ballistic missile (SLBM) designed to utilize the entire volume of the Ohio class launch tube. Although the final weapon system configuration for the new missile. the Trident II (D-5), will not be selected until later this fiscal year, it will have considerably more payload than the Trident I (C-4) missile, a major improvement in accuracy over the C-4, and a full-load range comparable to or greater than the C-4. This program will lead to a late 1989 IOC, and, for the first time, provide the United States with a survivable strategic missile system which cannot be targeted by enemy missiles and that is effective across the entire target spectrum. The ninth and all subsequent Trident submarines will be delivered with the D-5 missile system. We will then refit the first eight with the new system during their first regularly scheduled overhauls in the 1990's.

Last spring, the Navy studied the feasibility of advancing the IOC of the D-5 missile. It was found that a one year acceleration was technically feasible, but with slight degradation in performance at IOC. Any greater acceleration would have resulted in an unacceptable degradation in missile performance. It was decided not to accelerate but to continue with the 1989 IOC because the additional near-term cost for the one year acceleration was not commensurate with the improvement in military capability that would be achieved. At this late time in system development it is no longer technically feasible to accelerate the missile IOC.

The Trident program that is before the Congress reflects President Reagan's strategic modernization program announced in October 1981. It reflects the D-5 deployment in 1989 and continuation of building one Trident submarine per year. Although the building rate could be increased, with the long lead times involved we would not be able to realize the results of any increased building rate until 1992 or 1993. Unless there are overriding considerations of national importance with regard to force levels and capabilities, we think continuation at the rate of one year is adequate and prudent.

We plan to retire the 31 Poseidon hulls after they reach a nominal life of 30 years. The first will retire in FY 1993; the last in FY 1999. By the end of the century we plan to have an all Trident D-5 force of about 20 submarines; a force significantly more capable than that existing now or that will exist in the early 1990s. The ultimate size of the SLMB force depends on a wide range of factors: The overall mix between land-based missiles, bombers and cruise missiles is a major one. Of course, U.S. strategy and objectives, the threat, the character of the enemy target system, nature and effectiveness of other U.S. srategic forces and arms control considerations are also important considerations which could influence this plan. All are being constantly evaluated by the Secretary of Defense and the joint chiefs of staff.

When I testified before this subcommittee on 18 March, I discussed at some length why it is so necessary to maintain the invulnerability of our sea-based deterrent. We have all witnessed the importance of survivability in our continuing search for a survivable basing mode for ICBMs. Survivable nuclear forces significantly enhance crisis stability, allow reduced force levels without compromising national security, ease the achievement of long-term arms reductions, provide confidence to ourselves in the effectiveness of our deterrent and make our strategic policy and doctrine credible to potential enemies. We are confident that the Navy's program with its super quiet Trident submarine and long-range missile will continue to provide this invulnerable element over the life of the system.

The President's modernization program announced the deployment of Tomahawk nuclear land attack cruise missiles beginning in 1984. These missiles will be deployed on a large number of ships and submarines. This wide distribution of naval offensive strike power will enhance U.S. naval worldwide nuclear force deterrent capability by increasing the number of Soviet pact targets put at risk and introducing another major element of uncertainty into the Soviet military planner's calculus. As specified in President Reagan's strategic modernization program, given the TLAM/N's great survivability and endurance, they will become a major contributor to our nuclear reserve forces.

Subsequent to an intensive program review (completed in November 1982), significant funding shortfalls and technical problems were identified that required a restructuring of the Tomahawk program. These necessary programı changes were structured so as not to impact the schedule of the nuclear Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM/N). Approval of the TLAM/N for full production requires certification of the TLAM/N missile itself, the theater mission

planning system (TMPS), and the ship/submarine platforms on which it will be eployed. This effort is currently ongoing and will continue into 1984 in suport of the 1984 initial operational capability for both the submarine and surace platforms. Also in support of the effort, the following major events either Lave or will occur:

Tomahawk weapon system performance base line frozen-October 1982.
Theater mission planning system certified-spring 1983.
Submarine/ship operational evaluation-summer/fall 1983.

Production of missions in support of operational deployments-1983 and on.
In summary, the Navy's Tomahawk nuclear land attack effort remains on
schedule in full support of the President's program for nuclear land attack cruise
missiles.

