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Secretary STIMSON. We will have that number of men quite soon but it will not be an army. Mr. Fish, you have been a soldier, I have been a soldier. You know the difference between a crowd of men and an army. You have been a football man and you know the difference between 11 men and a football team. And you know that an army is a team. You know that an army has to be, in modern times, equipped with modern weapons, weapons the necessity of which we have only just learned since last May, and yet weapons which in many cases take a year to make. And you speak as if we could pass a conscription law and in 2 weeks have an army. I say you have not thought it out, sir.

Mr. FISH. I did not say that. I was only quoting the War Department, what they said when they would have the men conscripted, and they are not conscripted yet. I am in favor of your Army of 1,400,000 men and I am in favor of the greatest possible national defense and modern equipment. And I believe 1,400,000 is a sufficient number for defense in America against any possible force that can be brought over here.

Secretary STIMSON. I do not agree with you on that.

Mr. FISH. Does not the Secretary agree to that?

Secretary STIMSON. No; not any possible force that can be brought over; no.

Mr. FISH. Does the Secretary believe that any nation could land more than 50,000 men, have the transports to do it?

Secretary STIMSON. In time I do, but that is not the question.
Mr. FISH. I mean, at one time-

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fish, please allow the Secretary to finish his answer to your question.

Secretary STIMSON. Nations do not act that way. Japan is not acting that way today in her movement down toward the Netherlands East Indies. They go little by little. They get bases. They get nearer and they get a preponderating power in the air and in the sea and they finally get themselves in a position where they can strike. But they do not commit the folly of trying to strike before they are good and ready.

Mr. FISH. Then I say to you, Mr. Secretary, that if the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, or this administration permits any foreign nation to get those bases, then they are not defending our country properly.

Secretary STIMSON. I think I would fully agree in that, and I would call your attention to the steps which we have been taking to get bases, sometimes I think under your criticism.

Mr. FISH. No, sir.

Secretary STIMSON. Then I beg your pardon.

Mr. FISH. That can go in the record.

Secretary STIMSON. Then we are agreed on one thing, anyhow, and I am very glad, sir.

Mr. FISH. Let me say, so that the record will be very clear, Mr. Secretary, that a long time ago, being a pan-American, I made perhaps the first speech insisting on getting bases in South America, and I agree with Mr. Lindbergh who made the same statement a long time ago.

Secretary STIMSON. I am very glad, sir, to hear it, and I am very glad to know there is one thing you and I can be hand in hand on.

I am always glad of that. But I regard this bill which is now before you gentlemen, and the prompt enactment of it, another step in that same direction of promoting our outer defense. The problem to me is not only the problem of keeping America out of war but perhaps more accurately the problem of keeping war out of America.

Mr. FISH. The only difference between us, as I see it, is that I believe strongly in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, and you want to extend the Monroe Doctrine all over the world.

Secretary STIMSON. The Monroe Doctrine at the time it was made, sir, was made in the days of sailing ships and not in the days of steam and electricity. You can understand that. You are a New Yorker. I am a New Yorker. Just let me give you an illustration of what I mean in regard to this national defense. At the time of the Revolution, where were the defenses of New York City? They were on Governors Island and the Battery. A little bit later, when guns got stronger and more powerful, they moved down to Fort Wadsworth and Fort Hamilton, halfway down the Narrows. A little bit later they went out to Sandy Hook and Fort Hamilton. They were following the development of modern war. Now the line of our defense runs out into the middle of the Atlantic. Everybody who knows anything about modern warfare knows that.

I fully endorse and believe in the Monroe Doctrine, and I say that it was established at a time when the defenses of New York Harbor were at Governors Island. If our military experts have found it necessary to put the defense further out, I am inclined to say that they are dead right.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Secretary, you have just said you endorse the Monroe Doctrine. You say you believe in it, that it is a sound doctrine. So do I.

Secretary STIMSON. I believe in the principle that stands behind it. Mr. FISH. Is not our outer defense our Navy? Has not the Congress appropriated for a two-ocean Navy?

