satellite connectivity and cryptographic equipment that is hardened against EMP. An early operational capability is planned for fiscal year [deleted] and will include many users [deleted]. A [deleted] conferencing capability that will include [deleted] locations is planned by the fiscal year [deleted] timeframe.

EMBEDDED COMPUTER SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION

Senator WARNER. Secretary Latham: Would you describe the status of the review being performed pursuant to congressional action last year concerning embedded computer systems standardization? Please provide in detail the options under review and their relative merits and deficiencies.

Mr. LATHAM. The study directed by Congress as a part of the fiscal year 1983 Defense Authorization Act has been underway since November 1982. It is being conducted by a team from the three Military Departments and the OSD staff. A rough draft report has been prepared and the target for completion is April 15, 1983.

The study is addressing the six issues posed in the Conference Report, namely: (a) A full assessment of the applicability of commercial computer technology including, but not limited to computer hardware, semiconductors and associated ISA's to Defense Department missions.

(b) The desirability of standardization at ISA level in light of alternative approaches, including those taking advantage of the technology mentioned in paragraph (a).

(c) The degree of software transportability (transferring computer programs from one computer to another) that the various approaches permit and how each approach would affect Department of Defense hardware/software logistics support requirements and the cost of computer system ownership.

(d) An assessment of the relative merits and liabilities involved in the incorporation of each approach into Department of Defense weapons systems. (e) A justification for all on-going service computer development projects including but not liimted to the Army's Military Computer Family and other Army computers, the Navy's AN/UYK-43/44, the AN/UYK-7, the AN/UYK-20 and all Air Force computers including the family military-standard 1750 ISA computers.

(f) A plan to reduce the proliferation of these computers.

Among the options under review are: No standardization; Standardization only at the High Order Language (HOL) level; standardization at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level; standardization on a limited number of external attributes; form, fit and function (F-cubed) standardization; box-level hardware standardization; module-level standardization; and total product standardization.

The relative merits and deficiencies of these approaches and various combinations of them will be included in the report which will be delivered to the Congress. It is not possible to provide the detail you request in advance of completion of the study.

STREAMLINING MISSION-CRITICAL COMPUTER PROCUREMENTS

Senator WARNER. Secretary Latham: Wou'd you describe for the record progress which has been made in the aftermath of the committee's initiative concerning the streamlining of critical mission related computer procurements? What steps have been taken to implement this initiative:

Mr. LATHAM. In February 1981, the Department issued preliminary guidelines which informed the acquiring activities in the Department of the change in our authority relative to computer acquisition. l'articular note was made that the essential test as to whether such acquisitions were to be under 10 U.S.C. 2315 or 40 U.S.C. 759 is the functional usage of the equipment and services, and not their commercial marketplace availability. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering was named the senior official in the context of Section 2315.

Language in the committee's report on the fiscal year 1983 Defense Authoriza tion Act clarified the intent of Congress with respect to this exemption. Wit!: that clarification and in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, the guidelines were revised and reissued on March, 1983. A copy of the revised guidelines has been provided to the Committee. At that time, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering delegated the responsibilities of Senior

Official for Mission Critical Computer Resources (MCCR) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology. He further directed "at a Defense Computer Resources Board be established under the MCCR SenOfficial. This Board will serve in policy oversight role for determinations of exempt status under 10 USC 2315. This latter action will be implemented as part of a current update to DOD Directive 5000.29, "Management of Computer Rewinrces in Major Defense Systems."

ECX/TACAMO

Senator WARNER. Would you comment at this time briefly, and in greater deail for the record, on the reasons for which the Navy found unacceptable the solicited proposal submitted by the Lockheed Corporation which called for cancellation of the ECX program and the procurement instead of modified EC-130 aircraft.

