Opinion of the Court.

In Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, 113 U. S. 205, 208, it was held that a statute of California authorizing a bridge without a draw or opening for the passage of vessels to be constructed over a navigable water of the United States within that State was not in the absence of legislation by Congress to be deemed repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution. The court, referring to prior cases, said: "In these cases the control of Congress over navigable waters within the States so as to preserve their free navigation under the commercial clause of the Constitution, the power of the States within which they lie to authorize the construction of bridges over them until Congress intervenes and supersedes their authority, and the right of private parties to interfere with their construction or continuance, have been fully considered, and we are entirely satisfied with the soundness of the conclusions reached. They recognize the full power of the States to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, which embraces among other things the construction, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges, and the establishment of ferries; that the States are more likely to appreciate the importance of these means of internal communication and to provide for their proper management, than a government at a distance; and that, as to bridges over navigable streams, their power is subordinate to that of Congress, as an act of the latter body is, by the Constitution, made the supreme law of the land; but that until Congress acts on the subject their power is plenary. When Congress acts directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the State, its will must control so far as may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams." The doctrines of this case were reaffirmed in Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543.

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 662, the question was presented whether a state enactment requiring telegraph companies with lines of wires wholly or partly within the State to receive telegrams and on payment of the charges thereon to deliver them with due diligence, was not a regulation of interstate commerce when applied to interstate telegrams. We held that such enactments did not in any

Opinion of the Court.

just sense regulate interstate commerce. It was said in that case: "While it is vitally important that commerce between the States should be unembarrassed by vexatious state regulations regarding it, yet on the other hand there are many occasions where the police power of the State can be properly exercised to insure a faithful and prompt performance of.duty within the limits of the State upon the part of those who are engaged in interstate commerce. We think the statute in question is one of that class, and in the absence of any legis lation by Congress, the statute is a valid exercise of the power of the State over the subject."

So, in Richmond & Alleghany Railroad v. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311, 315, it was adjudged that a statute of Virginia defining the obligations of carriers who accepted for transportation anything directed to points of destination beyond the termini of their own lines or routes, was not, in its application to interstate business, a regulation of interstate commerce within the meaning of the Constitution. This court said: "Of course, in a latitudinarian sense any restriction as to the evidence of a contract, relating to interstate commerce, may be said to be a limitation on the contract itself. But this remote effect, resulting from the lawful exercise by a State of its power to determine the form in which contracts may be proven, does not amount to a regulation of interstate commerce." And the court cited in support of its conclusion the case of Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 137, which involved the validity of state regulations as to the liability of carriers of passengers, and in which it was said: "They are not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, although they control in some degree the conduct and liability of those engaged in such commerce. So long as Congress has not legislated upon the particular subject, they are rather to be regarded as legislation in aid of such commerce, and as a rightful exercise of the police power of the State to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits."

Now, it is evident that these cases had no reference to the health, morals or safety of the people of the State, but only

Opinion of the Court.

to the public convenience. They recognized the fundamental principle that outside of the field directly occupied by the General Government under the powers granted to it by the Constitution, all questions arising within a State that relate to its internal order, or that involve the public convenience or the general good, are primarily for the determination of the State, and that its legislative enactments relating to those subjects, and which are not inconsistent with the state constitution, are to be respected and enforced in the courts of the Union if they do not by their operation directly entrench upon the authority of the United States or violate some right protected by the National Constitution. The power here referred to is to use the words of Chief Justice Shaw - the power "to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth and of the subjects of the same." Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cushing, 53, 85. Mr. Cooley well said: "It cannot be doubted that there is ample power in the legislative department of the State to adopt all necessary legislation for the purpose of enforcing the obligations of railway companies as carriers of persons and goods to accommodate the public. impartially, and to make every reasonable provision for carrying with safety and expedition." Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th ed.) p. 715. It may be that such legislation is not within the "police power" of a State, as those words have been sometimes, although inaccurately, used. But in our opinion the power, whether called police, governmental or legislative, exists in each State, by appropriate enactments not forbidden by its own con titution or by the Constitution of the United States, to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its jurisdiction, and therefore to provide for the public convenience and the public good. This power in the States is entirely distinct from any power granted to the General Government, although when exercised it may sometimes reach subjec's over which national legislation can be constitutionally extended. When Congress acts with ref

Opinion of the Court.

erence to a matter confided to it by the Constitution, then its statutes displace all conflicting local regulations touching that matter, although such regulations may have been established in pursuance of a power not surrendered by the States to the General Government. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626.

It is not contended that the statute in question is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States when applied to railroad trains carrying passengers between points within the State of Ohio. But the contention is that to require railroad companies, even those organized under the laws of Ohio, to stop their trains or any of them carrying interstate passengers at a particular place or places in the State for a reasonable time, so directly affects commerce among the States as to bring the statute, whether Congress has acted or not on the same subject, into conflict with the grant in the Constitution of power to regulate such commerce. That such a regulation may be in itself reasonable and may promote the public convenience or subserve the general welfare is, according to the argument made before us, of no consequence whatever; for, it is said, a state regulation which to any extent or for a limited time only interrupts the absolute, continuous freedom of interstate commerce is forbidden by the Constitution, although Congress has not legislated upon the particular subject covered by the state enactment. If these broad propositions are approved, it will be difficult to sustain the numerous judgments of this court upholding local regulations which in some degree or only incidentally affected commerce among the States, but which were adjudged not to be in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, but within the police powers of the States and to be respected so long as Congress did not itself cover the subject by legislation. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 320; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 104; Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455, 463; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Nashville, Chattanooga &c. Railway v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 100; Hennington v. Georgia, above cited; Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway v. Haber, above cited; and N. Y.,

Opinion of the Court.

N. H. & Hartford Railroad v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 631, 632, were all cases involving state regulations more or less affecting interstate or foreign commerce, but which were sustained upon the ground that they were not directed against nor were direct burdens upon interstate or foreign commerce; and having been enacted only to protect the public safety, the public health or the public morals, and having a real, substantial relation to the public ends intended to be accomplished thereby, were not to be deemed absolutely forbidden because of the mere grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, but to be regarded as only incidentally affecting such commerce and valid until superseded by legislation of Congress on the same subject.

In the case last cited- N. Y., N. H. & Hartford Railroad v. New York- the question was as to the validity, when applied to interstate railroad trains, of a statute of New York forbidding the heating of passenger cars in a particular mode. This court said: "According to numerous decisions of this court sustaining the validity of state regulations enacted under the police powers of the State, and which incidentally affected commerce among the States and with foreign nations, it was clearly competent for the State of New York, in the absence of national legislation covering the subject, to forbid under penalties the heating of passengers cars in that State by stoves or furnaces kept inside the cars or suspended therefrom, although such cars may be employed in interstate commerce. While the laws of the States must yield to acts of Congress passed in execution of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States did not, of itself and without legislation by Congress, impair the authority of the States to establish such reasonable regulations as were appropriate for the protection of the health, the lives and the safety of their people. The statute in question had for its object to protect all persons travelling in the State of New York on passenger cars moved by the agency of steam against the perils attending a particular mode of heating such cars.