The Navy heartily endorses the top priority given to improvement of command, Control and communications in the President's modernization program. Our guidng principle in C modernization is to insure that the SLBM force is responsive to the needs of the national command authority. Vice Admiral Gordon Nagler, The Director, Command and Control for the Navy, will appear before this subCommittee to discuss C in greater detail.

The Navy believes that our strategic program represents the proper balance between the needs of our strategic forces and those of the general purpose forces. Although we do not feel it necessary or desirable, the program could be expanded. It is important to realize, however, that the results of such an expansion or aceleration would not be felt until the early 1990s. We are confident that the Trident II 1-5 missile can be produced on time and will achieve the desired performance. When matched with the highly capable Trident submarine and improvements in C, the SLBM force will provide the cornerstone of our strategic deterrent well into the next century.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. FRANK B. KELSO, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SUBMARINE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral KELSO. It is a pleasure to appear before this committee. I would like to add that the third ship of the Trident class, the Florida, has just completed her second set of builder's trials and they have been very successful.

Following on after her sister ships, the U.S.S. Ohio and the U.S.S. Michigan, that ship is due to be delivered this summer, in June. It is possible she might deliver a little earlier, so the shipbuilding program las vastly changed in the last couple of years. It looks like the Trident hips are going to be delivered pretty much on the schedule that we now have, sir.

We have essentially completed the backfit of 12 Poseidon class ships with a Trident I or C-4 missile. The last ship will deploy in the early spring of this year after her training. So that program is essentially complete. We only intend to backfit 12 of those ships with the longer range C-4 missile.

Also, I would like to say that from a standpoint of survivability, the Navy strongly believes that the force is survivable today. We don't e anything on the horizon that would tell us we can't learn to operte the submarines correctly to maintain that survivability as far as Te can see in the future. So, we believe strongly that this is a survivable. force and we can sustain its survivability. That, sir, is my short state

Tent.

Senator COHEN. It may be survivable at sea, but what are you doing about protecting the Electric Boat yard?

Admiral KELSO. Senator, Electric Boat has upgraded her security forces significantly since their last case of intrusion by protestors. We are looking throughout the Navy shipyard organizations to see what we can do to strengthen the security of all of those organizations.

Senator COHEN. What we saw last year was a situation where there was relatively little or incomplete security in most of our yards. Admiral KELSO. Yes.

Senator COHEN. We had some nuns paddling a canoe to the yard and on last night's television show we saw that terrorists can be a little more sophisticated. When you have a group of nuns paddling in and putting a mine in one of those ships, it is not that survivable.

Admiral KELSO. Well, we agree. Through our studies we try to improve the security in all of those yards. In Electric Boat specifically there has been a fence put in and patrols have been established on the waterfront that were not there before.

We have had two occasions in recent times in Electric Boat where unauthorized people have gotten into the shipyard.

In the first one they were not detected for some time and the second time I think they were all detected within about 15 minutes and apprehended at the time they entered the yard.

The guard force at Electric Boat has been stepped up by 20 or 30 additional people since that time and we have put an additional watch on the ships topside before they are turned over to the Navy.

Gates have been put on the shins' brows and there is a check system where you can only get on by knowing how to get in. We have put various materials around the stern of the ships so that they cannot be boarded nearly as easily in the water.

So, we have taken significant steps at Electric Boat to try to improve security. I think that you are talking about an area that probably requires a lot of upgrading if we are going to be able to have good security throughout our military installations where you have large perimeters, to prevent anyone from coming in.

Senator COHEN. I am not saying it is entirely possible. I think it is academic.

Admiral KELSO. It is an issue that we are studying how to do better. We are looking at the use of dogs, which they are now using on the weekends, and we are looking at movement devices to detect movement to see if they are practical to use. It turns out that you run into a lot of false alarms with them, particularly where you have lengths of fencing where there is wildlife. We are studying how to improve our security.

Senator COHEN. I think these are the types of demonstrations that are going to intensify and increase in the coming months.

Admiral KELSO. Yes.

Senator GOLDWATER. Could I ask a question on that just for my information?

How do you share the responsibility of security with the manufacturers? Is that totally a Navy job?

Admiral KELSO. No, sir, it is a shared responsibility with primary reliance on the shipbuilder's security before the ship is delivered to the Navy. He owns the ship and he is responsible for the security, and within the contract there is a stipulation that he has responsibility

for the security. Like anything else, it is dependent upon how the contract is interpreted.

