Powers of Congress.-The organization of the Army of the United States is specifically conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. Ex parte Rielly (N. Y. 1867), 2 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 334.

Powers of States.-The laws and regulations for the efficiency of the United States Army being vested by the Constitution in the General Government, the States can not, either through their legislative or judicial departments, regulate or circumscribe the powers of the United States in reference thereto. In re Fair (C. C. 1900), 100 Fed. 149.

Persons subject to service.-Every citizen of sufficient age and capacity is under obligation to render military service to the country, when required, and is subject to draft for such service. Lanahan

v. Birge (1862), 30 Conn. 438.

There is nothing in this act to suggest an age limit in the Volunteer Army differ ing from that in the Regular Army, and it does not affect R. S. 1117 (superseded by 2169, ante). In re Burns (C. C. 1898), 87 Fed. 796.

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Validity. The grant to Congress of power to raise and support armies, considered in conjunction with the grants of power to declare war, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to make laws neces

sary and proper for executing granted powers (as provided by art. 1, sec. 8, of the Constitution), includes the power to compel military service, exercised by the selective service act. Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), 245 U. S. 366.

The constitutionality of the selective service act may be upheld against the following objections: (1) That by some of its administrative features it delegates Federal power to State officials; (2) that it vests both legislative and judicial power in administrative officers; (3) that, by exempting ministers of religion and theological students under certain conditions and by relieving from strictly military service members of certain religious sects whose tenets deny the moral right to engage in war, it is repugnant to the First Amendment, as establishing or interfering with religion; and (4) that it creates involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. Accord: Jones v. Perkins (D. C. 1917), 243 Fed. 997; aff. (1918), 245 U. S. 390; Franke r. Murray (C. C. A. 1918), 248 Fed. 865; U. S. v. Olson (D. C. 1917),

253 Fed. 233; Rhodes v. Tatum (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), 206 S. W. 114.

This act does not violate the Fifth Amendment, as depriving one of his property without due process of law, as respects his office or employment, for, in a just sense, there is no such property right. U. S. v. Olson (D. C. 1917), 253 Fed. 233.

This act is not ex post facto as respects aliens, for while Congress could not affect an alien's right to come into the country by change thereafter in the requirements for admission, nevertheless in all other respects his status after entry is the same as that of a citizen. U. S. v. Bell (D. C. 1918), 248 Fed. 992.

See also notes to 2785, post.

Draft for foreign service.-The army into which an enlisted man enters is not limited to services such as those for which it is asserted the militia only may be used. Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), 245 U. S. 366.

The common law right to "remain within the realm" can not prevail against an explicit provision of an act of Congress acting within its constitutional powers. Jones v. Perkins (D. C. 1917), 243 Fed. 997; aff. (1918), 245 U. S. 390.

Status of persons of draft age. This act does not give persons within the draft ages any military status solely by virtue of their

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Validity. This section is not a law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, inhibited by the First Amendment. Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), 245 U. S. 366; U. S. v. Stephens (D. C. 1917), 245 Fed. 956; affirmed (1918), 247 U. S. 504.

Status of boards.-The boards which this section authorizes the President to create are not courts, the creation of which, by the Constitution, is vested in Congress. U. S. v. Stephens (D. C. 1917), 245 Fed. 956; affirmed (1918), 247 U. S. 504.

A member of a local draft board is an "officer of the United States," or a person acting on behalf of the United States in an official function, within the meaning of sec. 39, Criminal Code, making it an offense to give or offer a bribe to any such officer or person. U. S. v. Bordonaro (D. C. 1918), 253 Fed. 477.

Special tribunals, such as local and district boards, created by the selective service act, are quasi judicial bodies of inferior and limited jurisdiction, and have authority to hear and determine only such matters as the law directs. Ex parte Beck (D. C. 1917), 245 Fed. 967.

Members of local draft boards have no authority to waive any of the provisions of the selective service act or the regulations made thereunder. U. S. v. Finley (D. C. 1917), 245 Fed. 871.

In view of the regulations thereunder, this section, declaring that local boards shall have charge to determine all questions including or discharging individuals, does not confer on such boards the power to determine whether an individual subject to the act falled to register. Ex parte Fuston (D. C. 1918), 253 Fed. 90.

Proceedings on an alien's claim for exemption under the selective service act are analogous to proceedings before boards of immigration, and the applicants have an

unquestionable right to a fair hearing. Ex parte Hutflis (D. C. 1917), 245 Fed. 798. As the local board is a public body, exercising quasi judicial functions in passing on the right of exemption, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to interfere with such a board's exercise of its functions. Bonifaci v. Thompson (D. C. 1917), 252 Fed. 878.

