ment on the basis that a civil disturbance situation might develop which would require bringing in Federal troops. The DOD specifically found that this support was not inconsistent with the DOD directive. Another incident reported to the subcommittee by the DIRC involved a military intelligence unit in San Diego, which, prior to the decision to move the GOP convention from San Diego to Miami Beach, had begun to build its files on dissident groups in the area in contemplation of liaison responsibility with the Secret Service at convention time. The DIRC advised that this activity should be halted. Occasionally, military liaison with local law enforcement, used for the purpose of investigating military personnel, becomes a pretext for assisting local authorities to investigate civilians. In a case which took place in Prince William County, Va., shortly after the promulgation of the DOD directive, military intelligence agents were assigned to assist local police by posing as members of a drug ring. Ostensibly, they were "loaned" to the local police because military personnel were thought to be involved. As it turned out none were, but military agents helped to identify 29 civilians for the local authorities. I mention these cases to illustrate that the borderline between permissible and impermissible intelligence activity is sometimes blurred by the contingencies of the moment. Liaison is helpful in the performance of legitimate functions, but it often offers tempting and compelling opportunities to hedge, if not avoid, the paramcters of the DOD directive. (7) The subcommittee notes, finally, that the DOD directive applies only to military personnel stationed in the United States or its territories and possessions. It does not apply to personnel stationed overseas. The DIRC reported to the subcommittee that it had considered expanding the applicability of the directive to overseas posts but had unanimously rejected the idea because it might interfere with the gathering of foreign intelligence by military agents. Regardless of the merits of their objection, I am not satisfied that the DIRC has chosen to turn its back on the problem altogether. It is one thing for the military to investigate civilians abroad, even American civilians, who are suspected of being agents of a foreign power. It is quite another thing for the military to have its agents watch civilians living or travelling abroad who have no remote connection with any foreign power or its intelligence services. I believe the DIRC would do well to reconsider its decision and draw more precise lines between overseas "intelligence" investigations and overseas "dissidence" investigations. As has been reported in the press, the subcommittee does have evidence that Army intelligence did, in fact, conduct extensive surveillance of American citizens in West Germany in 1972 and 1973. Most of the groups and individuals under surveillance were what might be described as "political activists" whose concerns focused primarily upon domestic politics in the United States. As far as we have been able to determine, there is no evidence to connect these groups and individuals under surveillance with the operations of any foreign government. The subcommittee is still awaiting the Defense Department's response to its inquiry of last December 10, which dealt with these matters. But I think it is clear that these sorts of operations violate the spirit of the DOD directive, if not its letter. In the minds of many, they mar what had otherwise been a highly successful turnabout. I do not plan to have these hearings concentrate unduly on overseas operations. I certainly do not think they should divert us from the larger and more significant fact that very commendable reforms have taken place within the United States. I do think, however, that the overseas operations remind us that the issue of military surveillance is not moot. With this in mind, I intend to submit certain evidentiary materials relating to these operations, now in the possession of the subcommittee, for inclusion in the record of these hearings. Some of these materials are classified and I propose to ask the Department's cooperation in having them declassified. In conclusion, then, while the Defense Department has taken significant and commendable strides to bring its domestic intelligence operations in line, the regulatory structure has shown itself to be still defective and inadequate as a matter of fully protecting our constitutional guarantees. The rights endangered by military surveillance are too precious to be left to an equivocal policy of selfrestraint on the part of the military. While I would be the first to agree that enactment of a statute offers no cure-all in itself, it is an opportunity to clarify and remedy many of the current ambiguities and shortcomings, and it would go much further in deterring future surveillance than a mere departmental directive. I am hopeful that the Department will give us its support and its assistance in developing this legislation. I can think of no better way for it to demonstrate to the American people its sincerity in putting an end to domestic spying than to have its support on this legislation. Its 1971 directive established commendable policy guidelines. This legislation only attempts to give them the permanence and dignity they deserve as a part of the law of the land. Before calling the first witness, I should like to say that without objection from the subcommittee members, I shall have placed in the appendix of the hearing record the past correspondence between the subcommittee and the Defense Department as it pertains to the matters we are addressing. Without objection, I shall also place the evidentiary materials which deal with the surveillance of civilians in West Germany together with an explanation of the materials prepared by the subcommittee staff in the appendix. All references to individuals in these materials will be stricken for purposes of publication. In the case of those documents which are classified, I will instruct the subcommittee staff to seek their declassification prior to publication. [A copy of the proposed bill, S. 2318 follows:] Correspondence-Continued Department of Defense: Letter, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman, Senate Subcom- Letter, Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Cappucci, Director, Defense In- Letter, Mr. D. O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Transportation: Letter, Rodney E. Eyster, General Counsel, to Senator Sam J. Page 190 191 216 191 195 272 275 276 277 277 279 281 283 285 286 Other Materials: Message from Department of the Army to major subordinate Evidentiary Materials Regarding Military Surveillance of Civilians Heidelberg Page 287 299 323 324 West Berlin_. 360 380 8th Infantry Division Regulation (USAREUR) No. 381-25, 395 |