Admiral HOLLAND. No, the extremely low frequency system is being installed now and going forward in a limited deployment in Michigan. Senator GOLDWATER. How about high frequency VHF? Do you use both of those on submarines? Admiral HOLLAND. We use high frequency, sir, but that is a standard Navy antenna system or standard Navy communication system and it is not dedicated to strategic services alone. There are no particular problems in that particular area. Senator GOLDWATER. What happened to the idea that you studied for a while of using communications with satellites to reflect back down to command? Admiral HOLLAND. You mean satellite communications? Yes, we have that ability now and in the improved system. Senator GOLDWATER. Are you running into the same problems with the other services and everybody who communicates? You buy a piece of equipment today and it is no good tomorrow, is that about the truth? Admiral HOLLAND. I am not competent to make that judgment. It is not my experience, anyway. Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you. I will discuss that later with another witness. Admiral HOLLAND. All right. Senator JACKSON. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to ask about the accuracy of the D-5, which has an IOC of 1989, as I understand. This gets involved in the MX issue as one of the possible supplemental factors with the MX, in a land-based version of it. First of all, what is the accuracy of our missile speaking in operational terms of the fleet? Senator WARNER. We will go into executive session and the question can be answered at that time. [Whereupon, at 8:23 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in executive Session.] EXECUTIVE SESSION Senator WARNER. We are now in executive session, Admiral Holland, so could you please respond to Senator Jackson's question. Admiral HOLLAND. To answer your question, the present Circular Error Probable [CEP] for C-4 missile is [deleted] feet at 4,000 miles. Our design goal for the D-5 will be to have [deleted] feet at 4,000 miles. We expect to improve that [deleted] feet in the succeeding 2 or 3 years and I would defer beyond that to Admiral Clark for technical details. Senator JACKSON. That is a substantial improvement, starting with the original missiles for the fleet. That is [deleted] feet? Admiral HOLLAND. It is not quite what we set out as the design criteria for C-4 when we started to build it. [Deleted] feet was what we tarted up with. Senator JACKSON. And you ended up with [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. Yes. Senator JACKSON. Let me see, we are talking about a yield on those missiles, of what, of [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. No, sir, the D-5 will deploy— Senator JACKSON. No, I mean the C-4. Senator JACKSON. And then the C-5, or the D-5? Senator JACKSON. So that will give you a hard target capability? Senator JACKSON. That will give you a hard target capability? Senator JACKSON. Let me ask you, on cruise missiles, the move now is for a Stealth characteristic to follow ultimately. There is some Stealth characteristics in the original Alcum, but if we are doing that in connection with the air-launch cruise missile, why aren't we doing it on the SLCM's, or the Tomahawk? Admiral HOSTETTLER. I haven't a good answer for you. I think it is a combination of things. First of all, the data would indicate that versus current systems the Tomahawk is an extremely survivable weapon so we are talking at some point out in the future. First, the ALCM mission is somewhat different than the Tomahawk mission. The targets, strategic targets for the ALCM on the initial salvoes are going to be difficult ones. It would seem that the Air Force would have a much more stringent requirement for survivability against those initial targets than would Tomahawk even today. Tomahawk is a strategic reserve weapon and will not be targeted necesarily against those prime targets and if so, I asume they would be in a followup mode or a backup mode. Therefore, the survivability requirements of the ALCM are significantly different. Senator JACKSON. I understand one is primarily a nonstrategic operation, that is the Tomahawk, but on the GLCM's, on the groundlaunch cruise missile, are we not moving again for the Stealth characteristics? This is a system that you do not know how long will remain survivable either. Admiral HOSTETTLER. Of course, in the case of the GLCM, the survivability of the platform, while not as good as we would have from a submarine launch or a diverse set of surface ships, nonetheless is reasonably survivable. As you know, we deploy from those bases on very short notice, [deleted]. You have a flight going into the field and once in the field we can set up [deleted]. A recent 30-day training exercise at Fort Lewis, Wash., indicated that once deployed, GLCM sites could not be seen by either satellite or TACRECE. During this exercise we moved these units about every 3 days. We have a firm, survivable site based on what we know now. DETECTING OUR SUBMARINES Senator JACKSON. Well, I have one other question, Mr. Chairman. The advantage of our submarine launch missile effort has been survivability. We hear that the Soviets are making greater and greater progress in being able to locate our subs and to be able to follow them, maybe not in a precise way, but they have really concentrated heavily in developing a system or systems of detection. Am I right in that? Admiral HOLLAND. They are working very, very hard on that. We do not believe that they are particularly successful at it, and we have no instances or evidence that they are particularly successful. I think the Chief of Naval Operations has put it very succinctly before the Appropriations Committee when he said the oceans are growing more opaque and not less opaque as we learn more about them. We are learning how to build submarines that are quieter than any of their predecessors. The quietest submarine in the world is a Trident submarine. It is very, very difficult to find. Senator JACKSON. How are the relative rates? They are turning out subs with a quieter performance? Admiral HOLLAND. Than they previously have. Senator JACKSON. It is all relative? Admiral HOLLAND. Yes, but we are still ahead. Senator JACKSON. We are substantially ahead or where are we? Admiral KELSO. You are speaking from an acoustics standpoint. We have, Senator, started out in a favorable position from acoustics. Acoustics means you have to have ability to hear with sonar and you have to have a quiet submarine. We have continually improved the submarines that we have built from the standpoint of quietness and we continue to improve the sonar. Our submarines today have gotten to the point of quietness that our submarines are not a very good adversary to find and locate, particularly in large ocean areas, as are other submarines because they are simply