blity of providing communications [deleted] through thick clouds and dirty water at noon. This test, if successful, could permit one-way communication to Lore [deleted] under more benigh conditions. Lasers for eventual use in space have demonstrated [deleted] is planned this year. Both XeCL and HgBr have demonstrated electrical efficiencies [deleted]. New solid-state laser ideas are eginning to surface which may offer as niuch as [deteled] systems efficiency as Tell as providing a substantially simplified engineering development path for se in a spacecraft. For the mirror satellite approach, novel adaptive optics ystems offering more than [deleted] have been demonstrated. Single pulse laser energies of [deleted] twice that required for the mirror satellite approach, have een achieved by Raman converting the output of a [deleted] Xenon Fluoride Laser to blue-green wavelengths. Progress has also been made in developing the repetitive pulse technologies required to achieve the [deleted] of average power required for this approach. Adaptive optics and atmospheric compensation have been demonstrated in field experiments with a 70 channel system. Tight beams [deleted] times diffraction limited have been demonstrated on a horizontal ath, and tests to aircraft begin later this year. Deformable, controllable space rror technology has been demonstrated successfully in half-scale breadboards a competitive effort. However, it is unlikely that this high-risk, high-cost hnology could provide an operational space-based laser communications sysem for submarines until the mid to late [deleted].

STATUS OF BLUE-GREEN LASER COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. What major technical milestones and performance demonrations have been accomplished so far in this program, and which remain? Mr. LATHAM. In addition to technical accomplishments achieved during this ast year, the most significant demonstration of SLC performance to date is the SLCAIR-81 experiment. In that experiment, [deleted]. The maximum depth at hich communication was achieved under nighttime condition was [deleted]. Suc ́s of individual runs were highly dependent on aircraft positioning [deleted]. The equipment could not generate sufficient power [deleted] and with the aircraft single mile off track, [deleted]. These results [deleted].

Remaining technical issues in SLCAIR tactical communications will be adssed during the SLCAIR-84 experiments. The feasibility of the mirror satelTe approach will be resolved by [deleted]. This involves demonstration of the inology required for a high quality, [deleted] average power blue-green laser ransmitter, and turbulence compensation of a low power uplink beam through he full atmosphere.

An end-to-end mirror satellite experiment at full power which would address maining technology integration issues, might be initiated as early as [deleted]. The remaining technical issues in the laser satellite approach will be addressed } {deleted]. These technical issues relate primarily to the demonstration of rele, long-lived, efficient blue-green lasers compatible with satellite deployment. It should be pointed out however, that even if technically successful, it is not all clear that we should proceed to develop and deploy such a communitions system. We are actively pursuing other options for surviving, enduring launications for submarines such as reconstitutable ELF and VLF plus HILSTAR.

FUNDING FOR BLUE-GREEN LASER COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. Provide the fiscal year 1984-88 funding profile for this program both the Navy budget and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency get-in both fiscal year 1984 (constant) and current dollars.

Mr. LATHAM. The current funding profile in then-year dollars to be provided * DARPA through the fiscal year 1985 decision is as follows: Fiscal year 198400; fiscal year 1985-19,000.

The DARPA funding for fiscal year [deleted] and beyond will depend on hether the SLCSAT mirror satellite or laser satelliite approach, if either, is **ted for further development. If either the mirror satellite or laser satellite Troach is chosen, significant additional funds would be required in fiscal year eted] and beyond to proceed with the SLCSAT experiment. An actual full ellite experiment may cost as much as $500 million and funding of several bildollars would be necessary for an operational space-based laser communica›ns system.

SCHEDULE FOR BLUE-GREEN LASER COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. Under this funding profile, when will the remaining major milestones and performance demonstrations be accomplished?

Mr. LATHAM. The next major milestone, the SLCAIR-84 technology demonstration, leading to a [deleted]. [Deleted] will be accomplished during fiscal year 19-4. Within the current DARPA funding, the level of technology demonstrated by [deleted].

