L. Ed. 618; Hall v. Coppell (1868), 7 Wall. 542, 554, 19 L. Ed. 244; Withenburg v. U. S. (1867), 6 Wall. 521, 531, 18 L. Ed. 935. Form and effect of license.-Permits granted during the rebellion by the proper licensing officers to purchase goods in a locality occupied by the Federal troops are prima facie evidence that the locality is properly within the trade regulations. U. S. v. Weed (1866), 5 Wall. 62, 72, 18 L. Ed. 531. 2826. Unlicensed trading in an insurrectionary State.-Every officer of the United States, civil, military, or naval, and every sutler, soldier, marine, or other, person, who takes, or causes to be taken into a State declared to be in insurrection, or to any other point to be thence taken into such State, or who transports or sells, or otherwise disposes of therein, any goods, wares, or merchandise whatsoever, except in pursuance of license and authority of the President, as provided in this Title, or who makes any false statement or representation upon which license and authority is granted for such transportation, sale, or other disposition, or who, under any license or authority obtained, willfully and knowingly transports, sells, or otherwise disposes of any other goods, wares, or merchandise than such as are in good faith so licensed and authorized, or who willfully and knowingly transports, sells, or disposes of the same, or any portion thereof, in violation of the terms of such license or authority, or of any rule or regulation prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury concerning the same, or who is guilty of any act of embezzlement, of willful misappropriation of public or private money or property, of keeping false accounts, or of willfully making any false returns, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than three years. Violations of this section shall be cognizable before any court, civil or military, competent to try the same. R. S. 5306. 2827. Detention of vessels by customs officers.-Whenever, at any port of entry, the duties on imports can not, in the judgment of the President, be collected in the ordinary way, or by the course provided in the preceding section, by reason of the cause mentioned therein, he may direct that the custom-house for the district be established in any secure place within the district, either on land or on board any vessel in the district, or at sea near the coast; and in such case the collector shall reside at such place, or on shipboard, as the case may be, and there detain all vessels and cargoes arriving within or approaching the district, until the duties imposed by law on such vessels and their cargoes are paid in cash. But if the owner or consignee of the cargo on board any vessel thus detained, or the master of the vessel, desires to enter a port of entry in any other district where no such obstructions to the execution of the laws exist, the master may be permitted so to change the destination of the vessel and cargo in his manifest; whereupon the collector shall deliver him a written permit to proceed to the port so designated. And the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, shall make proper regulations for the enforcement on shipboard of such provisions of the laws regulating the assessment and collection of duties as in his judgment may be necessary and practicable. R. S. 5315. 2828. Armed forces employed to prevent commercial intercourse.-It shall be unlawful to take any vessel or cargo detained under the preceding section from the custody of the proper officers of the customs, unless by process of some court of the United States; and in case of any attempt otherwise to take such vessel or cargo by any force, or combination, or assemblage of persons, too great to be overcome by the officers of the customs, the President, or such person as he shall have empowered for that purpose, may employ such part of the Army or Navy or militia of the United States, or such force of citizen volunteers as may be necessary, to prevent the removal of such vessel or cargo, and to protect the officers of the customs in retaining the custody thereof. R. S. 5316. 2829. Confiscation of property employed in aid of insurrection.--Whenever during any insurrection against the Government of the United States, after the President shall have declared by proclamation that the laws of the United States are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals by law, any person, or his agent, attorney, or employé, purchases or acquires, sells or gives, any property of whatsoever kind or description, with intent to use or employ the same, or suffers the same to be used or employed in aiding, abetting, or promoting such insurrection or resistance to the laws, or any person engaged therein; or being the owner of any such property, knowingly uses or employs, or consents to such use or employment of the same, all such property shall be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found; and it shall be the duty of the President to cause the same to be seized, confiscated, and condemned. R. §. 