so quiet. The sonar is not able to overcome it. The U.S.S. Ohio, for example, is probably the quietest submarine we have ever built and probably the quietest submarine in the world. Even with our sonar technology, we can only detect one of our submarines at [deleted] yards. If you take from a vast ocean that you can operate a submarine like that in, [deleted]. We similarly have a difficult job to locate our own submarines, even with our sophisticated ASW capability. This is true particularly when you consider a submarine where the primary job is to stay out of the way and not be detected. So, from the standpoint of ocean search, which is basically what you have to do to put the SSBN force at risk, [deleted]. Acoustics is an interesting area and there is a lot of work going on in nonacoustics. In our SSBN security program we look at the technologies that could come forward in the future and not just those of us in blue suits, but we ask some of the finest scientists in the country to look at those technologies. What people generally forget, when they think about a technology, is that just because you have a technology doesn't mean you are able to kill submarines. The equation includes technology, the ocean environment, resources to do it and the ability to execute it, which involves both communications and your ability to make a kill. Knowing most of those technologies and the scientists whom I know that know those technologies, we do not believe that there is an "o called big breakthrough on the horizon. There may be improvements in tactical ASW, but they are going to still require huge resources to ever make ASW capable. When you talk about 40 million square miles of ocean area where we can operate with missiles like the Trident I (C-4) and the Trident II (D-5), that is a very, very major proposition for anybody to have the forces to ever do that. Certainly we don't have those kind of forces today to do that. You certainly would be able to see anyone building those kind of forces because these are in the order of magnitude of hundreds beyond what they have today. So, there may be a technology that improves ASW, but not one that is going to make the oceans transparent. I don't know anyone who sees that. Senator JACKSON. With the increase in range, obviously, for your missile systems, you have a greater playpen in which to operate? Admiral KELSO. It is very important. Senator JACKSON. Which is a part of the most effective defense deception. What I was wondering is, do we really know [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. They would have [deleted] for us to know. We work very hard to create situations to give us [deleted], Senator, and we [deleted]. It is sort of like deterrence. Does deterrence work? We haven't had World War III so apparently it has, but we have not been able to find in an open ocean kind of a situation, [deleted]. The number of resources that the Soviets would have to devote [deleted] would be enormous. It really would be, even if they had the capability. As a member of our own submarine forces assigned the job to in fact do what you told me you want to find out, if the Soviets do, I found it was impossible to do. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. I guess my concern is whether they are in fact [deleted]. Admiral KELSO. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. And you verify it? Admiral KELSO. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. Now, let us look at it the other way. How effective have we been with the improvements the Soviets are making [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. We have to go above the level that we are cleared to go here. SUBMARINE FORCE CAPABILITY Senator JACKSON. That is something that I think. Mr. Chairman, that we should take a hard look at because the capability of our submarine force is a big part of the strategic debate. I think that is a matter that I would like to get into. Admiral KELSO. I can answer it to a certain degree, in the way of what you have to do to make a capability, to have that happen. Senator JACKSON. Let us ask without any classification, but not getting into methods, that is what you are concerned about. Do you have a mid degree or medium degree of confidence [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. Are we going to go to the open ocean [deleted]. Senator JACKSON. I am assuming that you have the necessary information from the two big choke points, out of Vladivostok? Admiral HOLLAND. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. I am assuming that [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. Let me suppose [deleted] because we happen to ave some assets of some kind already there. But there would be deleted]. Senator JACKSON. Once they break loose? Admiral HOLLAND. Unless they [deleted]. ¡Deleted.] Admiral KELSO. Let me approach your question and turn the tables nother way, and maybe I can answer for you. As I think you are aware, [deleted]. The ability [deleted]. You must ave [deleted]. If you run the simplest kind of operational research one will find ings, if you don't have a significant advantage, [deleted]. Now, for him [deleted]. So, I think from a technological standpoint [deleted]. Senator JACKSON. How much of a lag is there in these areas [deleted]. Admiral KELSO. If you plot what they are doing, you can certainly they are improving. I would say you are talking about in the [deed] range is the best that they can do to reach the same sort of thing. You have to, I think, assume probably longer than that, but you ave to assume [deleted]. They are going to get there someday, but even if they get there, our ASW capability might not be very good, [deleted]. Senator JACKSON. [Deleted.] Is that a fair statement? Admiral HOLLAND. That is a fair statement. Admiral KELSO. I think they will do as much as we do, because they do have some advantages, but I think that is a fair statement. Senator WARNER. [Deleted.] Second, [deleted]. Admiral KELSO. From the standpoint of a big open ocean, I would 1gree. I can't say [deleted]. Senator WARNER. [Deleted.] Admiral KELSO. I don't have a crystal ball to tell you, with certainty, t my assessment is that based on the studies we do on that, I think hat is right. [Deleted.] Senator COHEN. How would you know whether they would have a Peakthrough or not in ASW technology? Admiral HOLLAND. Implicit in these questions is the idea that someow they are going to know something that we don't know and there 3some technological lead that they can gain that we will not gain. Senator COHEN. Or that they can have access to it by penetrating? Admiral HOLLAND. Let us presume that the technology lead-follow as a 3- to 5-year lag, no matter who is ahead. We have demonated with bombs they will follow us by [deleted] so I think it is fair to make the same general conclusion in technological areas such as ASW. |