the United States, unless his assignor or transferrer could have sued
in such court. Lake County Commissioners v. Dudley, 243.
4. From the evidence of Dudley himself, the plaintiff below, it is clear
that he does not own any of the coupons sued on, and that his name
is being used with his own consent, to give jurisdiction to the Circuit
Court to render judgment for persons who could not have invoked the
jurisdiction of a Federal court, and the trial court, on its own motion,
should have dismissed the case, without considering its merits. Ib.
5. Under the act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, a Circuit Court of the United
States has no jurisdiction, either original, or by removal from a state
court, of a suit as one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties,
of the United States, unless that appears by the plaintiff's statement
to be a necessary part of his claim. Third St. & Suburban Railway Co.
v. Lewis, 457.
6. If it does not appear at the outset that a suit is one of which the
Circuit Court, at the time its jurisdiction is invoked, could properly
take cognizance, the suit must be dismissed; and lack of jurisdiction
cannot be supplied by anything set up by way of defence. Ib.
7. When jurisdiction originally depends upon diverse citizenship the
decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final, though another
ground of jurisdiction may be developed in the course of the pro-
ceedings. Ib.
8. The Circuit Court of the United States sitting in the State of Texas
was not bound to treat the judgment of the district court of Brazoria
County as if it were a domestic judgment drawn in question in one of
the state courts, and to therefore hold that it could not be assailed
collaterally, but, on the contrary, it was no more shut out from
examining into jurisdiction than is a Circuit Court of the United
States sitting in another State, or than are the courts of another
State. Cooper v. Newell, 555.
9. When the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the United States depends
on diverse citizenship, its decree is made final by the act of March 3,
1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826. Pope v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago
Railway Co., 573.
10. When an action or suit is commenced by a receiver, appointed by a
Circuit Court, to accomplish the ends sought and directed by the suit
in which the appointment was made, such action or suit is regarded
as ancillary, so far as the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, as a court
of the United States, is concerned; and where the jurisdiction of the
main suit is predicated on diversity of citizenship, and the decree
therein in the Circuit Court of Appeals therefore becomes final, the
judgment and decrees in the ancillary litigation are also final. 16.
11. The suits in which this receiver was appointed were in the nature of
creditors' bills, and the only ground of Federal jurisdiction set up in
them was diversity of citizenship; and as, if the decrees therein had
been passed upon by the Circuit Court of Appeals, its decision would
nave been final, the same finality attaches to the decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals in this suit. Ib.
D. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 2.
E. JURISDICTION OF TERRITORIAL COUrts.
Personal service of a summons, made in the Territory of Arizona upon the
general manager of a foreign corporation doing business in that Ter-
ritory, is sufficient service under the laws of the Territory to give its
courts jurisdiction of the case. Henrietta Mining & Milling Co. v.
Johnson, 221.
F. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.
1. It appearing from the opinion of the Circuit Judge that the various
bills in this case were dismissed on the grounds: (1) That the juris-
diction of the Circuit Court could not be maintained because the state
court, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, determined the eligi-
bility of the defendant Florence Blythe to inherit an estate which
that court was called upon to distribute under the laws of the State,
and that other propositions contended for by the complainants were
for the same reason deemed insufficient to take this case out of the
general rule that after a court of a State, with full jurisdiction over
property in its possession, has finally determined all rights to that
property, a court of the United States will not entertain jurisdiction
to annul such decree and disturb rights once definitely determined;
and (2) That the remedy of complainants, if any, was at law, and
not in equity: Held; as neither ground went to the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court as a court of the United States, the appeal could not
be sustained as within any class mentioned in § 5 of the Judiciary Act
of 1891, and if error was committed this was not the proper mode for
correcting it. Blythe v. Hinckley, 501.
2. In 1850 McGrael, a resident citizen in Brazoria County, Texas, brought
an action against Newell, who was alleged to be a citizen and resi-
dent in that county, to recover several parcels of land. Swett, an
attorney at law, appeared for Newell and a verdict was rendered that
McGrael recover the tracts, upon which verdict judgment was ren-
dered in his favor, and he went into possession. At the time when
that action was brought Newell had ceased to be a citizen of Texas,
and had become a citizen of Pennsylvania, from whence he soon re-
moved to the city of New York, and became a citizen of that State,
and spent the remainder of his life there and died there. He was
never served with process in the action in Texas, no notice of it was
given him by publication, he never authorized Swett to appear for
him, and was ignorant of the whole proceeding. In 1890, upon the
matter coming to his knowledge, he brought this action in the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas
against persons occupying and claiming part of the land, setting up
the above facts, and asking a decree that the judgment of 1850 was
null and void, and not binding upon him. He died before trial could
be had, and the action proceeded to trial and judgment in the name
of his executors. The jury found a verdict in favor of the executors,
judgment was rendered accordingly, and an appeal was taken to the
Court of Appeals. In answer to a question certified to this court by
the Court of Appeals, it is Held, that the said judgment of the dis-
trict court of Brazoria, Texas, which was a court of general jurisdic-
tion, was, under the circumstances stated, subject to collateral attack
in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
sitting in the same territory in which said district court sat, in this
suit, between a citizen of the State of New York and a citizen of the
State of Texas by evidence aliunde the record of the state court.
