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for the security. Like anything else, it is dependent upon how the contract is interpreted.

I think now the contracts are going to be strengthened to improve that. He gets paid for what security he provides and that has to be perhaps better spelled out in the future. Once the ship is delivered to the Navy, then it becomes strictly the Navy's responsibility:

Senator JACKSON. Just on the point that Senator Cohen raised, what about the operating bases? Specifically you know what I am talking about, like Bangor. We went through it this last summer right in the middle of my election. Admiral Kelso. Bangor is a particularly difficult place to secure since it has a large perimeter, both waterfront and fence, Senator. We are looking at putting some additional fencing in at Bangor, and we are looking at waterfront patrols.

Senator Jackson. I think specifically the waterfront. Admiral KELSO. We are running waterfront patrols now and we are patrolling the perimeters of the base better than we have in the past.

just saw a report from the commander, Submarine Force Pacific, where he talked about the fact that he had changed the way it was done to strengthen security in that area.

I am not telling you that I think it is perfect by any stretch of the imagination, but I do believe that we are working to improve the security out there. We will continue to look for ways to preclude intruders from getting into the base.

We had, I guess, about 2 months ago, three nuns getting in the base over the perimeter fence and they were apprehended very soon after they got into the base. That is a big base with a lot of people there and we are going to continually work on security, sir.

The industrial facility is separated from the rest of the base. Getting on the base is one thing, but to get into the industrial area, where the ships are, is different.

Senator Jackson. As you know, that is a very active area out there. It is constant and you never know when they are going to strike.

Admiral KELSO. We were worried when the U.S.S. Michigan and L.S.S. Ohio both arrived there within 2 days of each other. We didn't see nearly as many protestors as we saw when the U.S.S. Ohio first arrived in Bangor, possibly because of confusion over the time of arrival. I think people were planning to be active when the U.S.S. Michigan would get there.

Senator GOLDWATER. After delivery of these particular craft, have you ever discovered any acts or indications of acts of sabotage of any kind?

Admiral KELSO. I do not ever remember an act of sabotage on one of our SSBN's, Senator Goldwater. That is my personal memory. I will go back and look and see if I may be wrong and if I am, I will correct that for the record.

Senator GOLDWATER. Has there been anything like intentional shoddy workmanship?

Admiral Kelso. Well, we have had a couple of cases in overhaul where we had some cables that were pierced with pins, but that occurred in overhaul and it was found when we tested the systems so it could be corrected. I guess you could interpret that as sabotage. Referring to an operating ship, I don't remember them having issues of sabotage, nor do I remember anyone being successful in boarding any of the ships.

(Senator Warner assumed the chair.] Senator WARNER. Admiral Clark?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. GLEN CLARK, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR,

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE Admiral Clark. I would briefly amplify on the comments Admiral Holland made about the Trident program. I can report that the progress in the Trident II program is indeed good and we are proceeding on the new schedule of introduction of the weapons systems in the ninth Trident submarine and again progress during the advanced development program, of which this is the last year, has been very good.

We are now planning to start the full-scale engineering development at the beginning of fiscal 1984, in October of this year.

Senator WARNER. Admiral Hostettler ?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. S. J. HOSTETTLER, U.S. NAVY, DIREC

TOR, JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE Admiral HOSTETTLER. I lave just a brief comment, sir. The nuclear variant of Tomahawk remains the Navy's No. 1 priority in the Tomahawk program. We are proceeding to support the IOC of that variant in both submarines and surface ships in 1984.

We will go through the development test/operational test (DT/OT) test period this year and I look forward to a successful series of tests during this period.

Senator WARNER. We will now go to questions. The Chair intends to remain here throughout the hearings so I will be happy to defer to my colleagues who may have other commitments.

ACCURACY OF D-5

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask about the accuracy of the D-5 which has an IOC of 1989, as I understand.

This gets involved in the MX issue as one of the possible supplemental factors with the MX, in a land-based version of it.

First of all, what is the accuracy of our missile speaking in operational terms of the fleet.

Admiral HOLLAND. We can't go into that in open session. I may be wrong, Senator, I was told we were in open hearing.

Senator WARNER. We are in open session, but we can move to executive unless anyone has a question.

COMMUNICATIONS Senator GOLDWATER. You touched on communications. Are you still concerned about low frequency communications for submarines and the effect that the different States might have on that project, the States that have denied low frequency antenna structures?

Admiral HOLLAND. No, the extremely low frequency system is being installed now and going forward in a limited deployment in Michigan.

Senator GOLDWATER. How about high frequency VHF? Do you use both of those on submarines?

Admiral HOLLAND. We use high frequency, sir, but that is a standard Navy antenna system or standard Navy communication system and it is not dedicated to strategic services alone.

There are no particular problems in that particular area.

Senator GOLDWATER. What happened to the idea that you studied for a while of using communications with satellites to reflect back down to command ?

Admiral HOLLAND. You mean satellite communications? Yes, we have that ability now and in the improved system.

Senator GOLDWATER. Are you running into the same problems with the other services and everybody who communicates? You buy a piece of equipment today and it is no good tomorrow, is that about the truth?

Admiral HOLLAND. I am not competent to make that judgment. It is not my experience, anyway.

Senator GULDWATER. 'Thank you. I will discuss that later with another witness.

Admiral HOLLAND. All right.

Senator Jackson. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to ask about the accuracy of the D-5, which has an IOC of 1989, as I understand. This gets involved in the MX issue as one of the possible supplemental factors with the MX, in a land-based version of it.

First of all, what is the accuracy of our missile speaking in operational terms of the fleet?

Senator WARNER. We will go into executive session and the question can be answered at that time.

