which warrant specified security classification levels; and

(1) Be sufficiently detailed to permit all persons involved in any phase of the program or project to determine the exact information contained in the documentation and in the construction activity which requires specific levels of classification, and that which can remain unclassified.

(3) In all cases, the lowest classification possible, commensurate with sensitivity of the information under consideration, should be assigned. (See § 158.8, for specific classification guidance.)

(b) Construction phases. All phases of construction activity from planning to operational condition, shall be considered in relation to each progressive phase of construction (planning, negotiation and contract award, construction, and operation) to assure current realistic classifications and proper downgrading or declassification time-phasing of each significant item of information.

§ 158.6 Downgrading and declassifying.

To the maximum extent possible, downgrading or declassifying dates or events should be determined and indicated. If dates or events cannot be forecast, the classified information shall be assigned a grouping in accordance with DoD Directive 5200.10, Downgrading and Declassification of Classified Defense Information, July 26, 1962. Each classification and grouping shall be re-evaluated periodically as construction progresses from one stage to another to assure currency. Annually, the occupant shall review the necessity for continuing classification in light of current circumstances.

§ 158.7 Public release.

Release of unclassified and declassified information pertinent to construction details, plans and specifications is subject to provisions of DoD Directive 5122.2, Responsibilities of Office of ASD(PA) — Functions of the Directorate for Security Review, August 17, 1957.' Whenever possible, the responsible official designated under § 158.5(a)(1), shall recommend conditions under which public releases may be authorized. Restrictions on releases because of international considera

1 Copies available from U.S. Civil Service Commission.

tions known to the project initiator must be clearly stated by him.

§ 158.8 Guidance resume.

The attached work sheet and tables are provided to assist in developing classification guidance for the specific program or project construction. The work sheet is not to be used as a "Classification Guide." In using this "Guidance Resume" for preparation of a classification guide for the construction project:

(a) It is first necessary to consider whether security, in terms of national defense interests, will be involved in the construction of the particular installation. If security will be involved, or if there is any question about it, a classification guide will probably be required. (Reference: § 158.5(a) (1).)

(b) With respect to the various subjects listed in column 1 of the "Classification Work Sheet," analyze each subject to identify the specific items of information to be found within the subject. (Reference: § 158.4(d).)

(c) Consider separately each item of information identified to determine whether its disclosure could or would reveal any of the information listed in table 1 (§ 158.10(a)). (Reference: § 158.4(e).)

(d) Then consider whether the unauthorized disclosure of this specific item of information could or would, in any way adversely affect the objective of the construction or project in the manner reflected in table 2 (§ 158.10 (b)). (Reference: 158.4(c).)

(e) On the bases of these determinations decide the degree of adverse effect on national security which unauthorized disclosure would cause under DoD Directive 5210.47; that is, if prejudicial, then classify Confidential; if serious, then classify Secret; and if exceptionally grave (rare in construction projects), then classify Top Secret.

(f) In an appropriate form of guidance, state clearly and concisely the items of information which require the determined levels of classification. one or more of the construction phases,

(g) The classification assigned to any item of information should be commensurate to the degree of protection required during each phase of construction. If it is determined, however, that protection of the information is not feasible in this fact should be so stated together

ments..

Foregin relations, in general.

U.S. relations with allies.

(c) Target-Military Data (Ref: § 158.4(d) (3): Geodetic locations...

Vital fortification construction details...

Vulnerability or survivability data...

Basic operational concepts and equipment housed

Command and control systems..

Communications system...

Physical security measures.

(d) Operational Data (Ref: § 158.4(d)(4)):

Functions and performance.

Purpose and scope of operations..

Organization, personnel and type.

Beneficial occupancy dates..

Classified equipment used.

Command and control system..

Communications network..

Physical security system...

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

Consider for classification the information which could or would:

(1) Reveal derivative classified information.

(2) Reveal bases for, or direction, scope or substance of United States military planning.

(3) Reveal U.S. intelligence interest, scope or direction of effort.

(4) Reveal status or direction of U.S. R. & D. or testing effort.

(5) Reveal critical construction details or use of new materials or techniques from which operational capabilities, survivability or vulnerability might be discerned.

(6) Reveal identity or availability of particular equipments.

(7) Reveal performance capability of equipments or installation.

(8) Reveal significant international agreements or commitments.

(b) Table 2 (Reference: 158.4 (c)). Classify the information which could or would:

(1) Provide hostile interests with basis for invoking or planning effective countermeasures.

(2) Cause loss of a valuable element of surprise or United States advantage. (3) Jeopardize or harm U.S. foreign relations.

(4) Provide hostile forces with useful strategic or tactical defensive or offensive data against the United States or a U.S. ally.

(5) Provide hostile forces with a basis for planning espionage or sabotage activities against the United States.