over, we take over a headache. There is no question about that. Now, the thing to decide is whether they have sufficient military value to undertake that headache. I do not know. I know there is a natural reluctance on the part of the British Government to alienate the sovereignty of people. They do not care so much about the land. As a matter of fact, they have all been an expense to the British. There is a natural reluctance by anybody to pass their people to some other flag. That is, I think, the underlying British point of view. They have no illusions about the value in dollars and cents which is involved.

Mr. MUNDT. I think that second point is absolutely well founded. Do you not think leasing the bases is also apt to become a headache if we do not own them?

Mr. KNOX. No; because we do not assume the sovereignty. We only assume the possession for 99 years of a piece of land and we are given certain rights. Those rights are those which are essential to the use of the land for a base.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, if this question has been answered, I did not hear the answer. I do not know whether there was an answer or not.

The CHAIRMAN. State your question.

Mr. MUNDT. That is, about the matter of convoys. A question was asked further down the table whether you would have any objection to a provision to be written into this act specifically preventing the convoying of British ships by a part of the American Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That question was asked by Mr. Fish, and I believe answered by the Secretary.

Mr. MUNDT. I know it was answered.

Mr. KNOX. Let the reporter read my answer.

Mr. MUNDT. You felt that it would be tying the hands of the President?

The CHAIRMAN. You heard it pretty well, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, may I ask this question in that connection? Looking at it from the standpoint of the legislative branch of Congress, are we not thereby tying our hands to prevent that type of thing unless we write it in the bill?

Mr. KNOX. In a matter like that you have to allow discretion to some one man. Whether you shall or shall not do things of that sort must be determined quickly, and you are properly giving a tremendous amount of discretion to the President in this bill. I do not think it would be wise to tie the hands of the Executive when you do not know what the actual circumstances may be.

Mr. MUNDT. I think the Secretary's remarks were highly impressive and illuminating. I would like to ask you some questions to see whether I correctly interpreted his presentation in those remarks.

Am I right in feeling, Mr. Secretary, that you believe in a policy which provides for a program of aid to the British Government which is essential insofar as it affects the interests of our own national defense?

Mr. KNOX. Very firmly.

Mr. MUNDT. That is the basis of your presentation?

Mr. KNOX. Very firmly.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you or do you not believe that this country should keep out of the actual war now raging in Europe and Asia?

Mr. KNOX. I think, Mr. Congressman, I would rather put it this way: The only chance we have of keeping out of this war ultimately is by helping Great Britain win it.

Mr. MUNDT. We should certainly

Mr. Knox. I do not see what we should do, if we do not do that. The CHAIRMAN. That is, to help Great Britain win?

Mr. KNOX. That is to help Great Britain to win.

Mr. MUNDT. And you feel, do you not, Mr. Secretary, that Congress should seek to retain in its own hands every possible constitutional right which it can?

Mr. KNOX. Yes. That is a general statement. I agree with it. Mr. MUNDT. And that we should all, your Department and ourselves, study this problem from the standpoint of protecting American interests first?

Mr. KNOX. I am for that 100 percent.

Mr. MUNDT. I think we are all pretty well agreed on the general outline of policies. These little differences come up about the direction in which those things might lead. My particular worry in that connection, Mr. Secretary, is this: You have presented this case on the basis and with the hope which everybody shares that if this aid to England of additional materials, supplies, and ships can enable England to win the war, the world will be a happier place in which to live, and we will be a safer country.

Mr. KNOX. I am entirely agreeable to that.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if you care to express an opinion or if you have an opinion on what might happen if we pursue this identical policy and that happy eventuality does not evolve? In other words, if in engaging in this program of giving ships and destroyers and materials it will still leave England in what appears to be a losing position, then what is the status?

Mr. KNOX. You are again in the speculative field and recognizing it as such, I will tell you what my personal opinion would be.

Mr. MUNDT. All right.