5308. Notes of Decisions. Validity. The act is constitutional. Miller v. U. S. (1870), 11 Wall. 268, 305, 20 L. Ed. 135; Tyler v. Defrees (1870), 11 Wall. (U. S.) 331, 20 L. Ed. 161; Semple v. U. S. (D. C. 1868), Fed. Cas. No. 12,661; Kirk v. Lynd (1882), 1 Sup. Ct. 296, 297, 106 U. S. 315, 27 L. Ed. 193. Right of confiscation defined.-See Miller v. I. S. (1870), 11 Wall. 268, 305, 20 L. Ed. 135. Property subject to coniscation.-In view of this statute and act of July 17, 1862, R. S. 5332, post, 2842, it was held that an order on Aug. 17, 1863, by an officer in command of the forces then in quiet possession of the city of New Orleans, for the confiscation of private property, was unauthorized. Planters' Bank v. Union Bank (1872), 16 Wall. 483, 494, 21 L. Ed. 473. Method of seizure.-Seizure of corporate stocks held sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to condemn them as forfeited. Miller v. U. S. (1870), 11 Wall. 268, 294; 20 L. Ed. 135. In a proceeding to confiscate debts due from a municipal corporation to a person charged to be in rebellion, the method of seizure must conform to the State law as nearly as possible, and notice of the seizure must be given to the person on whom, by law, process against the corporation is required to be served. Fairfax v. City of Alexandria (Va. 1877), 28 Grat. 16. Enforcement of forfeiture.-To effect a seizure of a debt evidenced by a note, it is necessary for the marshal to take the note into his actual custody. Pelham . Way (1872), 15 Wall. 196, 202; 21 L. Ed. 55. Forfeitures declared under this act can only be enforced by seizure of the property. U. S. v. Stevenson (C. C. & D. C. 1869), Fed. Cas. No. 16396. Nature of property.-The act extended to all descriptions of property, real or personal, on land or water. An owner of real property in New Orleans, who leased it during the Rebellion to a firm publicly engaged in manufacturing arms for the Confederacy, the leases stating in terms that lessees intended to establish "engines, machinery," etc.. in the property leased, was presumed to know the purpose for which it was to be used and to have consented to it, and his interest in the property was rightly confiscated under this act, but he presumption was held to be otherwise as to a party taking a mortgage from him before lessees took posses sion, and where there was no proof of consent to such use by the mortgage beyond the fact of taking the mortgage, and the interest of the mortgagee was held not confiscable under the act. Union Ins. Co. v. U. S. (1867), 6 Wall. 759, 765, 18 L. Ed. 879; [C. S. p. 12,481]. Knowledge and consent of owner to unlawful use of property.-A forfeiture of property is imposed by this act only where it is employed, with the knowledge or consent of its owner, in aid of insurrection. U. S. v. One Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty-Six Shares of Capital Stock (C. C. 1865), Fed. Cas.. No. 15,961; (1869) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 105. Property of a resident of a loyal State employed in trade with the insurgents, is subject to confiscation, regardless of the question of violation of blockade, or of the The Shark owner's ignorance of the law. Effect of pardon and amnesty.-A full pardon and amnesty by the President for all offenses committed by the owner of property seized under this act relieved him from forfeitures of such property so far as the right accrued to the United States. Armstrong's Foundry v. U. S. (1867), 6 Wall. 766, 769, 18 L. Ed. 882. Purchase of property condemned.-This act was aimed exclusively at the property itself, to weaken insurrection, and not to punish the owner. Consequently the purchaser of property condemned thereunder took title in fee, and not a mere life estate for the life of the owner. Kirk v. Lynd (1882), 1 Sup. Ct. 296, 106 U. S. 315, 27 L. Ed. 193; decree affirmed, Kirk v. Lewis (C. C. 1881), 9 Fed. 645. 2830. Confiscated property condemned by courts. Such prizes and capture shall be condemned in the district or circuit court of the United States having jurisdiction of the amount, or in admiralty in any district in which the same be seized, or into which they may be taken and proceedings first instituted. R. S. 5309. Section fifty-three hundred and nine is amended by inserting, in the third line, after the word "same", the work "may". Act of Feb. 27, 1877 (19 Stat. 253), amending R. S. 5809. The words "or circuit," in this section, were superseded by the abolition of the circuit courts and the transfer of their jurisdiction to the district courts, by secs. 289-291, Jud. Code. Notes of Decisions. Jurisdiction.