37. "Secrecy and Dissemination in Science and Technology," A Report of the Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science (Feb. 21, 1969), pp. 787-90.

38. "Secrecy and Science," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, First Session, 1959.

39. Shils, Edward A. The Torment of Secrecy (New York: The Free Press, 1956).

40. Snow, C. P. "Science and Government," Science and Technology, Number 85 (January 1969), pp. 31-46.

41. "Strengthening the Basis of National Security," The Board of Directors of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science (Dec. 10, 1954), pp. 957-59.

42. Taylor, Robert L. and Feingold, Robert S. "Computer Data Protection," Industrial Security (August 1970), pp. 20–29.

43. Teller, Dr. Edward. Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, May 14, 1969.

44. Thomas, Frank. "Classification and Technological Breakthrough," Keynote address at the Second National Seminar, National Classification Management Society, Los Angeles, July 13, 1966.

45. Thompson, Peter. “TRACES: Basic Research Links to Technology Appraised," Science, CLXIII (Jan. 24, 1969), pp. 374–75.

46. Urey, Dr. Harold C. "Scientists, Secrets, and Security," The Chemist (January 1955), pp. 39-43.

47. Wilensky, Harold L. Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967).

48. "Intelligence in Industry: The Uses and Abuses of Experts," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXXXVIII (March 1970), pp. 46-58.

49. Wright, Loyd. "Commission on Government Security," submitted to Congress, June 21, 1957.

50. -.

Executive Order 10501 (Nov. 5, 1953), "Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States," Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, with amendment.

51.

Public Law 91-184, "Export Administration Act of 1969." Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office (Dec. 30, 1969). 52.

"Security Classification and Control of RDT&E Information," Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) to all DoD agencies and military departments, 10 August 1970.

53.

- Department of Defense Directive 5200.20, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents," 24 September 1970.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

Introduction

ABUSES IN THE MILITARY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

(Prepared by Forrest M. Mims III, July 30, 1971)

My duties as a security officer at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, provided an opportunity to observe the workings of military security at several Air Force bases. In the period from March 1968 to June 1970, the time I served as a security officer in addition to my assigned role as a developmental engineer, I witnessed numerous abuses of classification authority and procedure. Many of the abuses can be directly linked to the imperfect security classification guidelines provided in Executive Order 10501.

In this report I shall cite several examples of overclassification, the most common abuse, list some harmful results of the practice, and propose a remedy. Since testimony before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information and numerous reports in the press indicate that overclassification is a common security practice, this report may prove helpful in formulating proposed legislaiton to correct the problem.

Overclassification

Overclassification is probably the most common abuse of the military classification system. Air Force security regulations have little to say about the subject, and what is said is mer Ivice. For example, Air Force Regulation 205-1 provides, as is applicable

2-1b. "The judicious exercise of classification authority is vital in its effects upon all other aspects of the information security program. The assignment of a security classification is the basic act that brings into play the entire program. While underclassification may result in less than adequate protection for some information, overclassification undermines the integrity and effectiveness of the information security program, causes a waste of resources, and needlessly impedes the conduct of normal operations." (Emphasis added.)

Though the excerpt from the regulation is very well stated, there is no provision elsewhere or anywhere for preventing overclassification by enforcing "the judicious exercise of classification authority."

Some examples of overclassification I observed at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory include the following:

1. In 1967, the Department of Defense classified a project to develop a personnel sensing system based on a principle of nature familiar to any school boy. Both the project and the principle were classified Top Secret (Special Access Required). The project was downgraded to a more reasonable classification level in 1970.

2. The Air Force classified as Secret (Special Access Required) a certain laser weaponry program because revelation of the weapon's target would result in revulsion and disapproval on the part of the general public. The project, though compromised on several occasions as a result of unclassified supporting experiments and studies, is still classified as Secret. An identical Army program, since discontinued as being impractical, was classified only Confidential.

3. An Air Force scientist invoked the classification system to prevent a research project from being transferred to an Air Force research laboratory with the assigned task of performing identical work but without the required security access. The classification system was invoked even though nearly all aspects of the project were treated as unclassified at the scientist's own laboratory.

While these examples of overclassification may seem inconsequential, they seriously impede the efficiency and communication necessary for high quality research.

Overclassification is by no means limited to Air Force research laboratories. I witnessed many examples of the practice elsewhere. For example:

1. In 1966, a brief lesson block on the history of the Bolshevik revolution taught at the Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center was classified Secret.

2. In 1967, a large selection of photographs showing atrocities wrought by communist troops against Vietnamese civilians was classified Confidential. 3. Also in 1967, aerial reconnaissance photographs taken by Air Force planes which revealed bombing of civilian structures in North Viet-Nam were classified Secret.

