Military Surveillance: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights Of..., 93-2, April 9, 10, 19741974 - 397 pages |
From inside the book
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Page 20
... activities on the part of military organizations could not be exam- ined without also giving attention to the intelligence collection and retention activities of civilian agencies . Many of the same potential areas of abuse exist ...
... activities on the part of military organizations could not be exam- ined without also giving attention to the intelligence collection and retention activities of civilian agencies . Many of the same potential areas of abuse exist ...
Page 21
... activities which generate a legitimate need for information are personnel security programs , protection of mili- tary property and functions , and the protection of classified infor- mation , whether in the hands of the Department of ...
... activities which generate a legitimate need for information are personnel security programs , protection of mili- tary property and functions , and the protection of classified infor- mation , whether in the hands of the Department of ...
Page 22
... activities . One would then turn to subsection ( b ) to find all of the allowable exceptions to this broad general policy . In short , in order to justify any form of military intelligence activity regard- ing civilians or civilian ...
... activities . One would then turn to subsection ( b ) to find all of the allowable exceptions to this broad general policy . In short , in order to justify any form of military intelligence activity regard- ing civilians or civilian ...
Page 25
... activities on the part of Federal employees , but that has been nar- rowly interpreted to apply to party activities , Republicans versus Democrats and that sort of thing . I think an intelligence official who wanted to thwart the ...
... activities on the part of Federal employees , but that has been nar- rowly interpreted to apply to party activities , Republicans versus Democrats and that sort of thing . I think an intelligence official who wanted to thwart the ...
Page 25
... activities which generate a legitimate need for information are personnel security programs , protection of mili- tary property and functions , and the protection of classified infor- mation , whether in the hands of the Department of ...
... activities which generate a legitimate need for information are personnel security programs , protection of mili- tary property and functions , and the protection of classified infor- mation , whether in the hands of the Department of ...
Common terms and phrases
ACSI active Federal forces agencies agents Air Force American approval Armed Forces Army intelligence Army's Attorney authorized BASKIR believe bill Chairman Chief of Staff civil disturbance intelligence civil disturbance planning command Committee compliance concerning conducted Counsel counterintelligence criminal DCDPO Defense Intelligence Agency Defense Investigative Review Defense Investigative Service demonstrations Department of Defense Department of Justice Deputy DIRC inspection DIRC policies disorders DoD Directive domestic intelligence Executive exit critique files Fort George G gence groups Headquarters individuals Inspection Team intelligence activities Investigative Review Council involved June law enforcement liaison McGiffert memo memorandum ment military intelligence military personnel military surveillance mission National Guard Office operations paragraph persons political activities Posse Comitatus Act problem Program prohibited regulation relating request responsibilities retention criteria Secretary of Defense Senator ERVIN Service Subcommittee threat tion U.S. Army United United States Code USAINTC USASA violence Washington
Popular passages
Page 47 - Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.
Page 31 - ... is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause ( 1 ) the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws...
Page 87 - Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both.
Page 143 - Welfare; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce...
Page 48 - Nevertheless, after declaring that the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause,
Page 87 - Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.
Page 137 - Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated With the Department of Defense...
Page 232 - NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10 of the United States Code, particularly Sections 332, 333 and 334 thereof, do command all persons engaged in such obstruction of justice to cease and desist therefrom, and to disperse forthwith.
Page 90 - History abundantly documents the tendency of Government — however benevolent and benign its motives — to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect "domestic security.
Page 48 - The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.