Statement of the Case.

Soon after, Pettit filed his bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana, averring that he was a citizen of the State of Wisconsin, against "the said Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Indiana and State of Illinois, by the consolidation of an Illinois corporation of the same name of defendant herein, and an Indiana corporation known as 'the Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company of Indiana."" Pope was appointed receiver on that bill, the order being similar in its terms to that entered in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. After such appointment, and on July 12, 1881, Pope, as receiver, filed his bill of complaint in the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, seeking to recover certain property and property rights held and claimed by certain of the defendants, which appellant claimed belonged to the Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company and to the ownership of or right to which he had succeeded as such receiver.

The amended bill on which the cause was heard stated that "Your orator, Charles E. Pope, who is receiver of the Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company, and who is a citizen of the State of Illinois, brings this his amended bill of complaint-leave therefor having been granted by this honorable court — against" certain companies and individuals, severally citizens of the States of Indiana, Ohio, New York and Kentucky; that he was appointed receiver of the Atlantic Company by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, and also receiver by the Circuit Court of Indiana; and that he was authorized by the express orders of both courts, appointing him receiver, "to bring all suits necessary and proper to be brought to recover possession of said estate and effects and to enforce all claims," etc.

The cause went to hearing, and a money decree was rendered by the Circuit Court in favor of Pope, receiver, against appellee, which appellee was adjudged by that decree to pay. An appeal having been prosecuted to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a motion was made to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and the motion over

Opinion of the Court.

ruled. On final hearing the decree of the Circuit Court was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, with instructions to dismiss the amended bill. The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals was filed June 12, 1897. 53 U. S. App. 332. Thereafter a petition for a rehearing was filed and denied. Subsequently Pope, receiver, applied to this court for a writ of certiorari, which application was denied Mar 7, 1898. 169 U. S. 737. On March 23 Pope moved theircuit Court of Appeals for leave to file a second petition fo: rehearing, and the motion was overruled. Pope then applied to the Circuit Court of Appeals for an appeal to this court, which was granted, and the appeal having been docketed, this motion to dismiss was made and duly submitted..

Mr. Henry W. Blodgett, Mr. G. W. Kretzinger and Mr. E. C. Field for the motion.

Mr. John S. Miller opposing.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the

court.

If the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals was made final by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, this appeal must be dismissed; and it was so made final if the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court depended entirely on diverse citizenship.

The Circuit Courts of the United States have original jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, by reason of the citizenship of the parties, in cases between citizens of different States, or between citizens of a State and aliens ; and, by reason of the cause of action, "in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made or which shall be made under their authority," as for instance suits arising under the patent or copyright laws of the United States. Press Publishing Company v. Monroe,

.164 U. S. 105.

Diversity of citizenship confers jurisdiction, irrespective of the cause of action. But if the cause of action arises under

Opinion of the Court.

the Constitution, or laws, or treaties, of the United States, then the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court may be maintained irrespective of citizenship.

The Circuit Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction of this suit on the ground of diversity of citizenship, not only because that fact existed in respect of complainant and defendants, but because the suit was ancillary to those in which the receiver was appointed. When an action or suit is commenced by a receiver, appointed by a Circuit Court, to accomplish the ends sought and directed by the suit in which the appointment was made, such action or suit is regarded as ancillary so far as the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as a court of the United States is concerned; and we have repeatedly held that jurisdiction of these subordinate actions or suits is to be attributed to the jurisdiction on which the main suit rested; and hence that where jurisdiction of the main suit is predicated on diversity of citizenship, and the decree therein is, therefore, made final in the Circuit Court of Appeals, the judgments and decrees in the ancillary litigation are also final. Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47; Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 643; Carey v. Houston & Texas Railway Co., 161 U. S. 115. It is true that Rouse v. Letcher and Gregory v. Van Ee were proceedings on intervention, but Carey v. Houston & Texas Railway Co. arose on an original bill in the nature of a bill of review. In that case we took occasion to quote from the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company, 2 Wall. 609, in which the distinction is pointed out between supplemental and ancillary, and independent and original, proceedings, in the sense of the rules of equity pleading, and such proceedings "in the sense which this court has sanctioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of the Federal courts from that of the state courts." Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276; Pacific Railroad v. Missouri Pacific Railway, 111 U. S. 505, and other cases were cited; the bill held to be ancillary to the suit the decree in which was attacked; and the rule laid down in Rouse v. Letcher and Gregory v. Van Ee applied.