-A circuit court held to have no jurisdiction to proceed by information under this and the following sections, where land sold to the Confederacy was seized during the war and subsequently sold and conveyed by order of the Presi dent and the conveyance confirmed by act of Congress. U. S. v. Huckabee (1872), 16 Wall. 414, 424; 21 L. Ed. 457; [C. S. p. 12483]. Sale. A purchaser of real property condemned under the confiscation act, takes title in fee. Kirk v. Lynd (1882), 1 Sup. Ct. 296; 106 U. S. 315; 27 L. Ed. 193; [C. S. p. 12,484]. 2831. Institution of condemnation proceedings.—The Attorney-General, or the attorney of the United States for any judicial district in which such property may at the time be, may institute the proceedings of condemnation, and in such case they shall be wholly for the benefit of the United States; or any person may file an information with such attorney, in which case the proceedings shall be for the use of such informer and the United States in equal parts. R. S. 5311. Notes of Decisions. Right to prosecute.-Private persons, other than mere informers, can not join with the United States in prosecuting an information; nor can the United States prosecute such a suit merely to confirm the title of a third party. U. S. v. Huckabee (1872), 16 Wall. 414, 430, 21 L. Ed. 457. Rights of informers.--While an informer may file an information along with the At torney General and so make the proceeding inure to his own benefit equally as to the benefit of the United States, yet, after a proceeding has been instituted by the Attorney General alone, an informer can not come in and share the benefits. Francis v. U. S. (1866), 5 Wall, 338, 341, 18 L. Ed. 603. 2832. Forfeiture of vessels belonging to citizens of insurrectionary States.From and after fifteen days after the issuing of the proclamation, as provided in section fifty-three hundred and one, any vessel belonging in whole or in part to any citizen or inhabitant of such State or part of a State whose inhabitants are so declared in a state of insurrection, found at sea, or in any port of the rest of the United States, shall be forfeited. R. S. 5319. Notes of Decisions. The fact that a person's place of resi dence is occupied by the Army of the United States will not affect his status, where the government of the State is still under the control of the insurgents. U. S. v. The Allegheny (D. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 14,429. Before the passage of the ordinance of secession by Virginia, a vessel cleared from Norfolk, owned in Virginia, and her officers and crew were inhabitants of that State. On her return voyage she was captured by a United States man-of-war. Her papers were regular, and she sailed under the United States flag. Her master testified that he considered himself a subject of the United States, that he considered his allegiance to the Union as greater and stronger than the allegiance to his native State, and that he would sustain the United States against his native State. Held, that the vessel at the time of her capture was enemy property, in consequence of the residence of her owners in the enemy country. U. S. v. The Sally Mears (1864), 6 D. C. 36. Liens. Where the share of one owner in a vessel was condemned under this act, and the remainder acquitted, held, that the owner of the latter had no llen for outlays in fitting the vessel. The Mary McRae (D. C. 1861), Fed. Cas. No. 9,221. 2833. Liens upon condemned vessels. In all cases wherein any vessel, or other property, is condemned in any proceeding by virtue of any laws relating to insurrection or rebellion, the court rendering judgment of condemnation shall, notwithstanding such condemnation, and before awarding such vessel, or other property, or the proceeds thereof, to the United States, or to any informer, ârst provide for the payment, out of the proceeds of such vessel, or other property, of any bona-fide claims which shall be filed by any loyal citizen of the United States, or of any foreign state or power at peace and amity with the United States, intervening in such proceeding, and which shall be duly established by evidence as a valid claim against such vessel, or other property, under the laws of the United States or of any State thereof not declared to be in insurrection. No such claim shall be allowed in any case where the claimant has knowingly participated in the illegal use of such ship, vessel, or other property. This section shall extend to such claims only as might have been enforced specifically against such vessel, or other property, in any State not declared to be in insurrection, wherein such claim arose. R. S. 5322. Notes of Decisions. Proof and priority of liens and claims.A lien on enemy's property set up under act of Mar. 3, 1863, to protect the liens of all citizens of vessels and other property which belonged to rebels, was not sufficiently proved by the test oath of the party setting up a lien and asserting it without any specification as to date of origin, "from correspondence" with the parties and "copies of the invoice of the cargo" sworn to as "believed to be true," the correspondence and copies not being produced, nor their absence accounted for. The Sally Magee (1865), 3 Wall. 451, 458, 18 L. Ed. 197. The mere affidavit of a claimant that he is not within the exceptions of a proclamation which he sets up in support of his claim is not sufficient proof that he is not. The Gray Jacket (1866), 72 U. S. (3 Wall.) 342, 18 L. Ed. 646. A mortgagee of a vessel captured as a prize can not claim that his rights are superior to those of the captors because he was a loyal citizen. The Hampton (1866), 5 Wall. 372, 375, 18 L. Ed. 659. Vessels captured jure belli.