Admiral NAGLER. On March 11, 1982, the Naval Air Systems Command issued Request for Quotation (RFQ), No. N00019-82-Q-0014, expressly to obtain an FCX Weapon System. The ECX Weapon System, as defined by the RFQ, is an ectromagnetic pulse hardened aircraft serving as a platform for the AN/USCmission Airborne Very Low Frequency Communication System. Both the rcraft and the communications system comprise the ECX Weapon System. The RFQ permitted an offerer to submit deviations from the type specifications 1s long as reasons for the deviations were included in the quote. Lockheed did at respond to the RFQ. On 30 June 1982, Lockheed submitted an unsolicited Roposal to CNO for a preplanned product improvement to the EC-130. On 9 August 1982, the Lockheed proposal, with a covering letter from the Chief of The Naval Material Command, was returned to the President of the Georgiakheed Company, explaining that it did not meet the criteria of an unsolicited posal as delineated in the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) and other licable Naval instructions. The Lockheed proposal was submitted as "unsoBeted," but section 4-904 of the DAR defines an unsolicited proposal as a written offer to perform a proposed task or effort, initiated and submitted to Government by a prospective contractor (offerer) without a solicitation by Government, with the objective of obtaining a contract." In addition, Naval A Systems Command Instruction 4200.8B provides that a proposal shall not be emed "unsolicited" when it (1) is merely a normal development or extension an existing Department of Defense Program, or (2) the designation "unsoited proposal" is applied for the apparent purpose of avoiding competition. proposal submitted by Lockheed addressed the Government's requirement deeated in the RFQ and, thus, the Department of the Navy cannot treat the prosal as "unsolicited." The Government cannot consider a proposal for a requireat separately, when that requirement is the subject of an ongoing competin. Consideration of the proposal would be unfair to the companies who readed to the solicitation and would greatly jeopardize the integrity of the cometitive process.

Additionally, an operational assessment of this proposal by the Office of the ef of Naval Operations revealed numerous discrepancies, errors and unsupted assumptions thus avoiding the unsolicited proposals conclusions. Senator WARNER. Are you concerned that it may prove to be impossible to eport the [deleted] airborne alert posture in the Atlantic until such time as new ECX aircraft is introduced into the inventory?

Admiral NAGLER. I fully expect TACAMO to continue its outstanding performe in the Atlantic throughout the transition to ECX. The Atlantic TACAMO adron began supporting the JCS 100 percent airborne mission in September 3. Since 1973 there has been [deleted] continuous Atlantic coverage. There will 20 more severe conditions during the upcoming transition period than there ve been in the past.

Senator WARNER. Operational commanders have indicated concerns along these What steps are planned by the Navy to alleviate this problem?

Admiral NAGLER. The OPNAV staff along with the Naval Air Systems Command Te arranged a schedule for depot level maintenance [deleted]. This is an accept⚫ level that can be supported by each squadron without jeopardizing the misThe Fleet CINCS have personally agreed to this plan.

Senator WARNER. Would a further buy of EC-130 aircraft to insure an ability Support uninterrupted coverage in the Atlantic over the next few years be dvisable?

Admiral NAGLER. Purchase of additional performance, weight, speed and range limited EC-130s and companion communication suites would not see delivery until 1987 and would be too late to be of any assistance in the transition from EC-130 to ECX.

EXTREMELY LOW FREQUENCY (ELF)

Senator WARNER. You testified that the ELF system was performing according to mathematical predictions of its capability. Isn't it the case that the deployment sites selected have actually been shown to be capable of projecting an ELF transmitted message over a substantially greater area than had previously been thought possible with a system this size?

Admiral NAGLER. Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) system performance has been predicted on a worst case basis for [deleted] time availability throughout the required submarine operating areas. This performance is based on a submarine at a keel depth [deleted] and a speed [deleted]. Changes in depth. speed. range, and atmospheric noise which create excess signal strength provide added oprational flexibility to extend heading capabilities or expand receiving envelope factors. In such cases, ELF messages have indeed been received in areas outside the mathematically predicted, “worst case” area of reception contours. U.S.S. Ohio (SSBN 726) had an experimental ELF receiver installed for her first Trident patrol in 1982. ELF reception occurred [deleted] percent of the time irrespective of the ship's heading. [Deleted] ELF messages were received [deleted] and this with only a partial ELF transmitting capability in operation.

