deterrent, and most of the modification program in fact is directly or closely associated with integrating cruise missiles on the B-52's. Again, these modifications, to some very substantial extent, repay themselves in downstream support savings.

This is a format that we will use for each of the programs. I might spend just a moment on the format.

This is a pictorial depiction of the weapon ssytem here. Across the top we have the research and development line and below that the procurement line-in this case, modifications primarily. We will show fiscal year 1982 and prior years in the first column, fiscal year 1983 in this next column.

These numbers then are $91 million for research and development, and $528 million for modification and procurement in fiscal year 1983, the one we are now in.

The request for 1984 is highlighted in yellow. That is $86.9 million for RDT&E and $607 million in procurement.

Then the next column will show the request for authorization for fiscal year 1985: $42 million for RDT&E; $732 million in procurement. This continues on for some number of years as the B-52 G's and the H's are converted to cruise missile carriers.

Then to look at the 1984 request specifically, on the procurement side, on the righthand side, it is $607 million. It is broken down into Class IV modifications-those for reliability, maintainability purposes-$135 million, and Class V modifications which are performance improvements-primarily the improvement to the defensive avionics. and to the cruise missile carriage at $471.5 million.

The research and development request is $86.9 million and that is in support of both the Class IV and Class V modification programs. These are the largest RDT&E projects groups here to improve primarily strategic radar reliability, the autopilot, the softwave updates at $10.2 million, some work on nuclear hardness to make some improvements there and the integration of the Harpoon missile onto the B-52which is an adaptation of an already proven Navy development, and in procurement by the Navy.

We have had, I might say, out of three tries, three successful firings of the Harpoon from the B-52 against a surface ship target. Those were very interesting operational tests in that the airborne warning and control system-the AWACS-provided the targeting of the target ship and location and direction of the B-52 and brought the B-52 into proximity of this target ship ranging from 30 to 60 miles away and the Harpoon was released from the wing of the B-52, flew to the target and all test objectives were met. The details of the test we can provide to you, if you are interested.

I think the next slide breaks out the content of the modification procurement program. It is a very important program to us. The offensive avionics is the largest group. That is again improving the capability of the avionics which was built into the airplane roughly 25 years ago. The internal cruise missile carriage, $145 million. The strategic radar upgrade at $65.5 million and then the external cruise missile, again $65 million.

We also are putting in the ALQ-172, our electronic countermeasures set, into the B-52H model starting at $54.3 million. This particular electronic countermeasure is bringing modern digital equipment into

the B-52.

The ECM is key to specific understandings of the mission of the B52, as currently envisioned, and to specific threat requirements, as that. threat increases on the Soviet side.

The environmental system is being

Senator WARNER. Let me interrupt.

In other words, that is still contemplating a full-scale penetration mission?

General WELCH. This particular electronic countermeasure is key to the mission envisioned for the B-52 in the future. In that case, you will see that that is heavily oriented toward cruise missile carriage. Senator WARNER. Standoff mission? I am trying to differentiate between the standoff mission and penetration.

General WELCH. I think that is an important distinction. For those aircraft that have cruise missiles external, and I don't want to be ironclad about this because the commander at the time will make those decisions, but the general notion is that those cruise missiles will be launched from outside of the peripheral defenses.

Then they are cleaned up and either launch cruise missiles carried internally, if that is the case, or if they have internal weapons to penetrate into the Soviet Union.

One of the common misconceptions is that you come up to the border of the country and suddenly there is a big wall of defenses there. It is not that way at all. There are some parts of the Soviet Union that are more heavily defended, some that are less heavily defended.

As time goes on, what we find is that our more capable aircraft are then reserved for the more demanding penetration mission and the less capable aircraft are able to fortunately take care of the less demanding

cases.

So, over a period of time, as years go by, we will find that the most capable aircraft will go into the most demanding missions. So, right now we would have FB-111's which don't have a great deal of payload and perhaps don't have quite all the range of the B-52, but fly low and fast and they would go in and get penetration in areas that are not too deep.