I think now the contracts are going to be strengthened to improve that. He gets paid for what security he provides and that has to be perhaps better spelled out in the future. Once the ship is delivered to the Navy, then it becomes strictly the Navy's responsibility.

Senator JACKSON. Just on the point that Senator Cohen raised, what about the operating bases? Specifically you know what I am talking about, like Bangor. We went through it this last summer right in the middle of my election.

Admiral KELSO. Bangor is a particularly difficult place to secure since it has a large perimeter, both waterfront and fence, Senator. We are looking at putting some additional fencing in at Bangor, and we are looking at waterfront patrols.

Senator JACKSON. I think specifically the waterfront.

Admiral KELSO. We are running waterfront patrols now and we are patrolling the perimeters of the base better than we have in the past. I just saw a report from the commander, Submarine Force Pacific, where he talked about the fact that he had changed the way it was done to strengthen security in that area.

I am not telling you that I think it is perfect by any stretch of the imagination, but I do believe that we are working to improve the security out there. We will continue to look for ways to preclude intruders from getting into the base.

We had, I guess, about 2 months ago, three nuns getting in the base over the perimeter fence and they were apprehended very soon after they got into the base. That is a big base with a lot of people there and we are going to continually work on security, sir.

The industrial facility is separated from the rest of the base. Getting on the base is one thing, but to get into the industrial area, where the ships are, is different.

Senator JACKSON. As you know, that is a very active area out there. It is constant and you never know when they are going to strike.

Admiral KELSO. We were worried when the U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Ohio both arrived there within 2 days of each other. We didn't see nearly as many protestors as we saw when the U.S.S. Ohio first arrived in Bangor, possibly because of confusion over the time of arrival. I think people were planning to be active when the U.S.S. Michigan would get there.

Senator GOLDWATER. After delivery of these particular craft, have you ever discovered any acts or indications of acts of sabotage of any kind?

Admiral KELSO. I do not ever remember an act of sabotage on one of our SSBN's, Senator Goldwater. That is my personal memory. I will go back and look and see if I may be wrong and if I am, I will correct that for the record.

Senator GOLDWATER. Has there been anything like intentional shoddy workmanship?

Admiral KELSO. Well, we have had a couple of cases in overhaul where we had some cables that were pierced with pins, but that occurred in overhaul and it was found when we tested the systems so it could e corrected. I guess you could interpret that as sabotage. Referring to

L

an operating ship, I don't remember them having issues of sabotage, nor do I remember anyone being successful in boarding any of the ships.

Senator Warner assumed the chair.] Senator WARNER. Admiral Clark?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. GLEN CLARK, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE

Admiral CLARK. I would briefly amplify on the comments Admiral Holland made about the Trident program. I can report that the progress in the Trident II program is indeed good and we are proceeding on the new schedule of introduction of the weapons systems in the ninth Trident submarine and again progress during the advanced development program, of which this is the last year, has been very good.

We are now planning to start the full-scale engineering development at the beginning of fiscal 1984, in October of this year. Senator WARNER. Admiral Hostettler ?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. S. J. HOSTETTLER, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE

Admiral HOSTETTLER. I have just a brief comment, sir. The nuclear variant of Tomahawk remains the Navy's No. 1 priority in the Tomahawk program. We are proceeding to support the IOC of that variant in both submarines and surface ships in 1984.

We will go through the development test/operational test (DT/OT) test period this year and I look forward to a successful series of tests during this period.

Senator WARNER. We will now go to questions. The Chair intends to remain here throughout the hearings so I will be happy to defer to my colleagues who may have other commitments.

ACCURACY OF D-5

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask about the accuracy of the D-5 which has an IOC of 1989, as I understand.

This gets involved in the MX issue as one of the possible supplemental factors with the MX, in a land-based version of it.

First of all, what is the accuracy of our missile speaking in operational terms of the fleet.

Admiral HOLLAND. We can't go into that in open session. I may be wrong, Senator, I was told we were in open hearing.

Senator WARNER. We are in open session, but we can move to executive unless anyone has a question.

COMMUNICATIONS

Senator GOLDWATER. You touched on communications. Are you still concerned about low frequency communications for submarines and the effect that the different States might have on that project, the States that have denied low frequency antenna structures?