CUBAN JAMMER SYSTEM

Senator WARNER. How long has there been a jammer based on Cuban soil? What do we know about its capabilities? Is it currently interfering with any of our C3 activities?

Admiral TоMB. [Deleted.]

EMP HARDNESS OF ANMCC ANTENNAS

Senator WARNER. What percentage of the Alternate National Military Command Center's Antennas would we expect to lose as a result of EMP effects? Are steps planned to rectify this deficiency?

Admiral Toмв. [Deleted.]

SOVIET SPACE MINES

Senator WARNER. What can you tell the committee about Soviet capabilities with respect to space mines as a means of threatening our critical space-based C3 assets?

Admiral TOMB. The deployment of a space mine is certainly within Soviet technological capabilities. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. Is it believed that the Soviet Union possesses today the necessary technology? Do you personally feel that such a space mine anti-satellite capability exists in the Soviet inventory/is deployed in orbit?

Admiral TOMB. The Soviets have the necessary technology to employ a space mine. [Deleted.]

OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS

Senator WARNER. What steps are planned to try to make the evacuation of the President [deleted] system in the event of an attack more efficient, and consequently, more likely to succeed in its mission of insuring the survivability of the National Command Authority?

Admiral TOMB. [Deleted.]

ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE

Senator WARNER. What would be involved in the Soviet Union acquiring a capability? Are they believed to have such a capability today? Would we expect to have any high-confidence indicators that such a capability has, in fact, been deployed in the Soviet arsenal?

Admiral TOMB. [Deleted.]

PAVE PAWS EMP HARDNESS

Senator WARNER. How hard against EMP effects is the PAVE PAWS radar ystem?

General RANDOLPH. [Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. In the event that these radars are shut down due to power failure as a result of EMP effects, would they be brought back on-line by an ergency standby power system? How long would it take before the system as returned to operation under such circumstances?

General RANDOLPH. If the system were at an [deleted].

If we were not on backup power, and a commercial power outage were to occur for any reason, [deleted].

MILSTAR TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH CONFERENCING CAPABILITY

Senator WARNER. General Randolph, I understand that problems have develped of a technical nature with respect to the conference system planned for the MILSTAR satellite. Is there indeed such a problem?

Have the sources of this problem been identified and when do you anticipate orrective action will be taken to rectify these problems?

General RANDOLPH. As can best be determined by the MILSTAR Joint Proram Office and Joint Terminal Program Office, no technical problems exist in The conferencing system planned for MILSTAR. All MILSTAR terminals will se common secure voice equipment, the Advanced Narrow-band Digital Voice Terminal (ANDVT). This will insure that full cross service compatibility is achieved.

MILSTAR PRIORITY

Senator WARNER. In years past, the Committee has sought assurances that the MILSTAR program remains a high priority and enjoys unflagging support of its various prospective users. Would the panel speak to this question both in terms of its support for the revised MILSTAR schedule and the priority each Panel member assigns to the funding and deployment of this highly costly sys

em?

General RANDOLPH. MILSTAR enjoys a high degree of visibility and support. To date, most of the funds requested for MILSTAR have been approved. Furtherzore, the Secretary of Defense recently accorded MILSTAR the highest priority ever given to a C3I program. Formerly this priority was reserved for high visibily weapons programs such as the MX, Trident submarine, B-1 bomber, and the ise missile program. The revised schedule has not changed this priority. MILSTAR remains the highest priority C'I program.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

EMP AND C CAPABILITIES

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Latham, currently in the press, there has been a great peal of discussion of the effects of electromagnetic pulse. This phenomenon can ve disastrous effects on C3 capabilities. Would you assess for the Committee ar present vulnerability to electromagnetic pulse?