Mr. KNOX. In that event I would put every man available to building warships. I would not count the cost. I would build our strength for anything having to do with national defense. I would enlist a huge standing army which eventually would have to be used to defend our own country. I would build the greatest air force in the world. In the next 20 years we would not do a thing but give every dollar we could spare from our own pocketbook in support of that defense. That is the kind of a world in which we would be living.

Mr. MUNDT. That is the eventuality we all wish to avoid. We must act realistically. It seems to me, looking as you have, very realistically into the future whereby this bill would bring about a happy eventuality, and also looking into the future and asking ourselves what might happen if the tides of fortune would run against us, there might come a time, might there not, Mr. Secretary, when it would become questionable whether further aid along the lines of this bill would do more to protect than to jeopardize our national defense?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Secretary has already answered that in the last answer to the gentleman.

Mr. MUNDT. If he has, may I ask this question? Who would determine when that time had arrived under the terms of this bill? Mr. KNOX. The President.

Mr. MUNDT. Should not a decision of that magnitude include the voice of Congress who represent the people in matters of peace and war?

Mr. KNOX. That is up to the determination of the Congress. This bill gives the President broad powers to meet this crisis.

Mr. MUNDT. I have the same temptation, of course, that Mr. Tinkham has, having traveled with the Secretary, and I have spoken with him on the same platform from time to time, to quote back some of his words of earlier years. But I think I shall desist from that, because he has ably exhibited his artfulness in dodging the interpretations of the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you are through?

Mr. MUNDT. I am through.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I think he stated a minute ago that regardless of what the bill provides, you would oppose turning over our Navy or any substantial part of it under this bill?

Mr. KNOX. That is correct.

Mr. JONKMAN. Would you oppose in the same way the lend-leasing of any modern airplanes?

Mr. KNOX. Doing what?

Mr. JONKMAN. The lend-leasing of any modern airplanes?

Mr. KNOX. We are doing that now in the form. Very frequently both the Army and the Navy, in order to provide Great Britain, which is fighting for her life, with the planes that she needs, have deferred delivery on planes coming to us, in order that she might have them. I would advocate the continuing of that.

Mr. JONKMAN. There are three substantial requisites of the modern airplane. The first is self-sealing gas tanks. The next is armor plating. The next is to have far-reaching guns.

Mr. KNOX. I would add range. You have to have gasoline-carrying capacity as well. You have a very different situation to confront when you are building a fleet of planes for America than those that are now being built for use over Great Britain. Great Britain finds her enemy right over her head. They do not have to have long range. We do not expect that that will be true in our situation. We have to have range, and when you increase the range you have to decrease your gun power. You cannot carry both. So there is a distinction in the type of fighters that both are building.

Mr. JONKMAN. Would it invade the field of secret military information to tell us how many modern planes we have?

Mr. KNOX. Those figures have all been published. You will get nothing new out of it. The Chief of the Aeronautical Division of the Navy Department gave some figures the other day. He stated that on January 1, 1940, the Navy had on hand only 2,145 planes of all categories; that is last January.

On hand January 1, 1941, we had 2,590 planes. That is an increase during the year 1940 of 445 planes.

Mr. JONKMAN. I mean modern planes.

Mr. KNOX. Those are all new planes; 445 of them. They are all usable.

Mr. JONKMAN. They are all of use to the Navy?

Mr. KNOX. Absolutely.

Mr. JONKMAN. Did I understand you to say that a crisis was expected in England within the next 60 or 90 days?

Mr. KNOX. Now, that is pure speculation. I do not know when a crisis will come.

Mr. JONKMAN. Are you prepared to state what kind of crisis? Mr. KNOX. The crisis of the defeat of Great Britain might be imminent.

Mr. JONKMAN. You mean through the collapse of morale?
Mr. KNOX. The collapse of what?

Mr. JONKMAN. Morale.

Mr. KNOX. No. I think the British morale is admirable beyond comparison. I think it might come about, and again I am indulging in pure speculation, it might come about through the greater success of the submarine campaign, which is now a combined submarine and air campaign. And it might come about through persistence in these concentrated bombardments. Both of these campaigns affect the supplies available for fighting.