A relator duly certified into the military service by local and district boards can not obtain his release because he has convinced the adjutant general of his State that the examination by the medical officers of the local board was insufficient. The determination of the exemption board is final save for appeal to the President. U. S. v. Commanding Officer (D. C. 1918), 248 Fed. 1005.

The summons to a drafted person claiming exemption, to appear before the exemption board under sec. 101 of the Selective Service Regulations, is notice to him to present all the evidence he has in support of his claim. U. S. ex rel. Kotzen v. Local Exemption Board (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 245.

Under the Selective Service Regulations, local boards have the widest possible latitude in informing themselves of the truth or falsity of statements made by registrants, and such boards are not in any way restricted to what would be competent legal evidence in a judicial proceeding. Brown v. Spelman (D. C. 1918), 254 Fed. 215.

A drafted man ordered to report for service but remaining in hiding until after the draft boards were abolished may be tried by court-martial for desertion without a preliminary investigation before the draft board, as such investigation under a presidential order was a mere procedural step, the abolition of which does the drafted man no harm. U. S. ex. rel. Young v. Lehman (D. C. 1920), 265 Fed. 852.

Findings of local boards.-Civil courts have no jurisdiction to grant relief by habeas corpus against the orders of the draft boards unless it be made to appear that the action of such boards was arbitrary or capricious. The denial of a rehearng on a claim for draft exemption by a district board is not arbitrary action. Ex parte Tinkoff, 254 Fed. 222.

Local and district draft boards have the widest possible latitude for the purpose of informing themselves of the truth or falsity of statements made by registrants. They are not in any way restricted as to what would be competent legal evidence in judicial proceedings. Brown v. Spelman (D. C. 1918), 254 Fed. 215.

Civil courts can not review and grant relief against orders of local and district draft boards unless it appears that such boards have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or that the proceedings have been unfair, or show an abuse of discretion. Id.

Α local board certified for service a Russian subject, who had not declared his intention of becoming a citizen and was therefore not subject to the selectivedraft act (40 Stat. 76). His claim of exemption and affidavit had been filed in due form and were undisputed, and he was denied a hearing. The board exceeded its authority, and its action was void. Failure of one certified for service by a local draft board, although not subject to draft, to appeal to the district board, does not exclude the jurisdiction of a civil court to discharge him from the Army on habeas corpus, where the local board, before making its order, had consulted with and obtained the approval of the district board, and the appeal would have been vain. Ex parte Cohen, 254 Fed. 711.

The applicant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. He had filed a questionnaire with his local draft board claiming exemption on the ground of alienage. The board considered his claim and placed him in class 1 as qualified for military service. He made an application for a review of his claim for exemption which the bard refused. On this point a civil court is without jurisdiction to review the action of the local board on habeas corpus. Ellen v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 909.

The draft boards are purely executive agencies, and their error, committed against those who are within the draft law, is executive error in the enforcement of discretionary regulations. In re Kitzerow (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 865.

The decision of the local board and of the State adjutant general that a registrant is within the draft age will not be

upset by the courts where the registrant was given a fair hearing and no manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Brown v. Spelman (D. C. 1918), 254 Fed. 215.

A draft board classified a registrant in class 5-F upon his questionnaire; they were not satisfied with this classification, however, and gave him notice to appear and give oral testimony bearing on his right to deferred classification. He did not appear and the board reclassified him in class 1-A. He took no appeal, and relied on the original classification. Held, the court will not disturb the finding of the local ard. The statement of the registrant in his questionnaire is not evidence in his behalf, and the board is entitled to call for oral testimony; in the absence of such testimony it may treat the registrant as subject to draft. U. S. ex. rel. Kotzen v. Local Exemption Board (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 245.

Petitioner, a registrant under the selec‐ tive-service law, was called for service by a local board. Thereafter he applied to the district board for deferred classification, and his application was granted before the time he was required to report. Notwithstanding this decision of the district board, and apparently without any new finding, the local board had him taken into custody. Why this was done does not appear in the opinion. Held, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be sustained; the court has jurisdiction to decide whether the district board had power to make a superseding determination; and the court is of opinion that such power exists up to the time of induction defined in the regulations, namely, the hour at which the local board has notified the registrant to report. In re McDonald (D. C. 1918), 253 Fed. 99.

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On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it appeared that petitioner did not register the registration day, June 5, 1917. Later the local board demanded that he register, and being advised that he would be subject to prosecution if he did not, he registered, and later, under protest, filed with the board two questionnaires, partly filled out. In both he stated his age as 33 years. The board, after considering affidavits to the same effect filed by him, and other statements obtained by them, determined that he was under 31 years of age, and ordered him to report immediately for duty. He failed to do so, and was arrested as a deserter. Held, as the petitioner's regis tration card and answers in the questionnaires showed that he was more than 31 years of age on June 5, 1917, the local board acquired no jurisdiction over him whatever, and was without authority to