Cooper v. Newell, 555.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3.
Less than two years having elapsed from the payment of the first dividend
to the filing of this bill, and the other creditors of the bank not hav-
ing been harmed by the delay, no presumption of laches is raised,
nor can an estoppel properly be held to have arisen. Merrill v. Na-
tional Bank of Jacksonville, 131.
1 The recitals in the bonds of Gunnison County, the coupons of which
are in suit in this case, that they were "issued by the Board of County
Commissioners of said Gunnison County in exchange, at par, for
valid floating indebtedness of the said county outstanding prior to
September 2, 1882, under and by virtue of and in full conformity
with the provisions of an act of the general assembly of the State
of Colorado, entitled 'An act to enable the several counties of the
State to fund their floating indebtedness,' approved February 21,
1881; 'that all the requirements of law have been fully complied
with by the proper officers in the issuing of this bond;' that the
total amount of the issue does not exceed the limit prescribed by
the constitution of the State of Colorado, and that this issue of bonds
has been authorized by a vote of a majority of the duly qualified
electors of the said county of Gunnison, voting on the question at
a general election duly held in said county on the seventh day of
November, A.D. 1882," estop the county from asserting, against a
bona fide holder for value, that the bond so issued created an indebt-
edness in excess of the limit prescribed by the constitution of Colo-
rado. Gunnison County Commissioners v. Rollins, 255.
2. This case is controlled by the judgment in Chaffee County v. Potter,
142 U. S. 355, which the court declines to overrule. Ib.
3. The plaintiff corporation was a bona fide holder, when this suit was
brought, of some of the bonds sued for in it. lb.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 6.
1. A secured creditor of an insolvent national bank may prove and receive
dividends upon the face of his claim as it stood at the time of the dec-
laration of insolvency, without crediting either his collaterals, or col-
lections made therefrom after such declaration, subject always to the
proviso that dividends must cease when, from them and from collat-
erals realized, the claim has been paid in full. Merrill v. National
Bank of Jacksonville, 131.
2. A State is wholly without power to levy any tax, either direct or in-
direct, upon national banks, their property, assets or franchises, except
when permitted to do so by the legislation of Congress. Owensboro
National Bank v. Owensboro, 664.
3. Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes is the measure of the power of
States to tax national banks, their property or their franchises, that
power being confined to a taxation of the shares of stock in the
names of the shareholders, and to an assessment of the real estate
of the bank.
4. The taxing law of the State of Kentucky, under the provisions of
which the tax in controversy in this case was imposed, is beyond the
authority conferred by Congress on the States, and is void for repug-
nancy to that act. Ib.
5. The tax here complained of having been assessed on the franchise or
intangible property of the corporation, was not within the purview of
the authority conferred by the act of Congress, and was therefore
illegal. Ib.
See TAX AND Taxation, 1, 2.
PARENT AND CHILD.
See VOLUNTARY GIFT, 1, 2.
The rule, that successive and concurrent decisions of two courts in the
same case upon a mere question of fact are not to be reversed unless
clearly shown to be erroneous, is equally applicable in equity and in
admiralty. Towson v. Moore, 17.
1. A record in the Department at Washington of the approval by the
President of a deed made by an Indian to convey lands held by him
subject to the provision in the treaty of Prairie du Chien that it was
never to be leased `or conveyed without the permission of the Presi-
dent, is notice to all concerned from the time it was made, and is
similar, in effect, to a patent issued by the President for lands that
belong to the Government, which is not required to be recorded in
the county where the land is located. Lomax v. Pickering, 26.
2. The recording of a deed of such land, made without previous approval
of the President, is notice of the grantee's title to subsequent pur-
chasers; and, when approved, operates to divest the title of the
grantor as against a subsequent grantee. Ib.
3. The provisions in the act of March 2, 1889, c. 412, 25 Stat. 980, 1005,
with regard to honorably discharged Union soldiers and sailors were
intended only to give them an equal right with others to acquire a
homestead within the territory described by the act, but did not
operate to relieve them from the general restriction as to going into
the territory imposed upon all persons by the provisions of the act.
Calhoun v. Violet, 60.
4. Under the act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, known as the
Swamp Land Act, the legal title to land passes only on delivery of
a patent, and as the record in this case discloses no patent, there was
no passing of the legal title from the United States, whatever equi-
table rights may have vested. Until the legal title to land passes
from the Government, inquiry as to all equitable rights comes within
the cognizance of the land department. Brown v. Hitchcock, 473.
5. Although cases may arise in which a party is justified in coming into
the courts of the District of Columbia to assert his rights as against
a proceeding in the land department, or when that department refuses
to act at all, yet, as a general rule, power is vested in the department
to determine all questions of equitable right and title, upon proper
notice to the parties interested, and the courts should be resorted to
only when the legal title has passed from the Government. 16.
6. When a patent of public lands is obtained by inadvertence and mis-
take, to the injury of a person who had previously initiated the
steps required by law to obtain possession and ownership of such
land, the courts, in a proper proceeding, will divest or control the
title thereby acquired, either by compelling a conveyance to such
person, or by quieting his title. Duluth & Iron Range Railroad Co.
v. Roy, 587.
7. The claimant against the patent must so far bring himself within the
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