Blockheads!: Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and ConsciousnessAdam Pautz, Daniel Stoljar New essays on the philosophy of Ned Block, with substantive and wide-ranging responses by Block. Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Ned Block synthesizes philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind; he is unique in moving back and forth across this divide, doing so with creativity and intensity. Over the course of his career, Block has made groundbreaking contributions to our understanding of intelligence, representation, and consciousness. Blockheads! (the title refers to Block's imaginary counterexample to the Turing test—and to the Block-enthusiast contributors) offers eighteen new essays on Block's work along with substantive and wide-ranging replies by Block. The essays and responses not only address Block's past contributions but are rich with new ideas and argument. They importantly clarify many key elements of Block's work, including his pessimism concerning such thought experiments as Commander Data and the Nation of China; his more general pessimism about intuitions and introspection in the philosophy of mind; the empirical case for an antifunctionalist, biological theory of phenomenal consciousness; the fading qualia problem for a biological theory; the link between phenomenal consciousness and representation (especially spatial representation); and the reducibility of phenomenal representation. Many of the contributors to Blockheads! are prominent philosophers themselves, including Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, and Hilary Putnam. Contributors |
Contents
Themes in Ned Blocks Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness | 1 |
1 Attention and Direct Realism | 19 |
Reply to Bill Brewer | 35 |
3 Psychological Content and Egocentric Indexes | 41 |
4 Tyler Burge on Perceptual Adaptation | 71 |
5 Attention Alters Appearance | 79 |
Response to Marisa Carrasco | 107 |
7 Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience | 109 |
21 Could an Android Be Sentient | 335 |
Reply to Brian McLaughlin | 375 |
23 How Can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists | 379 |
24 Arguments Pro and Con on Adam Pautzs External Directedness Principle | 421 |
25 Naïve Realism and Qualia | 427 |
Reply to Hilary Putnam | 451 |
27 Phenomenal Character and Physicalism | 459 |
28 Sydney Shoemaker on Transparency and the Inverted Spectrum | 481 |
8 David Chalmers on Shape and Color | 139 |
9 Physicalism and the A Priori | 145 |
10 Reply to Frank Jackson on A Priori Necessitation | 167 |
11 The Emperors New Phenomenology? The Empirical Case for Conscious Experiences without FirstOrder Representations | 171 |
Reply to Hakwan Lau and Richard Brown | 199 |
13 Alien Subjectivity and the Importance of Consciousness | 215 |
14 Geoff Lees Hegemony of the Third Person | 243 |
15 Representational Exhaustion | 247 |
Reply to Janet Levin | 273 |
17 On Phenomenal Access | 279 |
Reply to Joe Levine | 301 |
19 Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities | 307 |
Reply to Bill Lycan | 327 |
29 Attention and Perceptual Justification | 487 |
Reply to Nicholas Silins and Susanna Siegel | 505 |
31 In Praise of Poise | 511 |
Reply to Daniel Stoljar | 537 |
The Importance of History to Phenomenology | 545 |
A Response to Michael Tye | 571 |
35 Can Representationism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances? | 581 |
Reply to Sebastian Watzl | 609 |
617 | |
Contributors | 629 |
631 | |
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Blockheads!: Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness Adam Pautz,Daniel Stoljar No preview available - 2019 |