(Whereupon, at 8:23 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Senator WARNER. We are now in executive session, Admiral Holland, so could you please respond to Senator Jackson's question.

Admiral HOLLAND. To answer your question, the present Circular Error Probable (CEP] for C-4 missile is [deleted] feet at 4,000 miles. Our design goal for the D-5 will be to have [deleted] feet at 4,000 miles.

We expect to improve that [deleted] feet in the succeeding 2 or 3 years and I would defer beyond that to Admiral Clark for technical details.

Senator JACKSON. That is a substantial improvement, starting with the original missiles for the fleet. That is [deleted] feet?

Admiral HOLLAND. It is not quite what we set out as the design criteria for C4 when we started to build it. [Deleted] feet was what we started up with.

Senator JACKSON. And you ended up with [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. Yes. Senator Jackson. Let me see, we are talking about a yield on those missiles, of what, of [deleted]. Admiral HOLLAND. No, sir, the D-5 will deploy

[graphic]

Senator JACKSON. No, I mean the C 4.
Admiral HOLLAND. [Deleted) yes, sir.
Senator JACKSON. And then the C-5, or the D-5!
Admiral HOLLAND. [Deleted] at the present time.
Senator Jackson. So that will give you a hard target capability?
Admiral HOLLAND. I am sorry, it is [deleted].
Senator Jackson. That will give you a hard target capability?
Admiral HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. Let me ask you, on cruise missiles, the move now is for a Stealth characteristic to follow ultimately. There is some Stealth characteristics in the original Alcum, but if we are doing that in connection with the air-launch cruise missile, why aren't we doing it on the SLCM's, or the Tomahawk?

Admiral HOSTETTLER. I haven't a good answer for you. I think it is a combination of things.

First of all, the data would indicate that versus current systems the Tomahawk is an extremely survivable weapon so we are talking at some point out in the future.

First, the ALCM mission is somewhat different than the Tomahawk mission. The targets, strategic targets for the ALCM on the initial salvoes are going to be difficult ones. It would seem that the Air Force would have a much more stringent requirement for survivability against those initial targets than would Tomahawk even today.

Tomahawk is a strategic reserve weapon and will not be targeted necesarily against those prime targets and if so, I asume they would be in a followup mode or a backup mode.

Therefore, the survivability requirements of the ALCM are significantly different.

Senator Jackson. I understand one is primarily a nonstrategic operation, that is the Tomahawk, but on the GLCM's, on the groundlaunch cruise missile, are we not moving again for the Stealth characteristics?

This is a system that you do not know how long will remain survivable either.

Admiral HOSTETTLER. Of course, in the case of the GLCM, the survivability of the platform, while not as good as we would have from a submarine launch or a diverse set of surface ships, nonetheless is reasonably survivable.

Ås you know, we deploy from those bases on very short notice, [deleted]. You have a flight going into the field and once in the field we can set up [deleted].

A recent 30-day training exercise at Fort Lewis, Wash., indicated that once deployed, GLCM sites could not be seen by either satellite or TACRECE. During this exercise we moved these units about every 3 days.

We have a firm, survivable site based on what we know now.

DETECTING OUR SUBMARINES

Senator JACKSON. Well, I have one other question, Mr. Chairman.

The advantage of our submarine launch missile effort has been survivability. We hear that the Soviets are making greater and greater

progress in being able to locate our subs and to be able to follow them, maybe not in a precise way, but they have really concentrated heavily in developing a system or systems of detection.

Am I right in that?

Admirał HOLLAND. They are working very, very hard on that. We do not believe that they are particularly successful at it, and we have no instances or evidence that they are particularly successful.

I think the Chief of Naval Operations has put it very succinctly before the Appropriations Committee when he said the oceans are growing more opaque and not less opaque as we learn more about them. We are learning how to build submarines that are quieter than any of their predecessors. The quietest submarine in the world is a Trident submarine. It is very, very difficult to find.

Senator Jackson. How are the relative rates? They are turning out subs with a quieter performance?

Admiral HOLLAND. Than they previously have.
Senator Jackson. It is all relative?
Admiral HOLLAND. Yes, but we are still ahead.
Senator Jackson. We are substantially ahead or where are we?

Admiral Kelso. You are speaking from an acoustics standpoint. We have, Senator, started out in a favorable position from acoustics. Acoustics means you have to have ability to hear with sonar and you have to have a quiet submarine. We have continually improved the submarines that we have built from the standpoint of quietness and we continue to improve the sonar.

Our submarines today have gotten to the point of quietness that our submarines are not a very good adversary to find and locate, particularly in large ocean areas, as are other submarines because they are simply so quiet.

The sonar is not able to overcome it. The U.S.S. Ohio, for example, is probably the quietest submarine we have ever built and probably the quietest submarine in the world. Even with our sonar technology, we can only detect one of our submarines at [deleted] yards. If you take from a vast ocean that you can operate a submarine like that in, [deleted].

We similarly have a difficult job to locate our own submarines, even with our sophisticated ASW capability. This is true particularly when you consider a submarine where the primary job is to stay out of the way and not be detected. So, from the standpoint of ocean search, which is basically what you have to do to put the SSBN force at risk, [deleted].

Acoustics is an interesting area and there is a lot of work going on in nonacoustics. In our SSBN security program we look at the technologies that could come forward in the future and not just those of us in blue suits, but we ask some of the finest scientists in the country to look at those technologies.

What people generally forget, when they think about a technolory, is that just because you have a technology doesn't mean you are able to kill submarines. The equation includes technology, the ocean environment, resources to do it and the ability to execute it, which involves both communications and your ability to make a kill.

Knowing most of those technologies and the scientists whom I know that know those technologies, we do not believe that there is an an

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