[Deleted] of an SLC satellite communication experiment based upon the relay mirror satellite concept. A decision to proceed with the laser satellite concept could not be made until at least 2 years later and would depend on development of long-lived, reliable space-based blue-green lasers. If either the mirror satellite or laser satellite approach is chosen, significant additional funds would be required in [deleted] and beyond.

ACCELERATION OF BLUE-GREEN LASER COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. Under an accelerated program assuming Congress provides the sufficient funding, what is the earliest each of these major milestones and performance demonstrations could be accomplished?

Mr. LATHAM. The SLCAIR-84 demonstration program is fully funded under the DARPA program and could not be accelerated by additional funding. Likewise, technology development through the decision milestones for proceeding to the SLC mirror or laser satellite experiment is technology, rather than funding, limited, and could not be accelerated by additional funding.

CONSTRAINTS ON BLUE-GREEN LASER COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. Is the present program constrained by technology or funding/ affordability reasons?

Mr. LATHAM. The present program through the [deleted] SLCSAT decision milestone is constrained by technology development and represents a prudent balance between technology risk and program pace.

UTILITY OF BLUE-GREEN LASER COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. Is it not true that the blue-green laser communication system has great potential to provide both our strategic ballistic missile and attack submarines with a survivable high data rate message transmission system?

Mr. LATHAM. Given time for development and maturation of the SLC technology, a blue-green laser communication has potential to eventually provide oneway message transmission to both strategic and tactical nuclear submarines. Although the instantaneous data rate would be high, operational system considerations would significantly reduce the effective data throughput capacity of the bluegreen laser system. The laser communication system could be as survivable as any other synchronous orbit satellite communication system provided [deleted]. It is important to note however, that both of the current spaced-based laser communications approaches will be very costly. This is caused by the system complexity and [deleted].

[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984

MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1983

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AND

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

SEA-BASED DETERRENT

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 8:04 , in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Senators Warner, Goldwater, Cohen, and Jack

Staff present: Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. and Patrick L. Renehan, prosional staff members; James G. Roche, minority staff director; and Karen A. Love, staff assistant.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Min Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant Senator Cohen; and Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon.

Senator GOLDWATER [presiding]. The meeting will come to order. I will read a short statement by Senator Warner, who is chairman the subcommittee.

The subcommittee reconvenes today to take testimony on the contution of our sea-based strategic forces to the maintenance of a credle, balanced deterrent. Our witnesses represent various aspects of the vy's nuclear capabilities: Strategic policy, nuclear submarines, seanched ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

Our witnesses today representing these various perspectives are Rear Alm. W. J. Holland, Jr., Director of Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare; Rear Adm. Frank B. Kelso, Director of the Strategic Subrine Division; Rear Adm. Glen Clark, Director of the Strategic stems Project Office; and Rear Adm. S. J. Hostettler, Director of the nt Cruise Missile Project Office.

Admiral Holland, we welcome you and your colleagues to this hear

You may proceed as you see fit. As you know, we allow you to testify is you care to or put your complete statement in the record as read.

(2523)

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. W. J. HOLLAND, JR., U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. FRANK B. KELSO, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SUBMARINE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; REAR ADM. GLEN CLARK, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE; AND REAR ADM. S. J. HOSTETTLER, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE

Admiral HOLLAND. I have submitted a complete detailed statement for the record, which I can summarize briefly with your permission. In the past year we have put to sea the Ohio which has completed her second patrol. We have excellent performance from the ship and systems and the crew.

The second ship, the Michigan, is in Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and will make her first patrol early in the summer.

The third ship, the Florida, has completed her first two builder's trials. The contract for the 10 Tridents is signed and work is underway. We have completed the backfit of the Trident I missile on 12 Poseidon hulls. This has been completed and as of this time we have completed 2,138 deterrent patrols in the SSBN program.

In our missile program we are in the third year of the advanced development for the Trident II, the D-5. This missile will have an IOC in late 1989.

Senator GOLDWATER. In 1989?

Admiral HOLLAND. Yes, sir. We will have a higher accuracy and greater payload than the present missile.