Mr. LATHAM. A large percentage of our critical communications systems are pendent on the leased telephone circuits. The leased telephone system is not Cordened to electromagnetic pulse (EMP). A large analysis and test effort was ducted by various DOD agencies to assess the EMP vulnerability of the leased Telephone during the 1970's. The basic conclusion that came out of these efforts s that the EMP vulnerability of the leased telephone system is [deleted]. DNA ecommends that we (1) use what is remaining of the existing system (if we R); (2) where serious vulnerabilities can be readily identified, consider fixing ; and. (3) identify and provide high confidence (unarguably survivable) Terlay systems which contain proliferated nodes, each hardened to EMP, conected by links that are immune to nuclear weapons effects-such as the GroundAre Emergency Network (GWEN) or other hardened systems.

Today, in the CONUS, we have a very limited number of [deleted]. MILSTAR s another example.

For local area communication, EMP hardening is considerably simpler and, in many cases, can be accomplished by command initiative. [Deleted.]

The EMP vulnerability of aircraft, including helicopter systems, [deleted]. Studies that have been conducted by DOD agencies and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to predict failures in the national power grid due to EMP. The extent of these failures is not well understood. [Deleted.] In summary, there are demonstrated vulnerabilities associated with C3, aircraft and power systems. Without specific evaluation and sometimes testing of systems involved, it is only possible to address these issues in a general way. For any mission analysis, it is necessary to consider the EMP vulnerabilities of all the systems involved in mission performance, as well as systems that may indirectly affect mission performance (that is, aircraft, power systems, etc.).

MX BASING

Senator THURMOND. There is a great deal of doubt as to whether the President's MX plan will survive. How much of the money in the fiscal year 1984 budget for C is tied to some form of MX basing?

Mr. LATHAM. The Peacekeeper missile system is required to redress the current strategic imbalance and an appropriate basing mode is expected to be selected by the executive branch and the Congress. The fiscal year 1984 budget request is structured to protect a fiscal year 1986 initial operational capability for the Peacekeeper in a closely-spaced basing (CSB) mode. R&D and Procurement funding is required for MX C3 in the amount of [deleted]. These funds are all carried within the total request for Peacekeeper. No funds requested for C3 for Peacekeeper are carried outside the Peacekeeper program. While currently structured around the C3 required for CSB, all, or a significant portion, of these funds will be required to support whatever basing mode is finally selected; and hence, any adjustment of the fiscal year 1984 C3 budget for Peacekeeper should await the basing mode decision.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Latham, of interest to the Committee are Soviet capabilities in anti-satellite weapons systems. These weapons pose a rather significant threat to some of our satellite systems. Would you assess the Soviet capabilities for us and describe for us what measures we are taking to protect our C3 systems in the future?

Mr. LATHAM. At the present time, the Soviets only have a low altitude coorbital anti-satellite system [deleted]. We believe that this phased approach will provide MILSTAR with an excellent survivability capability for a very long time. Similar survivability upgrades are also being examined for DSCS III and other satellites such as DSP, GPS, and others.

MX BASING

Senator THURMOND. If the United States were to move toward some form of mobile small intercontinental ballistic missile system, as suggested by certain members of Congress, what would be the effect on our C program?

Mr. LATHAM. Our current C3 program could be adapted to deployment of a small mobile missile. The amount of change and specific programmatic redirection would depend heavily on the deployment concept, operational concepts for the missiles employment, and the geographical dispersion of these missiles. Specific C concepts will have to await a firmer definition of the system, its deployment, and its operational concept.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

PROGRESS IN BLUE-GREEN LASER COMMUNICATION PROGRAM

Senator LEVIN. Since last year, what progress has been made in developing a blue-green laser system-either satellite or ground-based-to communicate with strategic ballistic missile and attack submarines?

Mr. LATHAM. During the past year, equipment fabrication was initiated for 1984 aircraft-to-submarine laser communication tests to investigate the feasi