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STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. W. J. HOLLAND, JR., U.S. NAVY, DIREC
TOR, STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. FRANK B. KELSO, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SUBMARINE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; REAR ADM. GLEN CLARK, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE; AND REAR ADM. S. J. HOSTETTLER, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE
Admiral HOLLAND. I have submitted a complete detailed statement for the record, which I can summarize briefly with your permission.
In the past year we have put to sea the Ohio which has completed her second patrol. We have excellent performance from the ship and systems and the crew.
The second ship, the Michigan, is in Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and will make her first patrol early in the summer.
The third ship, the Florida, has completed her first two builder's trials. The contract for the 10 Tridents is signed and work is underway.
We have completed the backfit of the Trident I missile on 12 Poseidon hulls. This has been completed and as of this time we have completed 2,138 deterrent patrols in the SSBN program.
In our missile program we are in the third year of the advanced development for the Trident II, the D-5. This missile will have an IOC in late 1989.
Senator GOLDWATER. In 1989?
Admiral HOLLAND. Yes, sir. We will have a higher accuracy and greater payload than the present missile.
The ninth Trident hull and subsequent ships will receive D-5 missile systems during this building period. The first eight ships will be backfitted during their first regularly scheduled overhaul.
The Navy studied the feasibility of accelerating the Trident II program in great detail last year. We decided not to do so because the small improvement in capability was not worth the very large additional near-term costs.
It is no longer technically feasible to accelerate the D-5 program and introduce it earlier than 1989.
As far as our future plans are concerned we could increase the SSBN building rate, but in doing so the results of such an effort would not be evident until 1992 or 1993.
It is the Navy's position we should stay at one hull per year unless there is an urgent need to increase the SLBM capability more rapidly.
We intend to retire the Poseidon submarine force after a normal 30year life, such that by the end of this century all SLBM's will be Tridents and we will have about 20 ships.
The ultimate size of this force is constantly being evaluated and much depends upon decisions made outside the Navy and indeed outside the United States, the development of bombers and other forces. U.S. strategy and objectives, the Soviet threat and character of the Soviet target systems and effectiveness of other strategic forces and arms control considerations.
Finally, the Tomahawk. Recent changes in the cruise missile program have not impacted on the IOC of 1981 for the nuclear land attack l'ersion. This strategic nuclear asset will proliferate a threat not so much in numbers as in geographic scope of the Soviet Union.
The difficulty for Soviet planners to calculate the effect of this force should greatly enhance deterrence. The cruise missile will become a major contributor to our strategic reserve forces.
Our communications program receives high propriety, and although we are not here to specifically address that portion of the program tolay, Admiral Nagler will appear before the committee to discuss it in great detail. Finally, we believe the program we are presenting has a proper
balance and it is not necessary to accelerate at this time. We believe we man produce the Trident II missile with high confidence on time and it will meet the performance goals which we anticipate and which we have set forth for ourselves.
Senator, that completes my summary. I have a more detailed statement.
I will ask my colleagues if they would care to add anything to the -tatement I have made. Admiral Kelso is here.
The prepared statement of Admiral Holland is as follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM J. HOLLAND, JR., U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE DIVISION IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I am Rear Admiral Jerry Holland, the Director of The Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Vaval Operations. My purpose today is to update you on the status of the Navy's seabased strategic deterrent. I appricate the opportunity to once again appear *fore this subcommittee and to participate in your important work.
Before proceeding, allow me to introduce the key people in the Navy's nuclear missile program: Rear Admiral Glenwood Clark, U.S. Navy, the director of the Strategic Systems Project; Rear Admiral Frank Kelso, U.S. Navy, the director of the Strategic Submarine Division; and Rear Admiral Steve Hostettler, U.S. Xavy, the Director of the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office. I will call on them to respond to technical questions the subcommittee might have.
Since my predecessor last testified before the subcommittee in October 1981, the capabilities of our strategic submarine force have increased substantially. The 's Ohio, the first Trident submarine, equipped with 21 long-range Trident I (4) missiles completed her second highly successful deterrent patrol in the Pacific in March of this year. The ship's performance exceeded its design goals in many respects and clearly demonstrated significant improvements in survivability, endurance and turn around time.
The U.S.S. Michigan, which was delivered last August, is presently in a two month post shakedown availability (PSA) at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington. She will depart on her first patrol early this summer.
Florida, the next ship, has just completed her second builders trials and is scheduled for delivery to the Navy on June 30, 1983. The contract for the tenth Trident was signed last November and work is underway.
