would be much better than if we finally found we could not do that, but had to go in and help them militarily. I am not anxious to have us do that.

Mr. WASIELEWSKI. What I have in mind primarily is, if we stay out of war we do not have to devote as much time and attention to equipping our own forces, we therefore can probably allow a larger percentage of the output that we have to the defenses of democracies who are carrying on the defense of our country?

Mr. STIMSON. So long as that seems to be a successful policy, I believe in carrying it on.

Mr. WASIELEWSKI. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sikes?

Mr. SIKES. From your field of experience, are you able to suggest any step or any measure other than H. R. 1776 of quickly and economically assuring our hemispheric defense and minimizing danger from abroad to this country?

Mr. STIMSON. This is the latest step intended to achieve that end. And I have not thought of any further one.

Mr. SIKES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have sat here now for a long time with quite a few questions, and I have been checking them off one by I have only got one left that I would like to have clarified. Mr. STIMSON. You have been very forbearing.

one.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this bill provide for the purchase of munitions or articles in other countries with the use of American funds?

Mr. STIMSON. I think it does. In section A, I think, it does permit that. Of course, only when money is appropriated for that purpose. The CHAIRMAN. After the money is appropriated, Mr. Secretary, we can use that money to purchase munitions or ammunition in other countries; is that right?

Mr. STIMSON. Provided it is necessary for the defense of this country.. The CHAIRMAN. What is the last part of your answer?

Mr. STIMSON. That is expressly in the bill. That condition must be fulfilled.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about all, Mr. Secretary. The committee thanks you very, very much. You have been very patient and we appreciate your being here for so long a time.

Mr. STIMSON. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I hope I have not, lost my temper. I had not intended to.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further that you wish to state, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. STIMSON. No, sir; I think that is all. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK W. KNOX, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the committee is very glad to have you here today with reference to H. R. 1776. Have you a statement that you wish to read?

Mr. KNOX. I have a brief statement.

The CHAIRMAN. A brief statement? Are you distributing that to the members and the press?

Mr. KNOX. I have already done so. I think it has been done.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary. You may be seated or stand, as you wish.

Mr. KNOX. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I presume I am called before you because I am charged with the responsibility, as Secretary of the Navy, of preparing our first line of defense the Navy-against whatever dangers the future may hold.

It is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of sea power to our country and to our entire western world. It has been because of the existence of sea power, exercised by two nations, Great Britain and ourselves, that both the Atlantic and the Pacific have served as barriers against the acquisitive designs of aggressive powers.

If you will glance at the map, you will readily observe that there are but three exits into the Atlantic in Europe. The channels of the North Sea (north of the British Isles), the English Channel itself, and the Straits of Gibraltar. Our entire western world has been safe from attack from Europe because the British Fleet has always stood sentinel at these three exits into the ocean, and British policy, for many years, has accepted, and assisted us in the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. That has sufficed to make the Atlantic barrier secure.

The war in Europe must be looked upon as the latest of a long succession of attempts by dictators to establish rule over all Europe, and eventually, to establish dominion over a large portion of the world. Like all its predecessors, the Nazi regime has found that the power of its armies alone cannot establish that rule, because Europe is not self-supporting in raw materials, and the Nazi armies are powerless to obtain these materials unless they have control of the sea.

Great Britain has never been powerful enough to support an army strong enough to conquer Europe and to hold it under control. That nation has been enabled to survive against conquest through control of the seas between those islands and the Continent of Europe, and also to stifle the expanding military powers on the continent by denying them access to the sources of raw materials.

The struggle now going on is, fundamentally, an attempt by Germany to seize control of the sea from Great Britain. That is the reason why, from a military viewpoint, the war has so vital an interest to the United States. Our Nation has evolved without particular hindrance from Britain's control of a large part of the sea. But I believe it would be very different were control to pass to Germany, and were she able to send her armies into other parts of the world, and there lay tribute of raw materials for further building up her powers of oppression.

If Germany becomes free to move across the ocean for the conquest of new territories, she most probably will move first into South America, to get hold of that great storehouse of continental wealth. If the United States does not wish to face the consequences of the establishment in South America of aggressive military power, we should now prevent Germany from overturning the British sea power which holds the Nazis in Europe.

For 118 years the Monroe Doctrine has been the one national policy firmly and continuously maintained by the American people. This

doctrine, which forbids the extension in the Western Hemisphere of non-American military and political control, was enunciated for the purpose of preserving the territorial, economic, and social integrity of the United States. Our statesmen clearly foresaw that we ourselves could be safe from aggression only by keeping safe the whole of the American Hemisphere. The United States under that policy has progressed from weakness to strength. The other nations of this hemisphere have also been enabled to develop their own civilizations, free from the fear of sudden foreign conquest.

The United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine to keep the New World from being conquered by the Holy Alliance which was the Triple Axis of 1823. We were successful in maintaining that doctrine only because of the support of Great Britain, whose overwhelming fleet could prevent overseas aggression from Europe.

Our Nation thus could develop because of the fortunate circumstances of the great oceans to the east and the west. Military power has not been able to cross these oceans, and never will be, without the support of naval power superior to our own. British naval power has not threatened us for 125 years, and during that time no other European naval power could touch us since they feared the British fleet.

