for the importance of love in the higher activity of man, in accordance with the law of human nature, which is a much better justification of Goethe's conduct than all the arguments of his interpreters and admirers.

I do not agree with the common idea that the two Parts of Faust are two distinct works, but regard them as complementary. In the first Part we see the young pessimist, full of ardour and of desires, ready to make an end of his days and stopping at nothing to satisfy his thirst for love. In the second Part we have a mature old man still loving women, but in a different way, a man who is wise and optimistic, and who, having satiated the wants of his individual life, dedicates the rest of his days to mankind, and who, having reached a century, dies extremely happy, in fact almost exhibiting the instinct of natural death.

PART IX

SCIENCE AND MORALITY

I

UTILITARIAN AND INTUITIVE MORALITY

Difficulty of the problem of morality-Vivisection and antivivisection-Enquiry into the possibility of rational morality -Utilitarian and intuitive theories of morality-Insufficiency of these

IN the course of this book I have from time to time approached subjects closely related with the problem of morality. For instance, in considering the prolongation of human life, it was necessary to show that extension of longevity far beyond the reproductive period of man in no way is opposed to the principles of the highest morality, although there exist races who find the sacrifice of old people in harmony with their conception of morality.

Experimental biology, which lies at the root of most of the doctrines exposed in this work, depends on vivisection of animals. There are, however, very many persons who regard it as immoral to operate on living animals when it is not for the direct benefit of these. The attempts which have been made in France and Germany to prevent or to limit vivisection in laboratories have not succeeded, but in England there is a severe law controlling operations on animals and submitting them to oppressive regulations to which many of the scientific men in the country are opposed. The question of experiments upon human beings is still

more delicate. Just as formerly the examination of a human corpse could be made only in secret, so at the present time, if the slightest experiment is to be made upon a human being, it can be only by devious ways. People who are hardly shocked at all at the numberless accidents caused by automobiles and other means of transit, or in field sports, make the strongest protest against any proposal to try some new method of treatment upon a human being.

A large number of people, amongst them even men of science, regard as immoral any attempt to prevent the spread of venereal diseases. Recently, in connection with the investigations into the action of mercurial ointment as a means of preventing syphilis, the members of the Faculty of Medicine in France made a public protest, declaring that it would be "immoral to let people think that they could indulge in sexual vice without danger," and that it was wrong to give to the public a means of protection in debauch." None the less, other men of science, equally serious, were convinced that they were performing an absolutely moral work in attempting to find a prophylactic against syphilis which would preserve many people, including children and other innocent persons who, if no preventive measures existed, would suffer from the terrible disease.

Such examples show the reader what confusion exists in the problem of morality. Although at every moment, in every act of human conduct, the precepts of morality must be reckoned with, even the most authoritative persons are far from agreeing as to what rules to follow. About a year ago in a Parisian journal 2 an enquiry into the subject 1 V. Tribune médicale, 1906, p. 449. 2 La Revue, Nov. 15th and Dec. 1st.

of rational morality was directed to distinguished authors. The object was to discover if, at the present time, moral conduct could be based not on religious dogma, which binds only those who believe in it, but on rational principles. The answers were most contradictory. Some denied the possibility of rational morality, others admitted it, but in very different fashions. Whilst one philosopher, M. Boutroux, held that "morality must be founded on reason and could have no other foundation," a poet, M. Sully-Prudhomme, turned to feeling and conscience as the basis of morality. According to him, “in the teaching of morality, it is the heart and not the mind which is at once master and pupil." In the contradictions which I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, these two views appear. When antivivisectionists are protesting against experiments on animals, they are inspired by sympathy for poor creatures which cannot defend themselves. Guided by conscience, they think immoral any suffering inflicted upon a living being for the benefit of another being, whether human or animal. I know distinguished physiologists who have determined to limit their experiments to animals with little sensibility, such as frogs. The great majority of scientific men, however, would have no scruple in opening bodies and subjecting their victims to severe. suffering in the hope of clearing up some scientific problem which sooner or later would increase the happiness of human beings and animals. If vivisection had not been performed, or if it had been restricted, the great laws of infectious diseases would not have been discovered, nor would the discovery of many valuable remedies have been made. To justify investigation, men of science set out from the utilitarian theory of morality, which approves everything that is useful to the human race. The antivivisectionists, on

the other hand, rely on the intuitive theory, according to which conduct is controlled by the spontaneous activity of our conscience.

In the case which I have selected the problem is easy to solve. It is plain that vivisection is inevitable in the experimental investigation of vital processes, as it is the only means by whch serious progress can be made. None the less, very many people cannot accept this necessity, because of the intensity of their love for animals.

In the question of the prevention of syphilis, the moral problem is still more easy to settle. Whilst in the case of vivisection a real suffering may be inflicted upon animals, in preventive measures against syphilis, the evil is more or less intricate and very problematic. The certainty of safety from this disease might render extra-conjugal relations more frequent, but if we compare the evil which might come from that with the immense benefit gained in preventing so many innocent persons from becoming diseased, it is easy to see to which side the scale dips. The indignation of those who protest against the discovery of preventive measures can never either arrest the zeal of the investigators or hinder the use of the measures. This example again shows that reasoning is necessary in the solution of most moral questions.

However, the problems which arise in actual life are often very much more complicated than the two cases I have taken as an introduction. It is easy to prove the high utility of the work of vivisectors and of those who are seeking means of preventing syphilis, whilst their adversaries have nothing to invoke but their feelings. The situation is quite different in many questions which border on morality. The sexual life abounds in extremely difficult problems, in which it is almost impossible to deter