaments and their hypocritical talk about peace. There is no such contradiction, however, between the Soviet Government's preparations for defense and for revolutionary war and a consistent peace policy. Revolutionary war of the proletarian dictatorship is but a continuation of revolutionary peace policy "by other means." 42 Further insight into the reasons behind traditional Soviet pursuit of a peace policy was given on the same occasion: The aim of this policy is to guard the international revolution and to protect the work of building up socialism-the progress of revolutionizing the world. It strives to put off the conflict with imperialism for as long as possible.43 A similar idea was expressed by Stalin at the 15th Congress of the CPSU in 1927: We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries. *** Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the coexistence of two opposed systems." While these statements bear out the point that the Soviets have adverted to the principle of peaceful coexistence over a long period of time, they also make it quite clear that this principle, together with Soviet "peace policy" is general, serves the purely instrumental purpose of advancing the communist world struggle, and not that of establishing peace as the term is generally understood in the nonCommunist world. Lenin gave perhaps the classic notation on the Communist attitude toward the instrumental use of peace tactics to serve Communist ends when he analyzed the maneuvering behind the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany, which took Russia out of the war in 1918. *** As every sensible man will understand, by signing this treaty we do not put a stop to our workers' revolution. * * * In war never tie your hands with 40 "Current Soviet Policies II The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath," edited by Leo Gruliow, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 36. 41 "Theses of the VI World Congress of the Communist International," 1928, in International Press Correspondence, No. 84, Nov. 28, 1928, p. 1590. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. Stalin, J. V., "Sochineniya" (gospolitizdot, Moscow, 1949), vol. X, p. 289. Look up. considerations of formality. It is ridiculous not to know the history of war, not to know that a treaty is the means of gaining strength.45 Lenin's coldblooded appraisal of his Brest-Litovsk tactics is doubtless no more cynical than many a chapter in the diplomatic history of other states. It is of particular interest in the Communist context, however, because it is so frequently cited by the Soviets as the classic example of a "wise and flexible" maneuver in the interests of peace. No deviation from Leninist principles Khrushchev himself has recently linked his pursuit of a peaceful coexistence policy explicitly with the Brest-Litovsk example in a way which indicates that current Soviet peace policy has not deviated from the principles laid down by Lenin. In an address to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1959, Khrushchev said: The history of the Soviet state knows not a few examples of Lenin's wise and flexible foreign policy aimed at the solution of vital problems of peace. Thus, for example, during the periods of the Brest peace Vladimir Ilyich Lenin set the task of concluding peace with Germany to insure for the young Soviet state the possibility for peaceful construction of socialism. Lenin and the party had to wage a persistent struggle then against Trotsky, who advanced his ultra leftist objections and put forward his notorious slogan of "neither peace nor war," by which he played into the hands of the German imperialists. It is known that Trotsky's adventurist policy was used by German imperialism against the Soviet country.40 What Khrushchev is saying here, among other things, is that all Communists should understand that his peaceful coexistence policy is based on hard calculations of winning vital advantage in the struggle with the West, and not on any softening of either the heart or the ideology. In fact, in the same speech, Khrushchev made it a point to stress that "in questions of ideology we have firmly stood and will continue to stand like a rock on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." To Communist initiates, this amounts to saying that the game is to be played by the old rules and for the same ends that Lenin laid down. There may also be for the initiated another bit of interesting doubletalk in the passage quoted above. The reference to Trotsky (who is rarely mentioned in the U.S.S.R.) could be meant for the Chinese Communists, whose attitude toward the United States somewhat parallels Trotsky's "no peace no war" slogan. Khrushchev, in effect, would seem to be reminding the Chinese that their attitude at a time when he is doing his best to administer a sleeping pill to the West via the peaceful coexistence formula may simply "play into the hands of the German (read American) imperialists." In short-let's do it my way, which was Lenin's way-seems to be the import of what Mr. K has to say. Question of Soviet-Chinese divergence It may be useful at this point to touch briefly on the question of possible divergence in Soviet and Chinese Communist views of the strategy toward the West best suited for the present historical period. One school of thought among foreign observers has it that there is a widening split between the Soviets and the Chinese in the area of basic strategy, centering on the peaceful coexistence issue. 45 Lenin, V. I., "Selected Works," International Publishers, New York, 1943, vol. VII, pp. 303, 309. According to this view, the Chinese do not approve of Khrushchev's heavy emphasis on the peaceful coexistence theme, and are annoyed because this world strategy line is "out of phase" with the internal necessities of the Chinese revolution, which at the present brutal stage of its development badly needs a vivid external threat-an equivalent of "capitalist encirclement"-to justify and reinforce the Draconian measures it is necessary to impose on the Chinese people."