LEND-LEASE BILL

TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1941

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., Hon. Sol Bloom (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will kindly come to order. The committee has under consideration H. R. 1776.

The witness for this morning is the Ambassador to the Court of St. James, the Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO GREAT BRITAIN

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennedy, have you a prepared statement? Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir; I have not any prepared statement. I merely want to say that I am here prepared to answer any questions that I properly can, that will be of any assistance, in the consideration of this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Fish.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Kennedy, how long have you been Ambassador to Great Britain?

Mr. KENNEDY. About 2 years and 9 months, approximately.

Mr. FISH. And prior to that, Mr. Kennedy, what Federal offices did you hold?

Mr. KENNEDY. I was Chairman of the Maritime Commission and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Mr. FISH. Therefore, Mr. Kennedy, you are familiar with the workings of the Federal Government.

Mr. KENNEDY. In a measure.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Kennedy, are you in a position to tell us something about the conditions, economic and financial, in England?

Mr. KENNEDY. I think perhaps I am, and if I can hear the questions, I can tell you whether I can answer them or not.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Kennedy, the committee is very anxious to know, in the first place, about the financial situation in England, whether their finances are exhausted or not.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is a very difficult question. I read rather casually the memorandum prepared the other day by Secretary Morgenthau, and that would seem to indicate that they were not yet exhausted. Mr. FISH. Are you in a position to tell us anything about the economic situation in England?

288128-41-15

221

Mr. KENNEDY. What phase of it, sir?

Mr. FISH. As it affects the shipping; the feeding of the English people?

Mr. KENNEDY. I do not quite understand how the shipping and the feeding would apply to the economic situation. If you ask me if I know what the condition of their shipping is

Mr. FISH. I will divide the question. I made it a little too broad. Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. FISH. I will divide the question and ask you if you will tell us something about the situation of British shipping.

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, I would think the shipping situation, as far as Great Britain is concerned, was a vital and serious one at the present time.

Mr. FISH. And, therefore, the British are in need of additional ships in every possible way?

Mr. KENNEDY. I should think, if the rate of destruction of shipping were to continue to any degree similar to what it was previous to the last month, that some time in this year, unless they got shipping, their whole condition would be a serious and a vital one.

Mr. FISH. The previous witness, Mr. Kennedy, all referred to the probability of a crisis in Great Britain within the next 60 or 90 days. Could you enlarge on that?

Mr. KENNEDY. I think there has been a crisis in Great Britain since September 3, 1939. I think it became very acute in June of this year. Unless I knew just exactly what was meant by the crisis that was to occur in the next 60 or 90 days, I could not give you an explanation. But if it is meant that England will fall within the next 60 or 90 days, I do not know on what that can be based. It seems to me that the situation has been very critical there since the fall of France.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the purpose of correcting the record, Mr. Kennedy, you said June of this year; you meant June of last year? Mr. KENNEDY. That is right: June of 1940.

Mr. FISH. I cannot help you out on the definition of the crisis. It has been referred to by practically every witness; that is, that there would be a crisis within 60 or 90 days. You have answered the question

Mr. KENNEDY. It is very difficult for me to explain just exactly what that crisis is unless I knew what is meant by the word "crisis." I said on Saturday night that there were a great many things about the situation from a military point in England that were not clear to me. That is, I do not still understand why it is-and I never understood why it was that the Germans permitted the British Army of 300,000 to escape from Dunkerque. If their strength was as great as they said it was-if the German air strength was as great as they said it was, I never could understand why at that time, when they had a real chance to wipe out the real strength of the British Army, it was not wiped out.

I read with interest this morning an editorial in a Washington paper which attempted to explain why they had not bombed industrial cities. I read it with very great interest, because it has always struck me, even from the communiqués, that when the Germans came over and made up their mind to get some place, the antiaircraft guns and the balloon barrages never had very much of an effect. That being the case, I have never quite understood, if the Germans

had this terrific air strength now, why they have not attempted to finish England off at any time. It may be that something is happening that I know nothing about, or that has happened since the 22d of October. But if the Germans have the strength to capture the air, then I would say that the crisis could happen any minute at all. But they have not indicated that they have that strength.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Kennedy, do you know the war aims of the British Government?

Mr. KENNEDY. I certainly do not, sir.

Mr. FISH. Do you not think that something should be done to find out the war aims before we adopt our own policy toward the British Government and the war?