Our first line of

Secretary STIMSON. No, sir; only in one sense. defense is our diplomacy, if you will permit me to say it, by which we try to keep as many enemies away from us, and to get as many friends on our side as we can throughout the whole world. Then the Navy is another line, and the line of bases is another line. The Army is the last line to be used, the continental Army, in a situation which will never occur, I hope; namely, when an enemy has got its foot on our soil and is ready to do to us what the Germans did to the countries of Europe last spring.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Secretary, if our Navy is not our first line of defense, then some foreign nation must be our first line of defense. And if Great Britain is our first line of defense, then it is our war, and it would be craven not to be in it. But I believe the American Navy is our first line of defense, and always will be, and we do not have to depend on anyone else.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to reply to that, Mr. Secretary? Secretary STIMSON. I do not see any question there. I heard a statement of Mr. Fish's opinion.

Mr. FISH. I will ask you point blank if Great Britain is our first line of defense, are you in favor therefore of going to war?

Secretary STIMSON. I am in favor of assisting Great Britain to maintain her fleet. I am in favor of that. At present she, being at

war, is providing for the defense of the North Atlantic, and we are vitally interested in that defense.

Mr. FISH. Is it not rather cowardly of us, if England is fighting our battle, not to go into the war?

Secretary STIMSON. I am not going to pursue this line of argument. We are not concerned with it in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eaton?

Mr. EATON. As a mere layman, I feel I cannot add anything to the general confusion which has been created on this subject so far this morning. But there is one question that is very fundamental, in my opinion. We have at this present moment two great forces arrayed against each other in the world, one the force of despotism, the other the force of democracy. The chief democracy now engaged in active combat is Great Britain and the other one, standing behind Great Britain, is the United States of America. We are assisting Great Britain and have had her pay so far 100 cents on the dollar for all assistance rendered, and we are assisting Great Britain on the ground that if Great Britain falls, then we will be attacked.

Now, under those conditions I would like to ask the Secretary, if they are fighting our defense, is it giving away anything for us to help Great Britain?

Secretary STIMSON. I do not think it is, sir, if we help them effectively.

Mr. EATON. My leader here, Mr. Fish, wants to know if this is our war. I would like to ask you if this is not our war, what are we doing here today? What is all this fuss about armies and navies and airplanes? What is it all about? Up to that point does it not seem that this is our war?

Secretary STIMSON. It is.

Mr. EATON. Then I wonder why it is necessary to follow so many rabbit tracks and not stay on the main line. So I would like to ask just one question with reference to this bill. I am in favor of all aid to Great Britain in the interest of defending this nation from inevitable lonely conflict if Great Britain is defeated. Now, that being so, the thing that worries me in this bill is that it is apparently adopting the totalitarian method of placing all power in the hands of one man. Is that, in your judgment, absolutely necessary?

Secretary STIMSON. I do not think that we will adopt all of the totalitarian methods; no, sir. I do not think so. But experience has shown, in the life of this Nation, many times, that to defend ourselves against war or the danger of war, it is necessary temporarily to concentrate our means of self-defense and make them more effective than we are accustomed to do in time of peace. And that is all, as I understand it, that we are trying to do today.

There is one thing that has been brought up, that I should like to mention here, if I may move into the cerulean atmosphere of international law. I notice that in some of the things which Mr. Fish has mentioned, in speaking about war and nations being at war, and that in some of the questions that were asked of Mr. Hull yesterday, there was brought out the matter of whether or not it was an act of war for us to do certain things in the defense of Great Britain. Mr. Hull answered it by a good, common-sense statement, as reported in

the press, that the actions of the Axis Powers had so torn up international law that it had reduced us-I am speaking roughly, I am not trying to quote the Secretary-it had reduced us to the law of self-defense. But I want to put on record the fact that we do not have to go even that far. We do not have to say that we depend only on the law of self-defense, although that is the fact that stares us in the face.

Even if we should assume-which is not the fact that international law still existed today, after these attacks on it by the Axis Powers, then even under that international law as it stood before these hostilities in Europe began we would be rightfully authorized to act with regard to what it has been proposed do do in the defense or in the assistance of Great Britain. That is a thing which has not been understood, because the original fountain of the change has been so comparatively recent.