? Long-range implication of the Soviet-Chinese divergence theory now being hopefully explored in some quarters is that the Soviets maybe worried about Chinese competition in the future and that Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence campaign may therefore reflect at least a desire to hedge his bets, if not to effect a genuine rapprochement with the West. A more cautious school of thought, on the other hand, considers the mutuality of Sino-Soviet interests to greatly outweigh any latent differences over strategy, ideology or practical questions like the sharing of nuclear weapons. It is probably too early to render a judgment. But at least in the strategic domain, the present signs that Soviet coexistence and Chinese aggressive strategies (Tibet, India) are somewhat out of phase may imply no more than a difference over timing, rather than a difference over ultimate intentions toward the West. The suggestion that a kind of esoteric communication on SinoSoviet differences is buried in public_pronouncements of Communist leaders 48 illustrates the point that Communist statements must be carefully interpreted on more than one level of language. This sort of "deciphering" of Communist doubletalk is not necessarily a very precise science, hence there may sometimes be legitimate doubt or confusion as to whether Khrushchev can be taken at his word when he says, as he did on nationwide U.S. television networks on September 27, 1959: There can be no stability or tranquility in the world so long as the two strongest powers are not on good terms with each other. *** In the Soviet Union, everyone is in favor of living in peace, everyone is in favor of peaceful coexistence. Fortunately, however, the difference between facts and protestations is sometimes so blatant that it comes through loud and clear, even over the doubletalk. This happens to be the case with the definition of peaceful coexistence which Khrushchev gave in his Foreign Affairs article of October 1959. In the passages quoted below, the interpolations in brackets have been added to illustrate the point. Khrushchev said: 49 From its very inception the Soviet state proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of its foreign policy. What, then, is the policy of peaceful coexistence? In its simplest expression, it signifies the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues. [As repudiated, e.g., in Finland 1939, Poland 1939, Korea 1950.] However, this does not cover the entire concept of peaceful coexistence. Apart from the commitment to nonaggression, it also presupposes an obligation on the part of all states to desist from violating each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty in any form and under any pretext whatsoever. [As in 47 Other areas of possible difference include ideological questions like the "various ways to communism" issue, exemplified by the commune system, and practical questions like the extent of industrial and military support the Chinese can expect from the Soviets. 48 See also supra, p. 7. See the New York Times, Sept. 3, 1959. the case of the Baltic States 1940, Iran 1945, the countries of Eastern Europe 1945-48, Hungary 1956.] The principle of peaceful coexistence signifies a renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the object of altering their system of government or mode of life or for any other purpose. [As in the other cases bracketed, plus every other country of the world in which Communist parties have operated, above or underground.] The doctrine of peaceful coexistence also presupposes that political and economic relations between countries are to be based upon complete equality of the parties concerned, and on mutual benefit. [As may be testified by the Yugoslavs 1948, the Poles 1956, the Finns 1959 and others from time to time.] It hardly seems necessary to pursue the point that a world which has been treated to Soviet style peaceful coexistence for some 40 years finds it a bit difficult to sympathize with Khrushchev when he complains that his present offer of peaceful coexistence is not taken at face value. And yet, despite the unequivocal record of the past, there is a hope abroad in the world that this time Khrushchev really means it. Exploitation of nuclear war fears Such hope springs from a number of sources, the most compelling of which is a widespread concern over nuclear warfare on a world scale. The Soviets have assiduously exploited the world's fear of nuclear war, to the extent that numbers of people have come to feel, like Bertrand Russell, that it would be preferable to let communism take over the world rather than to resist and risk a nuclear exchange that could mean "the end of civilization." This is undoubtedly the conclusion that Khrushchev would like to see more generally accepted. However, there are many in the West who-while rejecting the alternatives of Armageddon or a Communist world-have tended to hope that in any case the "realities of the nuclear age" will have the effect of stopping communism in its tracks. In other words, because nuclear weapons play no favorites and will destroy Communist targets just as thoroughly as capitalist targets, perhaps the Communists have resigned themselves to settling for an historical stalemate. This would be a kind of uneasy coexistence,50 founded on what has come to be known popularly as the "balance of terror." 51 This view of things can be, and sometimes is taken to imply that in urging "peaceful coexistence" today, Khrushchev is saying in so many words that he himself has bowed to the verdict of modern technology. His revision of the doctrine of inevitable war sometimes is interpreted in this light. So too are Khrushchev's many statements to the effect that technology has shrunk the planet on which rival states must live. For example, in his concluding speech at the 21st party congress Khrushchev said: If one concentrates on winning, there will be no end to the cold war, or, even worse, it will develop into an armed conflict. Governments should show their will to end the cold war. Above all, they should display an appreciation of the fact that we live on a single planet of somewhat limited size by present-day engineering standards, and must therefore show caution and do our utmost to guarantee peaceful coexistence.52 This is essentially the assumption on which U.S. policy toward the Communist world, as expressed in the strategy of nuclear deterrence, now rests. However, as the President of the United States recently said, the American concept of the good life for humanity does not find bare coexistence a satisfactory state for mankind. After all, an uneasy coexistence can be as barren and sterile, joyless and stale a life for human beings as the coexistence of inmates in a penitentary or labor camp." The Washington Post, Dec. 24, 1959. For an exposition of factors that make for a "balance of terror," as well as a sober warning on the fragility of this balance, see Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, January 1959, p. 212. 42 Pravda, Feb. 6, 1959. |