Mr. JONKMAN. Do you think that a military invasion by Germany into England is probable?

Mr. Knox. I do not know that my judgment is worth any more than yours about that. We all have our own idea.

Mr. JONKMAN. That would not be, then, the expected crisis? Mr. KNOX. It might be.

Mr. JONKMAN. Do you think that the same danger exists in that respect as existed in the months of September and October 1940? In other words, is it not true that England has become an armed camp?

Mr. KNOX. Oh, yes, indeed. I think the difficulties in the way of invading England are now much greater than they were when France fell, for instance.

Mr. JONKMAN. Do I understand you to say that the principal effect of this bill within the next 6 months would be to bolster up the morale of the British?

Mr. KNOX. That is one of the effects, and it is very important. Mr. JONKMAN. Are there any other substantial effects?

Mr. KNOX. Yes. I think we would probably, as we are constantly doing, increase production and give them the benefit of the increased flow of munitions and supplies.

Mr. JONKMAN. You think that would be so material as to be effective within the next 6 months?

Mr. Knox. I do. I hope so.

Mr. JONKMAN. Do you not think it would be more effective if we continue our present policy, that is, to concentrate entirely upon protection and preparation for our own defense and continue to furnish them as we are doing at present?

Mr. KNOX. We cannot continue. to do that. The law provides against it and provides that they must pay for the things they get. They do not have enough dollars left to pay for what they have now ordered. You would have to repeal the Johnson Act before you could do that.

Mr. JONKMAN. Is it your understanding that, immediately under the passage of this bill, England would no longer have to pay cash for what she gets?

Mr. KNOX. That is my understanding. She has no longer any dollars with which to pay.

Mr. JONKMAN. Well, are you aware of the fact that their possessions still have millions?

Mr. KNOX. We can get a lot of things. We can get pounds, but the law provides purchases shall be paid for here in dollars. That is the situation. England is not bankrupt. No one pretends she is. But she has used up all the dollar exchange she can get anywhere. There is not any available anywhere in the world except here. We would have to exchange our dollars for pounds. It is up to Congress to determine if we want a lot of British paper money.

Mr. JONKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is all I have.
The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. You have said it is important to us that Britain do not fall?

Mr. KNOX. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. And, therefore, we need to help Britain in every conceivable way somewhat according to her rights, as well as according to our own; must we not?

Mr. KNOX. In accordance with her necessity, I would rather put it, Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Has there been conference between your Department and the Admiralty in the matter of what those are?

Mr. KNOX. Constantly.

Mrs. BOLTON. And you are satisfied that we are going to the lengths England would want?

Mr. KNOX. In this bill, you mean?

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes.

Mr. KNOX. Yes; I think so.

Mrs. BOLTON. And in what we can do under it?

Mr. KNOX. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. And have we taken into consideration British opinion in the matter?

Mr. KNOX. Well, I have had no opportunity, Mrs. Bolton, to do that myself, but I am reasonably sure British opinion is violently in favor of this bill.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask one step further than that, Mr. Secretary? In the Economist in London, on November 16, there was an expression of British opinion in regard to our help. Would you be willing to let me read this?

Mr. KNOX. I would love to have you do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. By way of a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mrs. BOLTON (reading):

We must hope for the United States' eventual participation in the struggle with all the strength of an armed combatant. If the answer is to be given from the somewhat narrower viewpoint of our own material needs (British needs) it must be we should prefer America to be nonbelligerent in 1941 and belligerent in 1942. We must hope for her eventual participation in the struggle with all the strength of a whole continent. The whole problem would be immeasurably simpler if American opinion were rescued by a declaration of war from the present delusion of outlook in which America's safety is seen to be involved, but her wealth not committed. Further than that it would be undoubtedly in accordance with this hope of active participation before long, also difficult but not impossible that she could provide escort vessels and still stay neutral.