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this, that in the first the objects must be the causes which determine the will, whilst in the second, the will itself causes the objects so that the causality of the will resides exclusively in pure reason, pure reason being thus practical reason" (Critique of Practical Reason).

So far as I can follow the argument of Kant, it seems to me to imply that rational morality cannot be bound by human nature as it exists. I may perhaps interpret Kant's thought as if he had the intuition that the moral will was capable of modifying nature by subjecting it to its own laws.

On the other hand, several critics of Kant have attempted to improve his theory of morality by reconciling it with human nature as it actually exists. Vacherot,1 for instance, has taken such an attitude in the most definite fashion. He insists that Kant "did not appreciate the capital importance of the object of the moral law. The problem which under the designation summum bonum absorbed the schools of antiquity plays a minor part in the Kantian theory. Kant should have recognised that human destiny is not limited to duty but must include happiness" (p. 316). But what is this "happiness" which is to be the standard of human actions? To answer this Vacherot places himself in the position of those ancient philosophers whom I discussed in The Nature of Man. He makes his point absolutely clear. "What is the 'good' for any being? The attaining of its purpose. What is the purpose of a being? The simple development of its nature. Apply this to man and morality. When human nature is known by observation and analysis, the deduction can be made as to what is the purpose, and the good, and therefore the law of man. For the conception of the good necessarily in1 Essais de Philosophie critique, Paris, 1864.

volves the idea of duty and of law to be imposed on the will. We have to fall back, then, on knowledge of man, but it must be complete knowledge, a recognition of the faculties, feelings, and inclinations that are peculiar to him and that distinguish him from animals" (p. 319). Here is a summary of this doctrine:-"Develop all our natural powers, subordinating those which are subsidiary to those which form the peculiar quality of human beings; this is the true economy of the little world we call human life; this is its purpose and this its law. The formula states in the most scientific and least doubtful form a very old truth, the foundation of all mórality and the test of all its applications. If we seek to know what are justice, duty and virtue, we must look in the world itself, and not above or below it" (Op. 301).

Professor Paulsen, a more recent critic of Kant, comes to a similar conclusion. He thinks that Kant should have modified his formula in some such way as follows:-" The laws of morality are rules which might serve for a natural legislation for human life; in other words, rules that, when they guided conduct according to natural law, would result in the preservation and supreme development of human life."

From whatever side we examine the problem of morality, we come to submit conduct to the laws of human nature. Sutherland, a modern author who discusses morality by the scientific method, defines morality as "conduct guided by rational sympathy." Such sympathy would not subordinate the chief good of others to an advantage less important but more immediate. Thus a mother may sympathise with her child when it has to take some unpleasant

1 System der Ethik, 7th and 8th editions, vol. i, p. 199. Berlin

medicine; but if her sympathy be rational she will not let it interfere with the health of the child.

In the foregoing case, sympathy has to be controlled by medical knowledge. In moral conduct generally, reason must be the determining factor, whatever be the inspiring motive of the conduct, whether it come from sympathy or from the sense of duty. And thus morality in the last resort must be based on scientific knowledge.

III

INDIVIDUALISM

Individual morality-History of two brothers brought up in same circumstances, but whose conduct was quite different -Late development of the sense of life-Evolution of sympathy-The sphere of egoism in moral conduct-Christian morality-Morality of Herbert Spencer-Danger of exalted

altruism

ALTHOUGH moral conduct refers specially to the relations between men, there exists a morality of the individual. As this latter is simpler, I shall consider it first in my investigation of rational morality.

When a man, seeking his individual happiness, gives way to his inclinations without restraint, he often comes to behave in a way that is generally regarded as immoral. Following his inclination, he may become idle and drunken. Idleness may depend on some irregularity of the brain, and may thus be as natural as is the wish to take drink in the case of a man to whom alcohol brings a feeling of wellbeing and gaiety. Why is it that idleness and alcoholism are immoral? Is it because they prevent the living of life in its completest and widest sense, according to the theory of Herbert Spencer? But it is precisely in this way that the adherents of the theory justify all kinds of excess without which fullness and width of life seem to them impossible.

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Whilst vices such as idleness and drunkenness arise directly from qualities of the human constitution, they must be regarded as immoral because they prevent the completion of the ideal cycle of human life. I knew two brothers, almost the same age, subject to the same influences, and brought up in the same environment. None the less, their tastes and conduct were very different. The older brother, although very intelligent, during his college career devoted himself eagerly to bodily exercises and indulged in every way his inclination for pleasure. “As the chief end of life is happiness," he said, "one must try to get as much of it as possible," and so he got into the habit of visiting places where there was most amusement. Cards, good living, and women furnished for him the means of pleasure. As his ability was unusual, he passed his examinations almost without having worked. The example of his younger brother, always a devoted student, did not attract him. "It is all very well for you," he said, "as you find your happiness in work; as for me, I detest books, and I am happy only when I am giving myself up to pleasure. Everyone must. take his own road to the goal of life." As a result, the health of the older brother was seriously affected by his mode of life. He acquired some disease of the circulatory system, had to face the end, and died at the age of fifty-six. The last years of his life were very unhappy, as the instinct of life developed in him extremely strongly. He was a victim of his own ignorance because when he was young he did not know that the sense of life would develop later on, and would become much stronger than in his youth. His brother was equally unaware of this fact, but, absorbed in scientific study, he kept himself apart from the indulgences of youth and lived a sober life. In this way he found that his strength and

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