-A vessel was captured jure belli and not under the non intercourse acts of Congress, and the vessel and cargo libeled as enemy property simply and in that character alone were condemned. Held, that the case did not come within this section. U. S. v. The Hampton (1864), 6 D. C. 75. 2834. Declaration of war.-The Congress shall have power To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; Art 1, sec. 8, Constitution of the United States. Notes of Decisions. Declaring war in general. The power to declare war is exclusively vested in Congress. Perkins v. Rogers (1871), 35 Ind. 124, 9 Am. Rep. 639. This clause relates only to wars with foreign nations. Norris v. Doniphan (1863), 61 Ky. (4 Metc.) 385. Blockades and commercial intercourse during war. The charges which the Treasury regulations required to be paid as a condition of carrying on trade in the insurrectionary States were imposed in the exercise of the war power. Hamilton v. Dillin (1874), 21 Wall. 73, 87, 22 L. Ed. 528. The proclamation of the blockade is of itself conclusive evidence of the existence of war warranting the blockade. The Mary Clinton (C. C. 1863), Fed. Cas. No. 9,203. Concession of belligerent rights by the legislative and executive departments to rebels establishes no rights except during the war. Shortridge v. Macon (C. C. 1867), Fed. Cas. No. 12,812. The President may lawfully proclaim a blockade of any of the ports of the United States when in his judgment the exigency for such action has arisen, though Congress alone has power, under the Constitution, to declare war and grant letters of marque. U. S. v. The Tropic Wind (1861), 6 D. C. 331. Recognition of state of war and belligerent rights. Whether war be made by inva sion of a foreign nation, or by States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be "unilateral," for war may exist without a declaration on either side, and a declaration of war by one country only is not a mere challenge, to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other. Prize Cases (1862), 2 Black, 635, 668, 17 L. Ed. 459. The power of making war is exclusively vested in Congress, but the President has power to repel Invasions by hostile forces, even when Congress has not declared war. U. S. v. Smith (C. C. 1806), Fed. Cas. No. 16,342. The practice of a formal proclamation before recognizing an existing war and capturing enemy's property has fallen into disuse in modern times, and actual hostilities may determine the date of the commencement of war, though no proclamation may have been issued, no declaration made, and no action of the legislative branch of the Government had. The Buena Ventura (D. C. 1898), 87 Fed. 927; decree reversed (1899), 20 Sup. Ct. 148, 175 U. S. 384, 44 L. Ed. 206; decree affirmed, The Panama (1900), 20 Sup. Ct. 480, 176 U. S. 535, 44 L. Ed. 577. A public war, within the meaning of the Constitution and the Rules and Articles of War (act of Apr. 10, 1806), has existed with the Seminoles since the day Congress recognized their hostilities and appropriated money to suppress them. (1838) 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 307. War against States.-By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war, but it can not declare war against a State, or any number of States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution. Prize Cases (1862), 2 Black, 635, 668, 688, 17 L. Ed. 459, Authority to suppress rebellion is found in the power to suppress insurrection and carry on war; and authority to provide for the restoration of State governments, under the Constitution, when subverted and overthrown is derived from the obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government. The latter, indeed, in the case of a rebellion which involves the government of a State, and, for the time, excludes the national authority from its limits, seems to be a necessary complement to the other. Texas v. White (1868), 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 700, 19 L. Ed. 227. Congress is not deprived of its power when its exercise is called out by civil war. Tyler v. Defrees (1870), 11 Wall. 331, 345, 20 L. Ed. 161. Although it is clear that the Constitution does not give Congress power, either expressly or by implication, to make war against a State, and to require the executive to carry it on by force drawn from the other |