Mr. KENNEDY. Well, it strikes me--I do not quite get the question there.

Mr. FISH. I will have to preface it by a little remark, because you may not understand at least my position and I think that of the committee. We all are in favor of all aid to Great Britain within the provisions of the Constitution and short of war. But some members of the committee think that we should know more about the war aims before we complete this bill and actually vote upon it. Do you know of any way we could find out the war aims of the British Government?

Mr. KENNEDY. I do not; I have never heard them expressed. I would think that the State Department would be the only way that you could find that out, by their asking the British Government.

Mr. FISH. Do you know whether there is any discussion in England itself as to their war aims? Are there any elements asking for the war aims?

Mr. KENNEDY. There has been discussion right through, ever since the war started. There was discussion early in the situation, but I have never heard anything that came from the Government. People are constantly agitating and asking, "What are we fighting for?"

Mr. FISH. You have nothing to suggest that would help us ascertain those war aims before we complete the consideration of the bill? Mr. KENNEDY. I would not, except to ask the State Department. But I fail to see, even if you were uncertain as to the war aims where that would be a point to have in consideration in limiting aid to England.

Mr. FISH. This is a very broad and comprehensive bill.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes; I quite agree.

Mr. FISH. It is, of course, aimed primarily to help Great Britain. Mr. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. FISH. You do not know anything about the visit of Mr. Hopkins to England, whether that has anything to do with their war aims?

Mr. KENNEDY. I have not the slightest idea, sir.

Mr. FISH. Is it fair, Mr. Kennedy, to the British people, for us to intimate that we are prepared to help them either in the invasion or the reconquest of Europe?

Mr. KENNEDY. I have never seen that; I do not believe we have ever done that, except some people may have taken it on themselves; but I do not think that officially we have ever done that. Certainly nobody in England ever had that idea while I was there.

Mr. FISH. You never did, and no one under your control ever did?

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir.

Mr. FISH. But is there not some feeling among the British that we are prepared to help them later on?

Mr. KENNEDY. I think that there is a very definite feeling that we are prepared to help them, and that we are helping them. But I think that is the general opinion of the mass of the British people. I think some of the people at the top feel very definitely that they are not getting as much help as they would ordinarily expect from the United States.

Mr. FISH. I did not quite mean that; I meant help them later on with armed forces.

Mr. KENNEDY. When I came back from Europe, I was asked that question by the press, and I said at that time that I thought that sentiment among the British Cabinet was quite divided on that score, but that some believed it would be a very great detriment to their interest to have the United States get in, because in that way they felt there was a grave question as to whether they could get the help and the support that they needed. The problem at that time was not a question of manpower, but rather of industry. And there are some, of course, who believe that if the United States got in, having assumed the responsibility, they would find a way of doing it. But there was no unanimity of opinion even among the men high up on that score. Mr. FISH. How did you interpret the recent remark of Winston Churchill that they did not need any armed help from us in 1941? Mr. KENNEDY. I frankly was a little surprised at that remark. I thought that that was rather strange at this time.

Mr. FISH. Can you enlarge somewhat on the economic situation, generally, in England?

Mr. KENNEDY. I can, if you would tell me what you mean.

Mr. FISH. I mean as to transportation, or business; feeding the people, and so on.

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. I think perhaps I can. When the air-raid bombing really became rather serious in England, transportation carried on but was hindered. If the Germans came over at night and dropped bombs on railway lines, of course, it was necessary either to move the trains back or else find some way of getting the stuff in by truck. But up to the time I left, while there were delays in transportation, they were not serious enough really to hold up the situation. The matter of industrial manufacturing was, of necessity, injured. The bombing that was effective, of course, was the night bombing. We went through, while I was there, approximately 242 air raids, and of those air raids, the day air raids, for the most part, were rather ineffective. The night raids caused some damage. And where men were working on day and night shifts, they were bound to be affected if airplanes were flying over them all the time.

In fact, a good friend over here on my left, who was over there most of the time, Eric Severeid, will probably agree with me when I say that we probably did not get to bed any night for a period of 6 or 7 weeks, that we did not have bombers over our head. That was bound to affect production at night. The day production, of course, was restricted more or less by the fact that the men were hampered as to their sleeping. Everybody was going into air-raid shelters and they were not the most comfortable places in the world