While Air Force regulations frown upon, but do not prevent, overclassification, what can best be described as the prestige factor encourages the practice. Documents, reports, projects, and weapons systems are invariably of higher priority when assigned a classification. Classified topics receive considerably more attention from officials at higher levels. Funding is often easier to secure since classified projects are, by definition, important or even vital to the national defense. For a research scientist, the automatic priority of a classified project may mean a position with a future. Often overclassification is encouraged by the fear of possibly adverse consequences for underclassification. Other reasons include efforts to conceal embarrassing information and unpopular policies and programs. Results of Overclassification

There are several serious drawbacks to frequent overclassification. The most obvious is that a large amount of time, money, and resources are wasted in controlling and storing classified material. Of more significance, excessive classification critically hinders the free and open exchange of information and ideas within our own government. The result in at least one field, research and development, is massive waste, duplication, and delay. Many times our best minds are kept from freely discussing a technical problem because of security restrictions. Worse, scientists working on classified research projects are not permitted to divulge their findings in scholarly journals, thereby preventing their work from being scrutinized and possibly challenged by others in the field and sometimes allowing erroneous conclusions to justify large expenditures of time and money. The quality of classified research is further downgraded by the refusal of many scientists to take on classified projects. Promotions, job opportunities, and 68-036-71-pt. 3-13

reputation often depend on the quality of a scientist's published work, and classified research means that the work cannot be published in the open literature. Since classified projects invariably have higher priorities, the research scientist is often faced with a dilemma in having to choose between secret and open research.

The most ironical aspect of overclassification is that it encourages security laxness. In his opinion on the recent case before the Supreme Court concerning publication of the "Pentagon Papers," Justice Potter Stewart views the problem thusly:

"I should suppose that moral, political, and practical consideration would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom [of exercising classification authority] would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion." (Emphasis Added.)

My duties as a security officer included many hours tracking down security violations committed by “cynical or careless" Air Force officers. Those of junior rank are usually quite particular about observing security regulations, and violations are often the work of higher ranking personnel. Violations I personally observed at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory ranged from the common offenses of leaving safes opened overnight and discussing classified information over the telephone to storing Top Secret (Special Access Required) matter in an unlocked desk drawer. Though security violations are required by regulation to be reported to the proper authorities, they often went unreported. Little or no disciplinary action was ever taken, and even in the cases of suspected compromise investigations were not conducted.

Still another result of overclassification is the massive imposition of prior restraint on publication by the press. Naturally the publication of matters which would be detrimental to our survival as a nation must be viewed with considerable concern. But so very little of what is classified falls within that category that freedom of the press is significantly damaged by current classification practices. Indeed, I am currently in litigation attempting to have the refusal of an information request made of the Air Force reversed by a Federal district court. The Air Force refused my request to interview a project officer about an unclassified laser for a technical publication for fear the officer might divulge classified information about other, unrelated subjects.

Proposed Classification Legislation

In order to eliminate abuses of classification authority, Congress should enact appropriate legislation. The current system, governed by regulations thicker than telephone directories containing amazing complex instructions and directives. must be drastically simplified. To insure that what is properly assigned a classification remains secret, security laxness must be discouraged by doing away with the present practice which tolerates classification of history, newspaper clippings, and principles of nature.

Enforcement provisions must be enacted which are enforceable. Overclassification and underclassification must be viewed as equal infractions. Finally members of the press who have been refused information because of its classification must have access to a reviewing authority which can make a determination about the propriety of the classification.

With these thoughts in mind, I make the following recommendations for proposed legislation:

1. Executive Order 10501 should be superseded by a simplified classification system. Top Secret should be reserved only for war plans and diplomatic communications of the highest order. All other classified material should be Secret. Confidential and For Official Use Only should be eliminated entirely. Suffixes such as "Special Access Required" and "Limited Access" should be eliminated and dissemination of classified material should be governed only by "need to know." The Congress should have a “need to know." Downgrading from Secret to unclassified should be automatic and within ten years of original classification. The new classification system should apply to all branches of the federal government.

2. What is classified must be treated as such. Therefore, enforcement procedures must be enacted which are genuinely enforceable. Security violations must be reported to the proper authorities r to permit investigation for possible compromise, for under the new ystem only vital defense informa

tion will be classified. To maintain vigilance and respect for the system, overclassification must be viewed in the same light as underclassification as both infractions are harmful.

3. The Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press from prior restraint must be respected. Newsmen should have the right to appeal refusal of a request for news information determined to be classified to an agency of the government other than the classifying agency. Besides providing the press with an administrative appeal procedure not presently in existence, the provision for appeal would serve as a form of check on overclassification.

Conclusion

The current classification system is costly, inefficient, and troublesome. It encourages large scale overclassification, a practice which in turn stimulates security laxness and jeopardizes the protection of material properly deserving a secrecy stamp. While the system may be easily penetrated by outsiders who make the attempt (as I have often noticed in my new profession as a writer), it seriously impedes normal and efficient operations for insiders.

Justice Potter Stewart's opinion in the recent "Pentagon Papers" case noted "... that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained." Justice Stewart's observation would make an ideal introduction for Congressional legislation on the subject.

Note: This report is submitted to The Honorable Ogden R. Reid in conjunction with an exchange of correspondence on the subject of security classification policies. The report was prepared by Forrest M. Mims, III, 6901 Zuni SE A-12, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108.

CLASSIFICATION IN RUSSIA*

(By Zigurds L. Zile, Robert S. Sharlet, and Jean F. Love).