The suits in which this receiver was appointed were in the

VOL. CLXXIII-37

Opinion of the Court.

nature of creditors' bills alleging an indebtedness due from the Atlantic Company; the insolvency of that company; that certain corporations had in their possession assets of the Atlantic Company; and praying for the appointment of a receiver; the marshalling of assets; the winding up of the Atlantic Company, and the application of its assets to the payment of its debts. The only ground of Federal jurisdiction set up in the bills was diversity of citizenship, and if the decrees therein had been passed on by the Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision of that court would have been final under the statute. And as this suit was in effect merely in collection of alleged assets of the Atlantic Company, it must be regarded as auxiliary, and the same finality attaches to the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, therein.

And this is true although another ground of jurisdiction might be developed in the course of the proceedings, as it must appear at the outset that the suit is one of that character of which the Circuit Court could properly take cognizance at the time its jurisdiction is invoked. Colorado Central Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 138; In re Jones, 164 U. S. 691, 693; Third St. & Suburban Railway Co. v. Lewis, ante, 456.

Some further observations may be usefully added, although what has been said necessarily disposes of the motion.

The receiver based his right of recovery on the alleged seizure by one of the defendant companies of certain rights of way, and grading done thereon by the Atlantic Company under two specified contracts, which seizure and appropriation were alleged to have been fraudulently and forcibly made; and it was averred that appellee, the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railroad Company, acquired title thereto and possession thereof through its consolidation with another of the defendant companies, which had acquired its title and possession through the foreclosure of a mortgage given by the company which had made the seizure. The bill nowhere asserted a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States, but proceeded on common law rights of action. We cannot accept the suggestion that the mere order of a Federal

Opinion of the Court.

court, sitting in chancery, appointing a receiver on a creditor's bill, not only enables the receiver to invoke Federal jurisdiction, but to do this independently of the ground of jurisdiction of the suit in which the order was entered, and thereby affect the finality of decrees in the Circuit Court of Appeals in proceedings taken by him. The validity of the order of appointment of the receiver in this instance depended on the jurisdiction of the court that entered it, and that jurisdiction, as we have seen, depended exclusively upon the diverse citizenship of the parties to the suits in which the appointment was made. The order, as such, created no liability against defendants, nor did it tend in any degree to establish the receiver's right to a money decree, nor to any other remedy prayed for in the amended bill. The liability of defendants arose under general law, and was neither created nor arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

· In Bausman v. Dixon, 173 U. S. 113, we have ruled that a judgment against a receiver appointed by a Circuit Court of the United States, rendered in due course in a state court, does not per se involve the denial of the validity of an authority exercised under the United States, or of a right or immunity specially set up and claimed under a statute of the United States. That was an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of the receiver's negligence in operating a railroad company of the State of Washington, though the receiver was the officer of the Circuit Court, and we said: "It is true that the receiver was an officer of the Circuit Court, but the validity of his authority as such was not drawn in question, and there was no suggestion in the pleadings, or during the trial, or, so far as appears, in the state Supreme Court, that any right the receiver possessed as receiver was contested, although on the merits the employment of plaintiff was denied, and defendant contended that plaintiff had assumed the risk which resulted in the injury, and had also been guilty of contributory negligence. The mere order of the Circuit Court appointing a receiver did not create a Federal question under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, and the receiver did not set up any right derived