The B-52H's go farther. The G and older models will take on the less demanding missions. As we get the B-1B's, we would expect to see the B-1B's take on more demanding tasks, the B-52's falling back and taking on the less demanding tasks and when the advanced technology bomber comes in, there will be a sequence then.

Senator WARNER. We are caught in our own rhetoric around here. I will have to answer this on the floor-we often say that the B-52's are older than the pilots flying them-the justification for the B-1B and the Stealth.

This modification program will accommodate how many aircraft? General WELCH. This program taken altogether will, in fact, modify all of the H's and about 90 of the G models.

Senator WARNER. About 180 aircraft?

General WELCH. Yes, plus lesser modification to the remaining 60 G models. Another 61 will be noncruise missile-carrying G models. Senator WARNER. With the same package?

General WELCH. Except for the cruise missile carriage.

Senator WARNER. That block of aircraft now having a useful "" for what additional period of time?

General WELCH. In rough terms for a decade.

Senator WARNER. You would not be investing this money if the other components of the aircraft were in such condition that they could go into that decade.

General WELCH. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. We will not be confronted with another major modification package of the size comparable to this for this block?

General WELCH. Not for the decade. You may remember when we went through the work preparatory to the President's strategic modernization program, considering what we should do in regard to the B-1B's, the Stealth, and B-52's, we looked at the case of what would you have to do to keep the B-52's in the inventory for two decades, to the turn of the century.

We found that in order to do that, really quite substantial modifications in addition to these shown here were necessary.

For example, new engine, structural modification. One would have to take all the wires out and put all new wires back in. That program taken together was more expensive than to modernize with more capable aircraft.

So, if you have them much beyond the decade, I think you would incur substantial additional cost.

Senator WARNER. What is likely to be our figure next year for this program?

General WELCH. It will be of comparable size.

Senator WARNER. A flat line around $600 million here?

General WELCH. Perhaps a bit larger. We have 732.1 in 1985 as our estimate at the present time. That will continue for the next several years at about that level.

Senator WARNER. Three-quarters of a billion dollars?

General WELCH. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Would you touch on the environmental? I interrupted you.

General WELCH. This environmental control system is a fancy name, if you will forgive me, for the cooling air that keeps the electronics cool and comfortable and reliable and working.

Those environmental control systems are as fancy as the electronics. They are absolutely essential to keep the program working.

You will notice we are requesting $15.4 million in procurement for Harpoon in fiscal year 1984. Then, there are a number of other modifications, primarily associated with, in this case, correcting of aging problems of a minor sort, there are a large number of things that break and have to be replaced, adding up to $55.4 million. The $55.4 plus the strategic radar, $65.5 million, and some of the environmental control systems add up to all of the Class IV modifications which you can really attribute to correcting the aging systems.

B-1B

Multi-role strategic bomber: Flexible, capable, available (IOC 1986).

This is the introduction for the B-1B program. I am not going to dwell on this, but simply give you overview data. We have General Thurman here to tell you about that program.

I want to emphasize, though, that the B-1B is a multirole strategic bomber. That was our proposal. That was confirmed by Congress in public law and I think that is a very, very important matter.

It is a flexible airplane and we can do a number of missions-do them all well. It is capable of doing those missions. We have a program coming along very, very nicely to provide us with initial operating capability of one squadron in 1986.

This is the standard format slide to give you an overview of the budgetary aspects of the program where we have listed the research and development on the top line, the weapons system procurement on the second line, and then the quantities requested for authorization and the delivery schedule which then comes a few years after the authorization.

In 1983, the Congress provided us in research and development $753.5 million and in procurement $3,868.1 million. In fiscal year 1984, we are requesting $750 million in research and development and $5.628.8 million in procurement.

We are requesting authorization for 10 aircraft and, as you know, sir, from the letter we sent to the Congress last month we are also requesting a multiyear procurement starting in fiscal year 1984.

You will notice, just to make sure there is no confusion, that this is a program for a hundred aircraft. The then year total is $23.723 billion in procurement and another $3.123 billion in research and develop

ment.

You may remember that that program when factored to 1981 dollars is within the $20.5 million contract between the President and the Congress for bringing this program in.