During the early period of our national existence there was no danger in the Pacific, and our merchants were as free as anyone else to trade with Asia. No aggressive military dictatorship in the Far East then disturbed the peace of other nations. There was no threat in the Atlantic because the balance of power in Europe permitted no aggression against us. We did not need a great navy or a large army.

Ouly during the past 50 years has it become necessary for us to develop a strong navy. The circumstances that rendered a strong navy essential to our safety were the construction of a German Navy to back aggression toward distant lands; and Japan's expansion into the peaceful lands beyond her borders.

During the years before the World War we were threatened by German naval power, because that power was directed against the continued existence of Great Britain and its powerful navy. To meet German aggression the United States built its Atlantic Fleet. We had only a weak Pacific Fleet, but we served notice of our interest in two oceans when President Theodore Roosevelt gave a practical demonstration of United States naval strength by sending the Atlantic Fleet around the world.

All doubtless remember that the World War gave Japan her chance for expansion throughout the islands of the Pacific, and remember that this was the occasion of her 21 demands upon China. We were able to check Japan's further aggressions by moving our entire fleet to the Pacific when the conclusion of the World War eliminated the German Fleet in the Atlantic. Since that time we have maintained a one-ocean navy in the Pacific, and that navy has proved adequate in both directions only because the existence and the deployment of the British Navy gave us security in the Atlantic. In effect, both we and the British Commonwealth of Nations actually have had a twoocean navy, operated for a single peaceful purpose.

We still have a one-ocean navy. We are building a two-ocean navy, but its structure will not be completed for 6 years. We need to complete that structure as fast as we can, because the other part

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of our present two-ocean navy is now in grave danger. The British Navy can survive only if the British Isles survive. Should the British Isles fall, we can only believe that the British Navy, which never runs from danger, will fall at the same time. I think we can safely assume that the British Navy will share the fate of the courageous nation that supports it.

Last year the Congress was suddenly warned by the Chief of Naval Operations of the grave threat to the freedom of the United States and its sister American republics, which would exist, were Britain to suffer defeat. The naval forces now in the possession of the Axis Powers, or which are under construction, would greatly outnumber our own. Our fleet would necessarily be divided, to meet danger in both oceans. Whether it would be strong enough to protect even the regions nearest to us is a matter that cannot be foretold. Certainly we could not project our strength across two wide oceans. With the Navy retained at home, we could not do much to prevent Japan from extending its sway over all of the Eastern Asia, nor could we prevent the establishment of strong military-base areas in Southern Europe and in Africa to threaten our neighbors to the South.

To keep our land secure we must prevent the establishment of strong aggressive military power in any part of the New World. We can keep non-American military power out of our hemisphere only through being able to control the seas that surround our shores. Once we lose the power to control even a part of those seas, inevitably the wars of Europe and Asia will be transferred to the Americas.

We need time to build ships and to train their crews. We need time to build our outlying bases so that we can operate our fleets as a screen for our continent. We need time to train our armies, to accumulate war stores, to gear our industry for defense.

Only Great Britain and its fleet can give us that time. And they need our help to survive.

If we fully organize the mental and material resources of the American people, we can give Britain that help and simultaneously can build a strong military defense for ourselves. The cost to us in money, effort, and sacrifice will be great-but that cost will be far greater even in the immediate future, should we now stand aside and let Britain fall.

We are a strong Nation, though our military strength is still largely potential. I believe that the American people have what it takes in character, courage, and wisdom to guard this country and to guard this hemisphere. But to keep from engaging in a desperate struggle in American territory, they need time to make ready their arms. They can get time to make ready, and can maintain their essential interests throughout the world, only so long as Britain and its fleet survive. With our unstinted help, I firmly believe that Britain cannot be defeated.

We will act in our best national interests, therefore, if, while increasing our naval power as fast as we can, we provide the British Commonwealth with the means that will bring her through this tragic

crisis.

Estimated comparative strengths in types (does not include France)

Mr. FISH. Mr. Secretary, is it not a fact that we have the greatest and most powerful Navy in the world today?

Mr. KNOX. It is.

Mr. FISH. Even greater than the British Navy?

Mr. KNOX. At the present time; yes.

Mr. FISH. And many times greater than the German Navy?

Mr. KNOX. Yes.

Mr. FISH. And many times greater than the Italian Navy?

Mr. KNOX. Yes.

Mr. FISH. Now, Mr. Secretary, you said that the Axis Powers, if the British Navy were defeated, would out-number ours?

Mr. KNOX. That is right.

Mr. FISH. Is it not a fair assumption, or rather a fair statement to make that if the British Navy is to be destroyed in battle, that there also would be losses on the Axis side?

Mr. KNOX. Possibly. That is speculative, however.

Mr. FISH. And therefore, the German, Italian, and other Axis Navies, if they suffer losses, might not out-number our own at that time?

Mr. KNOX. They would have to suffer an awful lot. Do you know what the figures are?

Mr. FISH. I would like to have them from you. I would like to get them from you. I would like to know, for example, what the losses of the French Navy have been.

Mr. KNOX. The losses of what?

Mr. FISH. Of the French Navy.

Mr. KNOX. Let us leave France out of it.

Mr. FISH. I want to find out whether they could possibly use the French Navy after they had suffered losses in the war.

Mr. KNOX. I think their losses are pretty well summed up. I think we have received advices as to what they are.