The ninth Trident hull and subsequent ships will receive D-5 missile systems during this building period. The first eight ships will be backfitted during their first regularly scheduled overhaul.

The Navy studied the feasibility of accelerating the Trident II program in great detail last year. We decided not to do so because the small improvement in capability was not worth the very large additional near-term costs.

It is no longer technically feasible to accelerate the D-5 program and introduce it earlier than 1989.

As far as our future plans are concerned we could increase the SSBN building rate, but in doing so the results of such an effort would not be evident until 1992 or 1993.

It is the Navy's position we should stay at one hull per year unless there is an urgent need to increase the SLBM capability more rapidly.

We intend to retire the Poseidon submarine force after a normal 30year life, such that by the end of this century all SLBM's will be Tridents and we will have about 20 ships.

The ultimate size of this force is constantly being evaluated and much depends upon decisions made outside the Navy and indeed outside the United States, the development of bombers and other forces. U.S. strategy and objectives, the Soviet threat and character of the Soviet target systems and effectiveness of other strategic forces and arms control considerations.

TOMAHAWK MISSILE

Finally, the Tomahawk. Recent changes in the cruise missile proTam have not impacted on the IOC of 1984 for the nuclear land attack ersion. This strategic nuclear asset will proliferate a threat not so nch in numbers as in geographic scope of the Soviet Union.

The difficulty for Soviet planners to calculate the effect of this force Should greatly enhance deterrence. The cruise missile will become a major contributor to our strategic reserve forces.

Our communications program receives high propriety, and although ve are not here to specifically address that portion of the program toay, Admiral Nagler will appear before the committee to discuss it n great detail.

Finally, we believe the program we are presenting has a proper balnce and it is not necessary to accelerate at this time. We believe we an produce the Trident II missile with high confidence on time and will meet the performance goals which we anticipate and which we are set forth for ourselves.

Senator, that completes my summary. I have a more detailed state

ent.

I will ask my colleagues if they would care to add anything to the statement I have made.

Admiral Kelso is here.

The prepared statement of Admiral Holland is as follows:]

REPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM J. HOLLAND, JR., U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE DIVISION IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I am Rear Admiral Jerry Holland, the Director of "e Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. My purpose today is to update you on the status of the Navy's abased strategic deterrent. I appricate the opportunity to once again appear -fore this subcommittee and to participate in your important work. Before proceeding, allow me to introduce the key people in the Navy's nuclear ssile program: Rear Admiral Glenwood Clark, U.S. Navy, the director of the rategic Systems Project; Rear Admiral Frank Kelso, U.S. Navy, the director the Strategic Submarine Division; and Rear Admiral Steve Hostettler, U.S. Navy, the Director of the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office. I will call on them respond to technical questions the subcommittee might have.

Since my predecessor last testified before the subcommittee in October 1981, e capabilities of our strategic submarine force have increased substantially. The S.S. Ohio, the first Trident submarine, equipped with 24 long-range Trident I (4) missiles completed her second highly successful deterrent patrol in the Pacific in March of this year. The ship's performance exceeded its design goals in ny respects and clearly demonstrated significant improvements in survivaty, endurance and turn around time.

The U.S.S. Michigan, which was delivered last August, is presently in a two nth post shakedown availability (PSA) at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington. She will depart on her first patrol early this summer. Florida, the next ship, has just completed her second builders trials and is heduled for delivery to the Navy on June 30, 1983. The contract for the tenth Indent was signed last November and work is underway.

We have completed retrofit of the Trident I (C-4) missile on 12 Poseidon marines. They, along with 19 Poseidon ships equipped with the C-3 missile, re conducting deterrent patrols from Kings Bay, Georgia, Charleston, South arolina and Holy Loch, Scotland. Since George Washngton's first patrol in 1960 Er ballistic missile submarine force has completed 2,138 patrols, nearly 400 shipCears under the water.

We are now in the third year of an advanced development program directed toward achieving significantly better performance in a new submarine launched