Soviet secrecy laws establish a dual system of classification: one for the purpose of determining the type of handling to be given to documents in accordance with the information they contain; the other for the purpose of determining the sanction to be imposed for infringing the particular security level. The classification for purposes of handling-"Top Secret (sovershenno sekretno)," "Secret (sekretno)," "Not to be Made Public (ne podlezhit razglasheniiu (oglasheniiu)),” "For Official Use (dlia sluzhebnogo polzovaniia)" and possibly other, less formal categories-does not correspond to the classification for imposing sanctions-"State Secret (gosudarstvennaia taina)," "Military Secret (voennaia taina)," [9,5-6]

A state secret is defined as "information of state importance especially protected by the state." "It includes data of military, economic and foreign policy character." Official secrets constitute a category of security information other than state secrets. Military secrets appear to have amphibian traits, Many military secrets are also state secrets; the remainder (i.e., all military documents and correspondence) partake of the nature of official secrets.

A currently cited list identifies the following broad categories of state secrets, each of which might be classified at different levels for purposes of handling: Information of a Military Nature Includes:

[1] mobilization plans and other documents containing general data on the preparation for mobilization of the country as a whole, of the armed forces, of the branches of the armed services, of the military districts, of the armies, fleets and flotillas, and also of all-union and union-republic ministries of the USSR and of enterprises of all-union significance;

[2] general information on places of storage, stockpiles and plans for stockpiling all types of state and mobilization reserves, and also individual types of products having defense or strategic significance as a whole for the USSR, the Main Administration of State Material Reserves attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its territorial administrations;

[3] operative plans, general information on the location and number of troops, the amount of armaments and military equipment as a whole for *This article is extracted from "Legal Aspects of Verification in the Soviet Union." August 1967. which was prepared by the Law School, University of Wisconsin. for the U.S. Arins Control and Disarmament Agency. Conclusions set forth herein do not necessarily represent views of the University of Wisconsin or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

the armed forces, the branches of the armed services, military districts, armies, fleets and flotillas.

[4] generalized data on the military training of the troops and the state of discipline as a whole for the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR [now replaced by Ministry for Protection of Public Order] for the branches of the armed services, military districts and fleets;

[5] general information on the number under a military obligation in reserve as a whole for the USSR and for military districts, and also information on the recruitment of troops through regular daft calls as a whole for the armed forces of the USSR, the military districts, and the fleets;

[6] plans with descriptions, sketches and photographs of fortified regions, naval bases, central and district bases and supply pools of armaments and ammunition and also data on their armament and equipment;

[7] general information on the network of airports, on the quality and capacity of airports as a whole for the USSR. General infromation on defense, airport base, and special construction as a whole for the armed forces, military districts and fleets;

[8] plans of preparation for local antiaircraft defense of cities, major industrial, defense and special objectives;

[9] information on the state of the protection of the state frontier.
Information of an Economic Nature includes:

[10] general information on the location of military industry enterprises, production capacities and plans for production of armaments, military equipment and ammunition and data on the fulfillment of the plans in concrete terms as a whole for the USSR, for all union and union-republic ministries chief administrations, and enterprises of all-union significance;

[11] general information on production capacities and plans of produetion of nonferrous, precious and rare metals and accounts of their fulfillment in concrete terms as a whole for the USSR, for the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy of the USSR, the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy of the Kazakh SSR and their chief administrations;

[12] information on underground reserves in the USSR of radioactive elements, on their extraction, on productive capacties and plans of production of radioactive and trans-uranium elements and data on the fulfillment of the plans in absolute figures as a whole for the USSR, ministries, chief administrations and enterprises;

[13] information on the extent of underground reserves in the USSR of nonferrous, rare, and precious metals, titanium, diamonds and piezo-optic minerals as a whole for the USSR, ministries and major deposits and also petroleum as a whole for the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry of the USSR;

[14] discoveries and inventions of major military significance;

[15] discoveries and inventions of major scientific and economic significance before the grant by the heads of ministries and departments of permission for their publication;

[16] the state of foreign currency reserves, information on the balance of payments, general data on state reserves and places of safekeeping of precious metals and precious stones as a whole for the USSR;

[17] state codes [i.c., cryptographic material];

[18] such other information as may be added by the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the list of matters subject to state secrecy. [10, 159-60] The preceding list of state secrets is based on the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 28, 1956. The decree was issued as part of the Soviet criminal law reform that began a few years after Stalin's death. Although the first seventeen items add up to a list somewhat milder than the one contained in the Council's Decree of June 8, 1947, one must not lose sight of the fact that the enumeration is open-ended. In the words of the law itself, anything "may be added by the Council of Ministers of the USSR."

While the list would seem to reflect a predominantly military concern, actual Soviet practice is not so circumscribed. Secrecy regulations have been extended to cover many other types of information. This has been accomplished by adding them to the list of state secrets through item 18, tossing them into the basket of miscellaneous official secrets, or, finally, by developing restrictions outside the standard categories which are especially tailored to suit the situation (e.g.. the secrecy status of certain information vis-a-vis foreigners). A recent study