This country was one of the authors of one of the greatest changes in international law that has ever taken place when it was in 1926 and 1927 and 1928 the initiator of what has been called the Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Now, it has not been recognized, even by us, by these Houses of Congress here that were the parents of it, what a vital change was made in the system of international law by that action. However, the international lawyers all over the rest of the world and in this country have recognized this important change, and I want to bring before this committee what they have found.

You will remember that that great treaty, the Pact of Paris, was joined in by some 63 nations. We joined it. Great Britain joined it. France joined it. Germany joined it. Italy joined it. Japan joined it. All the Axis Powers did. They all agreed to renounce war and they agreed in the second provision of that agreement that they would never seek the solution of any controversy except by peaceful means. Now, as I say, that treaty was ratified, I think, by practically the unanimous vote of the United States Senate by practically a unanimous vote. It was instigated by our Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, and has been known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

Now, when these troubles began to arise, when these lawless nations thereafter began to make attacks upon the fabric of international law, the oldest and the most authoritative body of the international law in the world, the Association of International Law, a European organization, met in 1934 to consider what the effect of such an attack as Japan had made upon China would be, or as Mr. Hitler was even then threatening, on Austria. They had a meeting in Hungary. might say that the membership of that association is composed of the most distinguished international lawyers from all over the world; Americans, British, Frenchmen, Germans, Scandinavians, Italians, Japanese-all of them. And they considered what the effect would be of an attack in violation of the Kellogg Pact by one signatory upon another, and what effect it would have upon the rights and redresses of the other members of the great family of nations which had entered into that treaty under international law. And the conclusions which they reached are the most authoritative statement of international law on that subject which, so far as I know, has ever been published. And this is what they said, and I would like to have it on this record very carefully so that when our friends say that to help Great Britain at

this time would be an act of war, I would like them to know what these great scholars and lawyers have said it would be under the Kellogg Pact.

Now, mind you that Germany and every one of her victims so far were members of the 63 nations who entered into that pact. Japan and China were both members. Ethiopia was a member, brought in on the introduction of Italy and afterward attacked by Italy. Norway was a member when Germany attacked her. Denmark was a member when Germany attacked her. Belgium was a member; Holland was a member; Czechoslovakia was a member.

Now, this is what they said and they were considering just that very question.

Whereas the pact (the Pact of Paris) is a multilateral lawmaking treaty— Making international law among those members, in other words.

* * whereby each of the high contracting parties makes binding agreements with each other and all of the other high contracting parties; and

Whereas by their participation in the pact 63 States have abolished the conception of war as a legitimate means of exercising pressure on another state in the pursuit of national policy and have also renounced any recourse to armed force for the solution of international disputes or conflicts

Then these things follow:

1. A signatory state cannot, by denunciation or nonobservance of the pact, release itself from its obligations thereunder.

Germany cannot release itself; Japan did not release itself by invading Manchuria or China; Italy did not release itself by invading Ethiopia.

2. A signatory state which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the pact.

3. A signatory state which aids a violating state thereby itself violates the pact.

Those are all important, but here come the articles that I want to call to the attention of every one on this committee, if I may have their attention:

4. In the event of a violation of the pact by a resort to armed force or war by one signatory state against another, the other states may, without thereby committing a breach of the pact or of any rule of international law do all or any of the following things

Now that Germany has violated it; now that Japan has violated it, and all of these axis powers are now tearing down the structure of our world, here is what we can do and still conform to international law:

a. Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the pact of belligerent rights such as visit and search, blockade, etc.

Every blockade by Germany is illegal under international law. Now, here is the most important one of all:

b. Decline to observe

That is, we on the outside, the law-abiding states can

decline to observe toward the State violating the pact the duties prescribed by international law, apart from the pact, for a neutral in relation to a belligerentWe are no longer bound by the rules.

Now, here is one that is directly in point. We can

c. Supply the state attacked with financial or material assistance, including munitions of war;

d. Assist with armed forces the state attacked.

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