We have completed retrofit of the Trident I (C4) missile on 12 Poseidon submarines. They, along with 19 Poseidon ships equipped with the C-3 missile, are conducting deterrent patrols from Kings Bay, Georgia, Charleston, South Carolina and Holy Loch, Scotland. Since George Washngton's first patrol in 1960 our ballistic missile submarine force has completed 2,138 patrols, nearly 400 shipSears under the water.
We are now in the third year of an advanced development program directed toward achieving significantly better performance in a new submarine launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) designed to utilize the entire volume of the Ohio class launch tube. Although the final weapon system configuration for the new missile, the Trident II (D-5), will not be selected until later this fiscal year, it will have considerably more payload than the Trident I (C4) missile, a major improvement in accuracy over the C4, and a full-load range comparable to or greater than the C4. This program will lead to a late 1989 IOC, and, for the first time, provide the United States with a survivable strategic missile system which cannot be targeted by enemy missiles and that is effective across the entire target spectrum. The ninth and all subsequent Trident submarines will be delivered with the D-5 missile system. We will then refit the first eight with the new system during their first regularly scheduled overhauls in the 1990's.
Last spring, the Navy studied the feasibility of advancing the IOC of the D-5 missile. It was found that a one year acceleration was technically feasible, but with slight degradation in performance at IOC. Any greater acceleration would have resulted in an unacceptable degradation in missile performance. It was decided not to accelerate but to continue with the 1989 IOC because the additional nenr-term cost for the one year acceleration was not commensurate with the im. provement in military capability that would be achieved. At this late time in system development it is no longer technically feasible to accelerate the missile IOC.
The Trident program that is lefore the Congress reflects President Reagan's strategic modernization program announced in October 1981. It reflects the Ddeployment in 1989 and continuation of building one Trident submarine per year. Although the building rate could be increased, with the long lead times involved we would not be able to realize the results of any increased building rate until 1992 or 1993. Unless there are overriding considerations of national importance with regard to force levels and capabilities, we think continuation at the rate of one year is adequate and prudent.
We plan to retire the 31 Poseidon hulls after they reach a nominal life of 30 years. The first will retire in FY 1993; the last in FY 1999. By the end of the century we plan to have an all Trident D-5 force of about 20 submarines ; a force significantly more capable than that existing now or that will exist in the early 1990s. The ultimate size of the SLMB force depends on a wide range of factors : The overall mix between land-based missiles, lombers and cruise missiles is a major one. Of course, U.S. strategy and objectives, the threat, the character of the enemy target system, nature and effectiveness of other U.S. srategic forces and arms control considerations are also important considerations which could influence this plan. All are being constantly evaluated by the Secretary of Defense and the joint chiefs of staff.
When I testified before this subcommittee on 18 March, I discussed at some length why it is so necessary to maintain the invulnerability of our sea-based deterrent. We have all witnessed the importance of survivability in our continuing search for a survivable basing mode for ICBJs. Survivable nuclear forces significantly enhance crisis stability, allow reduced force levels without compromising national security, ease the achievement of long-term arms reductions, provide confidence to ourselves in the effectiveness of our deterrent and make our strategic policy and doctrine credible to potential enemies. We are confident that the Navy's program with its super quiet Trident submarine and long-range missile will continue to provide this invulnerable element orer the life of the system.
The President's modernization program announced the deployment of Tomahawk nuclear land attack cruise missiles beginning in 1984. These missiles will be deployed on a large number of ships and submarines. This wide distribution of naval offensive strike power will enhance U.S. naval worldwide nuclear force deterrent capability by increasing the number of Soviet pact targets put at risk and introducing another major element of uncertainty into the Soviet military planner's calculus. As specified in President Reagan's strategic modernization program, given the TLAM/N's great survivability and endurance, they will become a major contributor to our nuclear reserve forces.
Subsequent to an intensive program review (completed in November 1982), significant funding shortfalls and technical problems were identified that required a restructuring of the Tomahawk program. These necessary program changes were structured so as not to impact the schedule of the nuclear Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM/N). Approval of the TLAM/N for full production requires certification of the TLAM/N missile itself, the theater mission
planning system (TUPS), and the ship/submarine platforms on which it will be eployed. This effort is currently ongoing and will continue into 1984 in supuit of the 1981 initial operational capability for both the submarine and sursce platforms. Also in support of the effort, the following major events either Lare or will occur: Tomahawk weapon system performance base line frozen-October 1982. Theater mission planning system certified-spring 1983. Submarine/ship operational eraluation-summer/fall 1983. l'roduction of missions in support of operational deployments—1983 and on. In summary, the Navy's Tomahawk nuclear land attack effort remains on schedule in full support of the President's program for nuclear land attack cruise sissiles.
