Mr. CASTLE. That is true. Mr. VORYS. Now, could we not authorize private loans to Britain as a modification of the Johnson and the Neutrality Acts and then let these private interests seek out their own security or collateral for such loans? Mr. CASTLE. That is perfectly possible, and, of course, entirely in accord with international law. Mr. VORYS. That would be entirely in accord with international law? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. What is your opinion, however, as to whether it would be of practical aid at this time, or do you have an opinion on that? Mr. CASTLE. I have no opinion; no, sir; because I have not talked with any of the financial people on the subject. Mr. VORYS. Well, a lot would depend upon the amount of dollars involved, would it not? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. That is, if Britain ran out of money at some time during 1942, or if Britain ran out during the course of this year, as far as placing additional orders is concerned, if it were a few million dollars' worth that was needed that could be financed privately; is not that true? Mr. CASTLE. Very easily. Of course, the amount of private financing that would be done would depend almost entirely on the chances of Britain winning the war. Private financiers are necessarily selfish. They have got to be. Mr. VORYS. Well, now, some question was asked you about our securing collateral, and the testimony of the various Cabinet officials was that it was intended to secure some sort of quid pro quo and we should let the President make the best bargain he could. Well, do you see any objection, if we are to embark upon a policy of underwriting the war, to taking over everything, let us say, that Britain has in the Western Hemisphere in advance as collateral, so that the accounts can be balanced up somewhat, and we, of course, would be fair, and they should no doubt be willing to trust us. Mr. CASTLE. If they would be willing to trust us, certainly that is the best way to do it. On the other hand, we cannot go down to South America and seize British holdings. Mr. VORYS. Well, if the title has been turned over to us? Mr. CASTLE. Then it is the best way to do it. Mr. VORYS. Then no question arises? Mr. CASTLE. No. Mr. VORYS. And the only objection to such a proposal, or to such a plan, that everything be turned over to us that would be that Britian would be unwilling to trust us, is that not true? Mr. CASTLE. I had never thought of that-you mean Britian would be unwilling to trust us in what way? Mr. VORYS. Well, they might be afraid that we would ask too much for a battleship or a fleet or airplanes, or they might be afraid that we would not be fair in the balancing of accounts, is not that it? Mr. CASTLE. That is presumable, yes; but I do not think they would be. I think they would probably if they felt that was the only way they could get what they wanted, that they would agree to it without any thought of our fairness. I think probably many of them always hope that they are going to get it some other way. Mr. VORYS. For instance, we have heard some rather convincing suggestions that the British offered us the bases without any strings tied to them, or destroyers or anything else. Have you ever received such information? Mr. CASTLE. Well, I would not say "information." I have heard it said from many different sources, and it sounds to me perfectly reasonable, because our having those bases is the very best insurance that the British could have for their colonies. It was all to their good to do it. Mr. VORYS. The approved deal which they insisted upon, and which was carried out, was that we get some of the most vital bases for nothing, is not that true? Mr. CASTLE. So I have heard. Mr. VORYS. It is in the correspondence that Newfoundland and Bermuda have no quid pro quo at all. Mr. CASTLE. No; because it is going to cost us numerous millions of dollars to put them in shape. Mr. VORYS. Yes; we get some liabilities, and they got some liabilities by taking over the old ships; that is true, is it not? Mr. CASTLE. Certainly. Mr. VORYS. But if we just had everything then there could be no question, if the fortunes of war did not turn out as many of us hope, about what would happen to the British possessions, is that not true? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. So that we would have not only financial security, but diplomatic security? Mr. CASTLE. Correct. Mr. VORYS. Now, we heard in our President's message about the democracies that we were to aid. Is the Government of Greece at the present time a democracy? Mr. CASTLE. No; not particularly. "Democracy" is a very difficult term to define. The Government of Greece is not totalitatian at the moment, but it certainly would not be called a democracy from the western point of view. Any nation, as I see it, which happens to be in conflict with Germany and Italy is called a democracy. Mr. VORYS. Now, you have had vast experience in the Orient, Mr. Castle. In your opinion, are we in any danger of war with Japan? Mr. CASTLE. That is a very difficult question, Mr. Vorys. I do not think that Japan wants to fight us at all. I think Japan knows that its prosperity very largely depends on its good relations with this. country. On the other hand, we have done a tremendous number of things to Japan which have made the feeling against this country very strong, and they have signed that miserable pact with Germany and Italy, and it is perfectly conceivable, as I see it, that if we should get into war with Germany, Japan would attack us. Of course, there, too, by Germany; but insofar as wanting to get into war with the United States, I am perfectly certain that Japan does not. Mr. VORYS. Now, you spoke of Japan attacking us. Japan might attack us in the Orient? Mr. CASTLE. That is all. They could not attack anywhere else. Mr. VORYS. That is what I wanted to bring out. Mr. CASTLE. Oh, no. Mr. VORYS. There is just no possibility, is there? Mr. VORYS. There is no possibility of an attack by Japan upon the continental United States? Mr. CASTLE. No, sir; none whatever. They might attack the Philippines; that is the worst they could do. I was talking with a naval man the other day who said we probably will have to fight with Japan. He had just been telling me that the Philippines are a dead loss to us. I said, "Why should we fight with Japan?" And he said, "To protect the Philippines." Of course, if the only danger to the Philippines is the war with Japan, the whole thing goes around in a circle. Mr. VORYS. So that, when you spoke of an attack by Japan upon us, that is what you meant? Mr. CASTLE. I meant an attack in the Far East. Mr. VORYS. Yes. Mr. CASTLE. An attack on our ships in the Far East or on the Philippines. Mr. VORYS. Now, Mr. Castle, you spoke of the tripartite or the Axis agreement. We have been warned here in the past few days repeatedly that we must not place any reliance at all even upon the solemn agreements of the Axis Powers. Now, will you tell me why we must pick out certain of their solemn agreements which happen to be hostile to us and make a total foreign policy in reliance upon their keeping those agreements? Mr. CASTLE. No; I do not think that is fair to have any trust in them keeping their agreements, but I think they are just as likely to break their agreements with each other as they are likely to break them with other people Mr. VORYS. And is not that true of others also? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. I am afraid that outside of the Axis Powers. there has been a tremendous amount of the same thing. Mr. VORYS. Now, the United States has, in the past, made efforts to bring about peace, has it not? For instance, we settled the Russo-Japanese War. We made efforts during the World War, and when there was a critical situation in 1921 the United States was very effective in having a little peace conference right here in Washington; is that not true? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. Do you know of other examples where the United States has made some sort of peaceful gestures while wars were going on? Mr. CASTLE. I think that we have often done it very quietly. You have mentioned cases that were published. I think we have often been helpful. It has always seemed to me that at the beginning of this war if we had been properly prepared ourselves, we might have made suggestions as to peace which would have been effective. As it was, they all knew it was just words, words, words. Mr. VORYS. Now, as to a time limit on this act, we cannot repeal a war if we get into it, can we, or if this limitless authorization results in bankruptcy, we cannot repeal the bankruptcy, can we? Mr. CASTLE. No. Mr. VORYS. If we get into a state of dictatorship, that is something that we can't just repeal, is not that true? Mr. CASTLE. That is true. Mr. VORYS. So that a time limitation is a rather thin reed to lean on as a protection against the misuse of extraordinary powers? Mr. CASTLE. Well, it is at least something; I do not think it is sufficient. Of course, I do not think, as probably you do not, that such extraordinary powers should be given. Mr. VORYS. I certainly do not. You are familiar, I presume, with the Declaration of Panama and the agreement which we have made recently with our neighboring republics? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. And, I note in the Declaration of Panama that there is an agreement among all of us that we will not outfit belligerent ships in our ports. Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. Now, in your opinion, is section 3 of this bill, which permits this Government to outfit ships, belligerent ships, in our ports, a violation of our agreement with our 20 neighboring American republics? Mr. CASTLE. It is wholly in conflict with that agreement. If we did such a thing without either getting them to abrogate the agreement, or getting them to amend the agreement, we should probably get into very serious trouble with a good many of those nations. Mr. VORYS. I do not know whether you know it, but the Secretary of State says that they have not been consulted on that matter as yet. Now, you were asked about the powers in this bill. Let me read to you, omitting certain words in between, just these words in section 3: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may procure any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital. Then, let me read these words: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may dispose of, to any such government, any defense article. Now, in your opinion as a lawyer, is there anything short of the bold provisions of the Constitution that would prevent the President from seizing anything in this country, so long as he said he was getting it for some other country? Mr. CASTLE. No; nothing. Mr. VORYS. That is, this would in terms repeal the laws against theft, or any other laws that we have, to permit the President simply to take anything in this country, so long as it was for some other country, is that not true? Mr. CASTLE. So far as I can see it; yes; absolutely true. Mr. VORYS. And dispose of it to the other country? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. You know of no legal limitations upon these terms, so that "disposal" means to give it any way he pleases to the other countries? Mr. CASTLE. No; it seems to me perfectly clear. The only thing, Mr. Vorys, is that you are too polite to me, because you say that I am a lawyer, and I am not. I am looking at it from the view, the common-sense view, of a layman, and I do not see anything else. Mr. STEARNS. May I ask whether the witness considers that a compliment as a layman? Mr. CASTLE. Oh, yes; I do. Mrs. ROGERS. May I say that I think there are probably few people in the country who have made as much of a study of international law and foreign relations as the witness. Mr. VORYS. Section 4 says that All contracts made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government. Well, suppose we delivered some howitzers out of our arsenals, can you tell us what sort of contract we could require that would prevent those guns in a British battery that was, we will say, destroyed in action, from getting into the enemy's hands? Mr. CASTLE. Of course, nothing can be done. I mean, that is the danger of that particular article, in my mind, that if we, for example, turn over a very secret bomb sight to the British and the Germans happen to seize it, that is the end of it, so far as we are concerned. I do not think the British would be held legally to have violated the contract, but we would be the ones who would be out. Mr. VORYS. Can you think of any contract or agreement we could require that would prevent an American-delivered plane from being disposed of to Germany by crashing when its motors go out? Mr. CASTLE. No, sir. Mr. VORYS. It is a perfectly futile section, is it not? Mr. CASTLE. They could not sell to Germany; probably they would agree to that, but they would not want to sell to Germany. Mr. VORYS. And they cannot sell to any other nation? Mr. CASTLE. No, sir. Mr. VORYS. But there is no writing that can be prepared which would prevent their disposing of it, or having it taken from them by force? Mr. CASTLE. Nothing in the world. Mr. VORYS. Along that line, Mr. Castle, it has been testified by all of our Cabinet officers here that really the sole reason for our going into this sort of aid to Britain is that the British Fleet is vital to our defense, but that we would have no control with reference to the disposition of the British Fleet? Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. Those officers have said that no agreement we could make with reference to the fleet would be binding or effective under all circumstances. Mr. CASTLE. Yes. Mr. VORYS. Well, if we cannot make an agreement with reference to the British Fleet, can you think of any agreement we could make with reference to anything else that would be effective? Mr. CASTLE. I cannot. I think the British Fleet, however, is unlikely, as a whole, to be captured. I think the talk about the fleet has been what is going to happen to us if they give it over to the Germans, if Germany should win and the British should surrender their fleet. Now, as I understand it, they have said that they would not surrender their fleet, but if they are the kind of people who would surrender it, I do not think we want to help as much as we are trying to. Mr. VORYS. Is not the best insurance as to the disposition of the British Fleet the British people themselves, and their own dominance? |