tempts to sink it, or transfer it. If not, then they are not vanquished, and we are back where we started. They would know they are dealing with a man who would make good the threatened consequences.

I trust our people will learn quickly the value of bold offensive action and that it is the most effective form of defense. The pleas of conservatives for delay, in the interest of greater preparedness, are not warranted while Britain holds control of the seas. Armies and navies have never been completely ready according to the meticuloulsy exacting few. In war the advantages are usually with the offensive. It is the leader of the offensive who determines when, where, and how he will strike. The defender is in the dark. A defensive policy is a negative policy.

Hitler has no intention of invading the United States, largely because it is unnecessary. What he seeks are the fruits of the victory, not the losses of an attempted and unnecessary invasion. It is remarkable, and, I believe, without precedent in history, what Hitler has accomplished in the field of conquest with such meager casualties and losses. But he does propose to tumble the United States into the category of a second-class power by gaining control of the seas, which he will have if he gets the British Grand Fleet and adds it to the fleets he already controls.

His armada would be footloose, for if Britain is vanquished, he would control all Europe. Our fleet has numerous and widely scattered defensive missions. Its concentration would necessitate abandonment of many of such existing responsibilities.

I believe in dealing with aggression at the source, police fashion, with boldness, speed, surprise, all in terms of action, now, while we may act in unity with the battling British "cop," whose resolute counter-attack spirit and methods give assurance of victory, if we comply with the principle expressed by E. Pluribus Unum.

And I would like to add, in reference to that motto, and to the pending bill that military history shows the vital importance of concentrating in a single leadership the war decisions that are to be made. Much of success is dependent not only upon the soundness of a policy or a doctrine, but upon promptness of decision, promptness of action, and the concentrated power to drive through the decision to success. Other than that, I have no comments to make about any proposed additions to the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fish.

Mr. FISH. General, do you think that this country should go to war right away?

General O'RYAN. I think that that question could not be answered by myself, because I am not familiar with the policies of the War Department or what the War Department views may be. But, to answer your question as frankly as I can, I believe, yes, consistent with the views of the War Department.

Mr. FISH. You have been advocating for some time that we should go to war, have you not?

General O'RYAN. If you call it war; yes. For some time and increasingly so, I think.

Mr. FISH. You said that this bill, No. 1776, is a step toward our objective?

General O'RYAN. I would think that the bill-I have read it twicewould open the way to action which conceivably might bring about

incidents that could-again conceivably-result in war. Yes; to that

extent.

Mr. FISH. You are appearing here on behalf of the bill?

General O'RYAN. Yes. I think the bill is a desirable bill in view of the military principles that I have outlined.

Mr. FISH. And in defense of this bill you advocate going to war? General O'RYAN. That is what I believe, unless I found the opinion. to be otherwise in the War Department, for example. I am not familiar with what that opinion is.

Mr. FISH. Has there been any overt act or act of aggression by Germany against this Nation that you know of?

General O'RYAN. Yes; an aggression against our civilization and all that we would uphold, as I see it.

Mr. FISH. Do you believe in changing the traditional policies of our country of nonintervention in favor of quarantining and policing the world?

General O'RYAN. I don't know that we agree upon what the policy has been. But it seems to me that the statement that I have made deals with fundamental principles. I think that each instance, Mr. Congressman, must be judged by logical thinking in terms of the problem itself.

Mr. FISH. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. General O'Ryan, you were in active service in the World War, as commander of what organization?

General O'RYAN. The Twenty-seventh Division.

Mr. JOHNSON. How many years does your military service cover? General O'RYAN. From 1897. I was in an infantry regiment then. I was 4 years a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery, and 3 years a first lieutenant. I was 6 years a captain and a couple of years a major. I commanded the Sixth New York Division on the Mexican border in 1916. And then I was in the World War.

Mr. JOHNSON. Quite a number of years.

General O'RYAN. Quite a few.

Mr. JOHNSON. We had another witness here-Mr. Lindbergh-and I asked him this question: "Do you think that the fall and destruction of the British Empire would menace the United States in their defense against attack?" To which the answer was, "Not seriously." Would that be your opinion?

General O'RYAN. I didn't get the last part.

Mr. JOHNSON. The answer was, "Not seriously." The question was, "Do you think that the fall and destruction of the British Empire would menace the United States in their defense against attack?"

General O'RYAN. I would say that it would, in my opinion. It is all speculation.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your voice so that the members and the press can hear you?

General O'RYAN. I think it would affect our ability to some substantial extent. It is speculation.

Mr. JOHNSON. What effect, if any, do you think it would have upon our country if the British Fleet should be captured by Hitler?

General O'RYAN. I think that Germany would command the seas. I think that our merchant marine would disappear from the seas until we could regain control of the seas. I think the Monroe Doctrine automatically would cease to have any practical usefulness.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think it is necessary for our own safety that we give all aid to England promptly?

General O'RYAN. I think it is conceivable that they could get along without us, because miracles sometimes happen. But, as I said in outlining these military principles, why take the chance? We need not send any troops over there.

Mr. JOHNSON. Your judgment is that it would be wise for us to be prepared to go to war at once, as I understand it. Is that right? General O'RYAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. For our own safety?

General O'RYAN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all.

General O'RYAN. I would say that the principle underlying this dissertation, is the importance of morale.

What I suggested that

we do would, I believe, have the effects that I indicated, on the morale of the contending forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Eaton?

Mr. EATON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richards?