The Navy heartily endorses the top priority given to improvement of command, control and communications in the President's modernization program. Our guidng principle in C modernization is to insure that the SLBM force is responsive to the needs of the national command authority. Vice Admiral Gordon Nagler, "he Director, Command and Control for the Navy, will appear before this subfunmittee to discuss C in greater detail.
The Vary believes that our strategic program represents the proper balance between the needs of our strategic forces and those of the general purpose forces. Although we do not feel it necessary or desirable, the program could be expanded. It is important to realize, however, that the results of such an expansion or acpleration would not be felt until the early 1990s. We are confident that the Trident II 1-5 missile can be produced on time and will achieve the desired performance. When matched with the highly capable Trident submarine and improvemients in C, the SLBJI force will provide the cornerstone of our strategic deterrent well into the next century. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. FRANK B. KELSO, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SUBMARINE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral Kelso. It is a pleasure to appear before this committee. I would like to add that the third ship of the Trident class, the Florida, has just completed her second set of builder's trials and they have been very successful.
Following on after her sister ships, the U.S.S. Ohio and the U.S.S. Michigan, that ship is due to be delivered this summer, in June. It is possible she might deliver a little earlier, so the shipbuilding program las vastly changed in the last couple of years. It looks like the Trident hips are going to be delivered pretty much on the schedule that we now have, sir.
We have essentially completed the backfit of 12 Poseidon class ships with a Trident I or C-4 missile. The last ship will deploy in the early spring of this year after her training. So that program is essentially complete. We only intend to backfit 12 of those ships with the longer range missile.
Also, I rould like to say that from a standpoint of survivability, the Navy strongly believes that the force is survivable today. We don't see anything on the horizon that would tell us we can't learn to operate the submarines correctly to maintain that survivability as far as We can see in the future. So, we believe strongly that this is a survivable force and tre can sustain its survivability. That, sir, is my short stateSenator Couen. It may be survivable at sea, but what are you doing about protecting the Electric Boat yard?
Admiral KELSO. Senator, Electric Boat has upgraded her security forces significantly since their last case of intrusion by protestors. We are looking throughout the Navy shipyard organizations to see what we can do to strengthen the security of all of those organizations.
Senator COHEN. What we saw last year was a situation where there was relatively little or incomplete security in most of our yards.
Admiral KELSO. Yes.
Senator Cohen. We had some nuns paddling a canoe to the yard and on last night's television show we saw that terrorists can be a little more sophisticated. When you have a group of nuns paddling in and putting a mine in one of those ships, it is not that survivable.
Admiral Kelso. Well, we agree. Through our studies we try to improve the security in all of those yards. In Electric Boat specifically there has been a fence put in and patrols have been established on the waterfront that were not there before.
We have had two occasions in recent times in Electric Boat where unauthorized people have gotten into the shipyard.
In the first one they were not detected for some time and the second time I think they were all detected within about 15 minutes and apprehended at the time they entered the yard.
The guard force at Electric Boat has been stepped up by 20 or 30 additional people since that time and we have put an additional watch on the ships topside before they are turned over to the Navy.
Gates have been put on the slins' brows ard there is a check system where you can only get on by knowing how to get in. We have put various materials around the stern of the ships so that they cannot be boarded nearly as easily in the water.
So, we have taken significant steps at Electric Boat to try to improve security. I think that you are talking about an area that probably requires a lot of upgrading if we are going to be able to have good security throughout our military installations where you have large perimeters, to prevent anyone from coming in.
Senator Cohen. I am not saying it is entirely possible. I think it is academic.
Admiral Kelso. It is an issue that we are studying how to do better. We are looking at the use of dogs, which they are now using on the weekends, and we are looking at movement devices to detect movement to see if they are practical to use. It turns out that you run into a lot of false alarms with them, particularly where you have lengths of fencing where there is wildlife. We are studying how to improve our security.
Senator Couen. I think these are the types of demonstrations that are going to intensify and increase in the coming months.
Admiral KELSO. Yes.
Senator GOLDWATER. Could I ask a question on that just for my information ?
How do you share the responsibility of security with the manufacturers? Is that totally a Navy job?
Admiral Kelso. No, sir, it is a shared responsibility with primary reliance on the shipbuilder's security before the ship is delivered to the Navy. He owns the ship and he is responsible for the security, and within the contract there is a stipulation that he has responsibility