Mr. RICHARDS. In view of the lateness of the hour, Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tinkham?

Mr. TINKHAM. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shanley?

Mr. SHANLEY. General, would you be able to enlighten us on just what chances there are of a crew of suicide bombers coming over from Africa and destroying the Panama Canal?

General O'RYAN. I think it is a waste of your time, frankly, for me to attempt to answer such questions.

Mr. SHANLEY. I hate to disagree with you, but I do.

General O'RYAN. It is speculation. I have had very little experience with that except flying around in aircraft of various kinds here and in Europe. I have never made a study of that. I will leave that to the air force people.

Mr. SHANLEY. I assumed that you were a military expert.

General O'RYAN. "Expert" might mean anything. I prefer not to venture opinions on that. I think you would get sound answers from the officers at the head of the Air Corps.

Mr. SHANLEY. I asked that because I consider the Panama Canal the Achilles heel of our naval supremacy. If we cannot preserve and protect that, we are not going to have the freedom of the seas and we are not going to have naval supremacy.

General O'RYAN. I agree with you about that.

Mr. SHANLEY. That is why I asked that question. In the back of my mind is the feeling that it can be done.

General O'RYAN. I would say that most anything can be done in What can be done by soldiers who have determination and who are seasoned is almost unbelievable.

war.

Mr. SHANLEY. I assumed that in your studies and your talks with military experts, because you are a high ranking National Guard officer, somebody might have given you enlightenment on that question. But I see that, like General Johnson, you feel that these things are too hypothetical.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Rogers?

Mrs. ROGERS. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arnold?
Mr. ARNOLD. I have no questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chiperfield?
Mr. CHIPERFIELD. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Burgin?
Mr. BURGIN. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vorys?

Mr. VORYS. General, you are against gangsters. Japan is a gangster in her treatment of China, in their wholesale murder, rape, and pillage. Isn't that true?

General O'RYAN. I think that is the view.

Mr. VORYS. Do you think that we have a police duty to stamp out that gangster?

General O'RYAN. No. I do not believe that Japan has any capacity to control the seas, as far as I can see, and certainly no intention or capacity to invade the United States.

Mr. VORYS. I thought you said that we had a moral duty to wipe out gangsters.

General O'RYAN. No. I didn't mention the moral duty except incidentally in regard to what I believed to be our own interests in going to the aid of Britain. I see a wide difference between the two situations.

Mr. VORYS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney?
Mr. COURTNEY. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stearns?
Mr. STEARNS. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eberharter?
Mr. EBERHARTER. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. General, did I understand you to say that you think that England will surrender her fleet to the totalitarian powers?

General O'RYAN. I believe that if Britain is vanquished, it is likely that Hitler will secure the British Grand Fleet. Yes. That is my personal opinion.

Mr. MUNDT. In that event the 50 destroyers that we gave to Great Britain will be used against us?

General O'RYAN. I don't know what will become of them.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gregory?

Mr. GREGORY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jonkman?
Mr. JONKMAN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wasielewski?

Mr. WASIELEWSKI. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sikes?
Mr. SIKES. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. We appreciate

your being here.

STATEMENT OF MISS DOROTHY THOMPSON

Miss THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I wish to say by way of beginning that my only qualification to testify is that for 7 years I have more than most laymen in this country studied with excruciating care the political, revolutionary, and military tactics of the German Nazi Government; and the only reason why you should hear me perhaps is because I have on numerous occasions predicted exactly what they are going to do, on the basis of information from German sources.

So I should like to tell you that the Germans intend to encircle this country and drive it to a purely defensive position and eliminate it as a world power to be reckoned with. They intend to do this with economic and military and revolutionary means. Those revolutionary means include the fomenting of civil war in the United States, once this country is really isolated, is the last democracy in the world, and can have pressure of a political, economic, and military kind brought against it. That is their program; and if there were time, I could bring a great deal of evidence from German sources to prove that that is their program.

Now, they count on keeping us for that purpose divided from Great Britain.

I would like to say that no feature of Europe's collapse is more common or more striking than the time lag between what the situation really called for at a given movement and what the public and Parliament were ready to sanction.

A relatively good policy may fail if it is applied half-heartedly. The success of a country's foreign policy may depend less on its intrinsic merits than upon the degree of popular support that it can win, so that the government applying the policy can do so with speed, decision, and persistence.

I am for our present policy, because I believe it is the only possible policy in view of the plans that are against us; and therefore I am for this bill.

When the charge is made that Britain wants to get us into the war, it is well to remember that there is one simple act of Britain that will almost certainly get this country into war, or into a catastrophic defeat without war, and that is to surrender to Germany, thus bringing about the establishment of a pro-Nazi government in England, the final surrender of General Weigand and the French Fleet, and the fleets of the Netherlands, of Norway, and the handing over of the British Fleet and Britain's factory and war resources to the Germans. If we let Britain down, and a pro-Nazi government succeeds Churchill in London, we shall be more unpopular than Germany in England; and no promises made about the fleet will necessarily have validity, because it will not be a Churchill government that will dispose of the fleet.

We have been advised by various people that we try for a negotiated peace now. The two things are not compatible. If we do not greatly increase aid to Britain, there will be a dictated peace wholly on German terms. If we do greatly increase aid to Britain, so that it becomes doubtful whether Germany can win the war, even if it is also doubtful whether England can win it, then you have got a situation as between relative equals; and under those conditions a negotiated peace might be possible.